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ARTICLE
Donald E. Campbell
The Paragraph 20 Paradox:
An Evaluation of the Enforcement of
Ethical Rules As Substantive Law
Abstract. This Article addresses an issue courts across the country continue
to struggle with: When are ethics rules appropriately considered enforceable
substantive obligations, and when should they only be enforceable through the
disciplinary process? The question is complicated by the ethics rules
themselves. Paragraph 20 of the Scope section of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct includes seemingly contradictory guidance; it states the
Rules are not to be used to establish civil liability, but also that they can be
“some evidence” of a violation of a lawyer’s standard of care. Most states have
adopted this paradoxal Paragraph 20 language. Consequently, courts are left to
determine when ethics rules should be excluded from consideration in
substantive disputes, and when they should be admitted as “some evidence” of
a substantive violation. This is the “paradox” this Article addresses—the
Paragraph 20 paradox.
Author. Donald E. Campbell is an Associate Professor of Law at the
Mississippi College School of Law in Jackson, Mississippi where he teaches
classes in professional responsibility & ethics as well as property-related
courses. He is the author of Ethics and Professional Responsibility for Mississippi
Lawyers and Judges (LexisNexis 2015) along with the late Professor Jeffrey
Jackson, as well as a textbook entitled Professional Responsibility & Ethics: Readings,
Notes & Questions (3d ed. Great Hall Press 2017). He frequently speaks to
lawyers and judges on ethics.

252

ARTICLE CONTENTS
I. Introduction ...................................................................... 254
II. History of the Paragraph 20 Paradox ........................... 256
A. The Origin of the Model Rules................................ 259
B. The Model Rules Evolve .......................................... 269
III. Understanding the Paragraph 20 Paradox ................... 280
IV. Establishing the Line: Enforcement of Ethics
Rules As Substantive Law .............................................. 285
A. Ethics Rules Do Not Create a Separate Cause
of Action ..................................................................... 290
B. Three Approaches As to Whether Ethics Rules
May Be Cited in Legal Negligence (Malpractice)
and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims..................... 292
1. The Michigan Approach: Breach Creates a
Rebuttable Presumption of a Violation of
Standard of Care/Conduct ................................ 294
2. The Alabama Approach: Ethics Rules Are
Irrelevant to Establishing Lawyer’s Standard
of Care/Conduct ................................................. 295
3. Massachusetts Approach: Ethics Rules
Provide “Some Evidence” of Standard
of Care/Conduct ................................................. 296
C. Use of Ethical Rules As a Defense to a Claim ...... 300
D. Use of Ethical Rules in Other Substantive
Contexts ...................................................................... 310
E. Use of Ethics Rules in Disqualification
Disputes ....................................................................... 311
F. Use of Ethics Rules in Claims by an Opponent
Against a Lawyer ........................................................ 316

253

254

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 8:252

V.

Evaluating Ethical Rules As Stating a Jurisdiction’s
“Public Policy” ................................................................. 322
A. Adopting the Ethics Rules As a Whole As the
Public Policy of the Jurisdiction .............................. 323
B. Analyzing Individual Rules As Statements of
Public Policy ............................................................... 327
VI. Conclusion: A Summary ................................................. 332

I. INTRODUCTION
Consider two cases. In the first, a lawyer enters into a fee-sharing
agreement with a non-lawyer who assists in certain cases. Once the cases
settle, the lawyer refuses to honor the agreement and the non-lawyer sues.
The court holds that, because the agreement is unethical (sharing fees with
non-lawyers), the agreement is void and unenforceable. In the second
case—on very similar facts—the court holds that, even though such a
fee-sharing agreement violates the ethical rules, it is not unenforceable.
These cases demonstrate a difficult issue courts across the country deal
with: Are the rules of ethics also rules of substantive law?1 In other words,
when can a party put forward the prohibitions (or mandates) in the rules of
ethics to bring or defeat a claim? Similar issues arise in other contexts as
well, such as in legal malpractice claims, breach of fiduciary claims, and
motions to disqualify counsel.
Paragraph 20 in the Scope section of the American Bar Association
(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)—which most
states have adopted—provides that a violation of the Model Rules “should
not give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer[,] nor should it create any
1. See Stratagene v. Parsons Behle & Latimer, 315 F. Supp. 2d 765, 774 (D. Md. 2004) (“Given
the limitations on this court’s function to find and apply Maryland law, not to create it, the court must
conclude that [the Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct] does not [have the force of law].”); see also
Karas v. Katten Muchin Rosenman L.L.P., No. 07–1545–CV, 2009 WL 38898, slip op. at *2 (2d Cir.
Jan. 8, 2009) (“[T]here is no private right of action for a violation of a New York Disciplinary Rule.”
(citing William Kaufman Org. v. Graham & James, L.L.P., 703 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (App. Div. 2000);
Mergler v. Crystal Props. Assocs., Ltd., 583 N.Y.S.2d 229, 233 (App. Div. 1992))). But see
Welsh v. Case, 43 P.3d 445, 452 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (“Disciplinary rules, together with statutes and
common-law principles relating to fiduciary relationships, all help define the duty component of the
fiduciary duty owed by a lawyer to a client.” (citing Kidney Ass’n of Or., Inc. v. Ferguson, 843 P.2d
442, 446 n.12 (Or. 1992))).
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presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.”2 At the
same time, Paragraph 20 provides that the Model Rules can be used as
“evidence” of breach of a lawyer’s standard of conduct.3 Thus, the Model
Rules attempt to make it clear that ethical violations are distinct from
substantive law while at the same time acknowledging that they do play
some role in substantive disputes. As the cases mentioned above indicate,
courts struggle with how to handle the interaction of ethical prohibitions
and substantive law. This Article addresses this “Paragraph 20 paradox”
faced by courts (and lawyers).
After providing a history of Paragraph 20’s adoption, this Article presents
six takeaways derived from an evaluation of cases where courts struggle with
the paradox. First, no courts find that ethics rules, standing alone, create an
independent cause of action. In other words, there is no independent
“professional responsibility tort” that exists which would allow a plaintiff to
assert that the violation of an ethical rule in the course of representation
establishes a viable claim. Second, in legal malpractice claims, courts adopt
three different approaches to deciphering when a violation of an ethical rule
can be used to establish the standard of care in the duty element of the claim.
The third takeaway involves cases where ethics rules are utilized defensively
to challenge enforcement of an unethical contract or transaction. Courts
are inconsistent in how they use ethics rules in these contexts. Some cite to
the ethical prohibition and allow the defense to stand (disregarding the
language in Paragraph 20), while others hold ethics rules can establish a valid
defense (and invalidate an agreement). Fourth, this Article addresses how
some claimants attempt to incorporate the definitions and standards set out
in ethical rules into other areas of substantive law. Courts have not been
receptive to these attempts. The fifth takeaway, where Paragraph 20 is most
often disregarded, involves using ethics rules to evaluate disqualification
motions; courts, considering the limitations of Paragraph 20, impose a
higher obligation on the party seeking disqualification than required. Sixth,
and finally, this Article presents situations where opposing parties (or
lawyers) attempt to sue a lawyer for violation of the ethics rules. Courts
universally reject such third-party claims.

2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
3. Id.
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II. HISTORY OF THE PARAGRAPH 20 PARADOX
The current Paragraph 20 of the Scope section of the Model Rules reads:
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a
lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty
has been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily
warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer
in pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore,
the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s
self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a
disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.
Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a
lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable
standard of conduct.4

Consider the paradox this creates. On one hand, the paragraph doubles
down on the idea that violations of the ethical rules are to be confined to
the world of enforcement through the disciplinary system: “Violation of a
Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer”;5
violations should not “create any presumption in such a case that a legal
duty has been breached”;6 breaches should not “necessarily warrant any
other nondisciplinary remedy”;7 and the Model Rules are “not designed to
be a basis for civil liability.”8 If this was all Paragraph 20 said, there would
be no paradox—the Model Rules (theoretically) would be barred from
substantive disputes. But then, in the last sentence, Paragraph 20
complicates things: “Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers,
[and therefore] a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of
the applicable standard of conduct.”9 This is the paradox: the Model Rules

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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are not to be used outside of the disciplinary realm except when they can be
used there.10
It is reasonable to wonder, how did this paradox develop? How did we
arrive at a situation where the ethics rules that establish the foundation of a
lawyer’s obligation to their client, as well as to the courts and third parties,
are not to be relied upon in disputes outside the disciplinary process? To
answer this puzzle requires a two-step analysis. We first need to consider
how ethics rules initially came to be codified. Then we need to understand
the evolution of the language in the current Paragraph 20 to understand how
we arrived at the current state of affairs.
Before starting the journey to evaluate the Paragraph 20 paradox, it is fair
to ask whether states have followed the ABA’s lead and adopted the
paragraph’s language. After all, if no or very few states have adopted the
language, this Article’s task becomes merely a theoretical exercise. An
analysis of state rules of professional conduct shows that a majority of states
adopted Paragraph 20 verbatim or near-verbatim (twenty-seven states).11
10. There are some states that have not adopted this last sentence. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2016) (asserting the last sentence as: “Accordingly,
nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extradisciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.”). However, even in these states the debate
continues over the relevance of ethical rules in substantive disputes. See, e.g., Nuri v. PRC, Inc.,
5 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (discussing the applicability of ethical rules to the standard
of conduct for attorneys involved in substantive disputes).
11. Such states include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20
(West 2017); ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2015); COLO. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2014); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble
and Scope ¶ 20 (2016); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 7 (West 2018); IDAHO RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (West 2018); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble
and Scope ¶ 20 (2015); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2015); KY.
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Preamble and Scope ¶ XXI (2015); ME. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (West 2017); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and
Scope ¶ 20 (West 2018); NEB. COURT RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2016);
NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0A(d) (West 2018); N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope
¶ 7 (West 2017); N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Statement of Purpose ¶ 3 (2016); N.Y. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 12 (West 2018); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 4 (West 2018);
OHIO PROF’L CONDUCT RULES Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2015); R.I. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
Scope ¶ 7 (2016); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 7 (2014); S.D. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2016); TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope
¶ 21 (West 2018); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2015); WASH. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (West 2017); W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2015); WIS. SUPREME COURT RULES Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (West 2018);
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Three states adopted Paragraph 20 but omitted the last sentence about use
of ethics rules in substantive contexts.12 Eleven states either replaced the
last sentence with something like the following, or adopt the Paragraph 20
language and add this caveat: “Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be
deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extradisciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.”13 California contains
the most direct and unambiguous limiting language: “These rules are not
intended to create new civil causes of action. Nothing in these rules shall
be deemed to create, augment, diminish, or eliminate any substantive legal
duty of lawyers or the non-disciplinary consequences of violating such a
duty.”14
Instead of limiting the use of ethical rules outside the disciplinary process,
some states go beyond the ABA in recognizing that ethics rules have a role
For example, Indiana includes the
in substantive disputes.15
following: “[The rules] are not designed to be a basis for civil liability, but
these [r]ules may be used as non-conclusive evidence that a lawyer has

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS AT LAW Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2017). Four
states, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Oregon, have not adopted the Scope provisions of the Model Rules.
See Links of Interest, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
resources/links_of_interest.html [https://perma.cc/T9XM-E2R5] (cataloging rules of professional
conduct by state).
12. Those states include: Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas and Montana. ARK. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (West 2017); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and
Scope ¶ 20 (West 2018); KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (West 2018);
MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 21 (West 2017).
13. Ten of these states are Alabama, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope
¶ 18 (2016); GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 18 (2015); MICH. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 21 (West 2018); MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope
¶ 6 (West 2017); MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 7 (West 2017); N.C. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 0.2 Scope ¶ 7 (West 2017); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20
(2015); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 19 (2015); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: Scope ¶ 15, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G,
app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (West 2018); VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 7
(West 2017). Florida, as the eleventh state, adopted all the language of ABA Paragraph 20, but also
included language substantially similar to that quoted above. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
Preamble and Scope ¶ 17 (2014) (changing “substantive legal duty” to “such a duty” in the second
portion).
14. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1-100(A) (2015).
15. See, e.g., MD. ATTORNEYS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 19-3000.1 pmbl. ¶ 20
(West 2018) (“[I]n some circumstances, an attorney’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of a breach
of the applicable standard of conduct.”).

2018]

The Paragraph 20 Paradox

259

breached a duty owed to a client.”16 Vermont takes the unique (and more
paradoxical) approach of recognizing that the violation of an ethics rule
could create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. However,
in the last sentence, the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct Scope
Paragraph 20, states that “nothing in the rules should be deemed to augment
or diminish any substantive legal duty of lawyers or extradisciplinary
consequences of violating such a duty.”17
In short, almost all states have adopted a version of Paragraph 20 of the
Model Rules, and even the few that have not adopted the language have
dealt with the Paragraph 20 paradox. Therefore, for simplicity and clarity,
this Article refers to the Paragraph 20 paradox as a shorthand to reference
the puzzle raised in Paragraph 20 of the Model Rules, even if a particular
state’s ethics rule is not verbatim the ABA language.
A. The Origin of the Model Rules
Lawyers, of course, had ethical obligations before ethics rules were
codified and adopted. A lawyer could be disciplined and even disbarred by
the courts in states where the lawyer practiced.18 This was seen as an
inherent power of the judiciary.19 Thus, when the first codification of the
rules of ethics was undertaken by state and local bar associations and by the
ABA, it was not because there were no legal duties or ethical obligations
placed on lawyers.20 In fact, the first bar associations—at both the ABA

16. IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2015); see also MASS. RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 6 (West 2018) (equating rules with statutes and regulations and
concluding: “[I]f a plaintiff can demonstrate that a disciplinary rule was intended to protect one in his
position, a violation of that rule may be some evidence of the attorney’s negligence” (citing
Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1986))).
17. VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (2016).
18. See ORRIN N. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 79 (N.W.U. Press 1915)
(explaining that the power of courts to discipline attorneys by suspension or disbarment has been long
exercised).
19. See Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9, 13 (1856) (“[I]t has been well settled, by the rules and
practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to
become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.”);
see also CARTER, supra note 18, at 79 (“The right to discipline attorneys by suspension or disbarment, as
well as by contempt proceedings, has been exercised from the earliest times by the courts. Because
attorneys are officers of the court, this power has always been exercised, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory restrictions, by all courts of general or superior jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)).
20. The first official codification of ethical obligations was by the Alabama Bar Association in
1887. See Walter Burgwyn Jones, Canons of Professional Ethics, Their Genesis and History, 7 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 483, 493 (1932) (“[T]he Alabama State Bar Association has the very distinguished honor and
OF
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and state level—were voluntary organizations, and the standards of conduct
adopted by these groups did not have the force of law.21 However, the
codes were viewed as largely codifying the pre-existing obligations of
lawyers and setting down the aspirational statements of what it means to be
an ethical and professional lawyer.22
Throughout American history the Bar has faced times of extreme
disfavor. Bar associations were “deemed undemocratic and un-American”
because they were perceived as aristocratic guilds that ran counter to the
American tradition of individualism.23 The result was a loosening of the
requirements for admission to practice law in the early years of the
republic.24 In fact, some states by statute or constitutional provision,
adopted policies that any voter had the right to practice law.25 After the
Civil War, the bar reached a low on credibility and respect.26 But beginning
in approximately 1875, bar associations began to re-form and adopt
standards for admission as well as mechanisms to discipline those lawyers
that acted unethically after admission.27

notable distinction of having adopted on December 14, 1887, the first Code of Legal Ethics ever
adopted in this country.”).
21. Cf. id. at 494–96 (expanding on the processes and meetings of individual representatives
from different states from 1887 to 1908 in order to codify existing legal duties of attorneys).
22. See, e.g., Herman v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 723, 726 (D.D.C. 1952) (describing ethical codes
as “indicative . . . of and reflect the attitude of the profession as a whole upon those courses of action
which they frown upon and interdict, and they are commonly regarded by bench and bar alike as
wholesome standards of professional ethics”).
23. See Philip J. Wickser, Bar Associations, 15 CORNELL L. Q. 390, 391–93 (1930) (“Why should
[the legal] profession organize in an aristocratic British way, when everywhere else in the land of the
free, unfettered individuals fought their own battles single-handed?”).
24. Id. at 393–94.
25. See id. at 391–92 (introducing the idea that the American public was to be the advocates for
the public in post-revolution America).
26. See id. (finding economic interest post-war more important than standard control of the
profession).
27. Id. at 396. At the same time the legal profession was being professionalized, legal education
was undergoing a similar transformation. In 1870, Christopher Columbus Langdell was named dean
of Harvard Law School. Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography,
1906–2000s, 22 L. & HIST. REV. 277, 277 (2004) [hereinafter The Langdell Problem]. In that position he
transformed legal education, increasing the requirements to both get into and graduate from law school.
Id. In 1876, he extended law school education to three years. Bruce A. Kimball, Students’ Choices and
Experience During the Transition to Competitive Academic Achievement at Harvard Law School, 1876–1882,
55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 163, 166 (2005). He introduced the casebook and the case method of law school
instruction. Id. at 191. Law schools around the country began to adopt this more expanded and formal
approach to legal education. The Langdell Problem, supra, at 277.
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Bar associations—including the ABA which formed in 187828—were
concerned with what was perceived as the lack of professionalism of
lawyers.29 The distinction was made between the noble legal profession
(the aspiration) and the reality of money-hungry practitioners treating law
practice as a business and not a calling.30 Before going on, it is important
to note that the attempt to professionalize admission to the Bar and the
desire for professionalism had a number of motivations.31 To get a taste of
the varying motivations, here is a statement from the second President of
the New York State Bar Association in 1879:
During the last thirty years, there have poured into the profession, through
the doors thrown open by well-meaning, but in many respects, short-sighted
reformers of 1846, large numbers of men, unfit by culture or training or
character to become incorporated into any learned profession. Hundreds of
men without a tincture of scholarship or letters, old pettifoggers in county or
justices’ courts, and others, still more rude, have found their way into our
ranks. Men are seen in almost all our courts slovenly in dress, uncouth in
manners and habits, ignorant even of the English language, jostling, crowding,
vulgarizing the profession.32

In the first paragraph of his Introduction to Ethics of the Legal Profession in
1915, John Wigmore commented:
For lawyers, the most important truth about the Law is that it is a
profession. That important truth has been more and more forgotten among
us, of late years. . . .
Anyone who has to do with the young men nowadays preparing to enter
the Law cannot help seeing that, in the dominant attitude, the Law is no more

28. About the American Bar Association, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/about_
the_aba.html [https://perma.cc/U6UL-DG6K].
29. Wickser, supra note 23, at 397.
30. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 20 (Colum. U. Press 1953) (citing to a discontent
with the “deplorable condition into which the[] profession was falling, as well as the imperative
necessity of taking a firm stance against the rising tide of commercialism and the growing influence of
those who would turn the profession . . . into a ‘mere money getting trade . . .’” as the reasons leaders
of the bar began to reestablish bar associations).
31. Wickser, supra note 23, at 395–96.
32. Id. at 395 (quoting 3 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORTS 70 (1880)).
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than a trade, an occupation, a business,—like any other worthy means of
livelihood.33

Wigmore goes on to state the ultimate goal of the legal profession: “The
Law as a pursuit is not a trade. It is a profession. It ought to signify for its
followers a mental and moral setting apart from the multitude,—a
priesthood of Justice.”34
For ethics scholars in the early twentieth-century, the degradation of the
legal profession in the United States could be explained by the fact that the
country did not have an aristocracy from which lawyers were drawn.35
Instead, those coming into the legal profession came from all strata of
society and could not rely on established wealth to sustain a practice.36
Adding to the pressures of the traditional practice was the
commercialization that arose after the Civil War and during the Industrial
Revolution.37 In this environment, lawyers were “drawn into the intimate
relations as adviser of the business man.”38 This association led lawyers to
adopt a businessman’s philosophy and to treat their practice as a trade and
not a profession.39 The primary concern seemed to be that lawyers sought
to make as much money as possible and viewed money as the primary
measure of success.40 This caused lawyers to place the interests of clients
above the larger public good, undermining the tenets of the “priesthood of
Justice.”41

33. John H. Wigmore, Introduction to ORRIN N. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION xxi (N.W.U. Press 1915).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at xxi–xxii.
39. Id. at xxii. Of course, to the extent that lawyers were more unethical at this time, the story
is undoubtedly more complicated than “commercialization made me do it”; however, the goal here is
to understand the rationale for adoption of a standard set of ethical rules, and it was a common belief
that the lawyers were treating their jobs like a business and not a profession.
40. Id.
41. Id. at xxi; see also Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 3 COMMONWEALTH L. REV.
22, 26 (1905) (“It is true that at the present time the lawyer does not hold that position with the people
that he held seventy-five or indeed fifty years ago; but the reason is not lack of opportunity. It is
this: Instead of holding a position of independence, between the wealthy and the people, prepared to
curb the excesses of either, able lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become adjuncts
of great corporations and have neglected their obligation to use their powers for the protection of the
people. We hear much of the ‘corporation lawyer,’ and far too little of the ‘people’s lawyer.’”).
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Leaders of the burgeoning bar associations and professors at burgeoning
law schools contemplated how to re-instill a professional mindset into
lawyers.42 While it was conceded that acting “ethically” involved more than
following a set of rules—it required a “whole atmosphere of life’s
behavior”43—setting down rules was seen as a way of codifying the
guideposts for ethical conduct.44 In essence, the early ethics codes were
intended to be an educational tool for lawyers and law students, defining
legal ethics as
traditions of behavior that mark off and emphasize the legal profession as a
guild of public officers. And the apprentice must hope and expect to make
full acquaintance with this body of traditions . . . without which he cannot do
his part to keep the Law on the level of a profession.45

The rules were intended to “furnish an authoritative standard by which
every lawyer, when in doubt, may be safely guided.”46 In drafting the first
set of ethical rules in Alabama, supporters noted that:
[It is important] to call these rules to the attention of the younger members of
the Bar, “many of them not having the advantages that others have had—not
having been trained in the law schools or courts—not having gone through
or had those advantages of development that others and more experienced
men have had.”47

In fact, after the first codification, the Alabama Bar had a copy printed,
framed and presented to every courthouse in the state for display.48
42. See Michael Ariens, Lost and Found: David Hoffman and the History of American Legal Ethics,
67 ARK. L. REV. 571, 612–13 (2014) (recounting the treaties, lectures, and printed articles based on the
works of David Hoffman–said to be one of the first American lawyers to publicly push for legal ethics
in the profession); see also AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON CODE OF PROF’L ETHICS, FINAL REPORT I no. 2
(1908) [hereinafter CODE, FINAL REPORT] (accounting for the material used in formulating the
Cannons of Ethics “including a reprint of the Hoffman Resolutions in regards to professional
deportment”).
43. Wigmore, supra note 33, at xxiv.
44. Herman v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 723, 726 (D.D.C. 1952).
45. Wigmore, supra note 33, at xxiv.
46. CARTER, supra note 18, at 29.
47. Jones, supra note 20, at 490 (quoting Hon. Lewis M. Stone, of Carrolton, Alabama).
48. Id. at 493. The draft of the Alabama Bar Association was then used as guide for the ABA
draft of the Cannons of Ethics. See CODE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at I no. 4 (“The foundation of
the draft for cannons of ethics, herewith submitted, is the code adopted by the Alabama State Bar
Association in 1887 . . . .”).
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It was also the education-through-codification goal that motivated the
drafters of the ABA’s first set of ethics rules in 1908—the Canons.49 The
Preamble to the Canons defined them as a “general guide” to lawyer
conduct, and recognized that there were other ethical obligations not
included in the thirty-two Canons.50
Reading through the Canons, the first thing that stands out is how short
and concise they are. The second thing is the general (perhaps vague) nature
of the guidance. For example, Canon 21 is entitled “Punctuality and
Expedition” and reads in its entirety: “It is the duty of the lawyer not only
to his client, but also the courts and to the public, to be punctual in
attendance, and to be concise and direct in the trial and disposition of
causes.”51 This gives a sense of the educational and aspirational tenor of
the Canons. In the Canons, there are no detailed standards and obligations
like those found in the current Model Rules.52 They might best be
described as a set of best practices to be an ethical lawyer. As early as 1934,
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone encouraged a reevaluation of the Canons to “pass
beyond the petty details of form and manner which have been so largely the
subject of our codes of ethics,”53 and argued that the Canons are “for the
most part . . . generalizations designed for an earlier era.”54 By 1977, critics
had become even more dismissive, describing the Canons as “little more
than a collection of pious homilies” and “primitive,” and in the ABA Journal
no less.55
These quotes make the important point that the early ethics rules were
not intended to provide detailed instructions on how to meet minimum
49. See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 2008 J. PROF’L LAW. 235,
254 (“On the other hand, that same recommendation was an acknowledgement of a changed legal
profession, a profession with far more lawyers, differing in class and educational background, and
trained in the law through law school instead of apprenticeships.”).
50. Id. at 236. As adopted in 1908, there were only thirty-two Canons. CANONS OF PROF’L
ETHICS Canons 1–32 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).
51. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 21 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).
52. Compare id. at Canons 1–32 (outlining the ideal performance of an ethical lawyer
representing those accused of a crime), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017) (proscribing in black letter terms the conduct of an ethical prosecutor).
53. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARVARD L. REV. 1, 10 (1934).
54. Id.
55. L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A. J., May 1977,
at 639, 639 [hereinafter Patterson, Wanted]; see also L. Ray Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the
Law of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C. L. REV. 519, 521 (1979) (“The Canons of 1908 prescribed rules of propriety,
largely reflecting, it seems, the naïve notion that precatory rules can serve as effective guidelines to
ensure moral conduct.”).
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ethical standards—but instead to educate and guide lawyers on what it
meant to work in a profession.56 The generalities and broad aspirational
statements were a feature—not a bug. Therefore, it is unsurprising that
there is no equivalent to Paragraph 20’s admonition against using the
Canons outside of the disciplinary process. In fact, there were very few
enforcement bodies to actually pursue claims of misconduct against
lawyers.57 It is not true, however, that the drafters of the Canons expected
courts to ignore the mandates and prohibitions set out in the Canons; it was
expected that courts would cite to the ethical standards set out in the Canons
in sanctioning lawyers for misconduct under the courts’ inherent power.58
In fact in 1913, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that while the Canons
were not enforceable they “constitute a safe guide for professional conduct
in the cases to which they apply.”59
As long as the Canons were viewed as reflecting the preexisting common
law obligations of lawyers in circumstances where courts were charged with
disciplinary responsibility, or as guidelines that courts could footnote when
sanctioning lawyers appearing before them, the discipline/substantive law
dichotomy lie dormant.60 Problems arose, however, in those situations
where ethical rules went beyond preexisting common law prohibitions or
obligations.61 In these situations, courts were confronted with the challenge
of determining the significance of an ethical prohibition in substantive
disputes.62 It is one thing to say that an action is unethical and should be
avoided by ethical (professional) lawyers. It is another to say that an

56. See, e.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal Ethics, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 541,
542 (1908) (“[The 1908 version] occupies a higher plane. Its canons are left to rest on principles of
right and honor.”).
57. See CARTER, supra note 18, at 79 (discussing a court’s inherent and infallible power to
discipline attorneys).
58. See id. at 80 (“[T]he power to discipline attorneys who are officers of the court was an
inherent and incidental power in courts of record, essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions . . . .”).
59. Ringen v. Ranes, 104 N.E. 1023, 1025 (Ill. 1914).
60. See id. (“[The attorney’s actions] indicate an inferior standard of professional conduct and
[they] are in direct violation of the canons of professional ethics adopted by the Illinois State Bar
Association and the American Bar Association.”).
61. See, e.g., Chreste v. Louisville Ry. Co., 180 S.W. 49, 53 (Ky. 1915) (“[T]here is a wide
difference between what is undignified or unbecoming conduct on the part of an attorney and what is
clearly contrary to public policy.”).
62. See, e.g., id. (“Such conduct may be disapproved of by the courts and by those representatives
of the profession who are concerned in seeing that its standards are never lowered, and yet it may fall
far short of being so injurious to the interest of the public as to invalidate a contract . . . .”).
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unethical action can have consequences beyond an impact on the lawyer’s
license. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court faced this issue in 1915
regarding solicitation of clients that was prohibited by the Canons, but that
was not a traditional basis for invalidating a contract.63 The court stated:
[T]he fact that solicitation is not condemned at common law[,] or denounced
by our Constitution or statutes, and the further fact that it is difficult to
perceive upon what theory it can be said to be clearly injurious to the public
good, we conclude that mere solicitation on the part of an attorney,
unaccompanied by fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or imposition
of some kind, or other circumstances sufficient to invalidate the contract, is
not of itself sufficient to render a contract between an attorney and client void
on the ground that it is contrary to public policy.64

One last point needs to be made before moving on to discuss the
adoption of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The
presumption until this point is that the Canons, and later the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules, actually represent
standards that define what it means to be an ethical (professional) attorney.
This should not be taken as a given. Those drafting and adopting the
Canons were seeking to protect a particular vision of “professional” law
practice and, unsurprisingly, included provisions (such as solicitation) which
some argue had the effect of protecting established lawyers.65 In 1964, the
United States Supreme Court case Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia66 called into question the idea that the ABA and other
bar associations were merely codifying preexisting cores of ethical norms.67
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Philip Schuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons As a Group Moral Code,
37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244, 268 (1968) (“The principal aim of the more important canons is to
perpetuate a form of protectionism, certainly against rank outsiders, but also against lesser guild
members.”).
66. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
67. See id. at 7 n.10 (discussing the various sources of standards of legal ethics, including the
common law, the Canons, and Virginia state statutes). Other cases in this time frame also call into
question the idea that the Canons distilled the undisputed essence of what it means to be an ethical
lawyer. See generally NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 451 (1963) (observing important, long-standing
legal principles have been incorporated into the Canons); United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill.
State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 226 n.2 (1967) (Harland, J., dissenting) (“Even in the absence of
applicable statutes, state courts have held themselves empowered to promulgate and enforce standards
of professional conduct drawn from the common law and the closely related prohibitions of the
Canons of Ethics.” (citing In re Maclub of Am., Inc., 3 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. 1936); DRINKER, supra
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In the Trainmen case, the railroad worker union would retain a list of
attorneys that were competent in the area of railroad injuries and, when a
member was injured or killed, an attorney on the list would be
recommended to the worker (or to his next of kin).68 The Virginia Bar
Association sought an injunction against this practice, citing, among other
provisions, ABA Canon 27,69 which made it “unprofessional to solicit
professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or
by personal communication or interviews not warranted by personal
relations.”70 The Virginia Bar prevailed in the state courts and obtained an
injunction.71
The union then alleged that the injunction violated its First Amendment
rights of speech and association, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case.72 The ABA filed an amicus brief describing itself as the definer of
ethical conduct: “The American Bar Association, therefore, is concerned
that the practice of law retain the characteristics which makes it a profession,
namely, ethical standards of conduct with regard to the duty of a lawyer to
the Court, to his client, to his fellow lawyers, and to the public.”73 In
defending Canon 27, the ABA justified the solicitation prohibition as
follows:
Canon 27 prohibits the soliciting of law business by attorneys. This rule of
conduct is based on the notion that it is of the essence of any true profession
not only that the professional man be skilled, but also that he apply his skill in
an objective manner as possible. Laymen seeking the professional advice of
an attorney want, and are entitled to, the attorney’s detached judgment. The
public is best served by the attorney who strives to give his best individual
judgment and whose representation is based on that judgment. The public is
not well served by attorneys who seek to attract clients by self-advertising and
note 30, at 26–30, 35–48)). However, the Trainmen case is a particularly useful exemplar here because
Virginia had adopted the Canons verbatim and because the ABA filed an amicus brief in the case.
Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 6 n.10.
68. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 2. The Court noted that the reason for the list was to ensure that
injured members knew their rights to avoid overreaching by “persuasive claims adjusters eager to gain
a quick and cheap settlement” and to avoid claims being taken on by lawyers who did not know how
to prosecute railroad injury claims. Id. at 3.
69. The Virginia courts adopted the ABA Canons to apply in Virginia. Id. at 7.
70. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).
71. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 2.
72. Id.
73. Brief for The American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 3, Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5 (1964) (No. 34), 1963 WL 105695, at *3.
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soliciting, because these activities make it difficult, if not impossible for there
to be any objective judgment. The public generally has wiser instincts in this
regard than is usually supposed. Most lay persons instinctively prefer to seek
the professional man rather than to be sought after by him. This is one of the
basic notions inherent in any true profession.74

Remember, the Canons were designed to distill the core components of
professionalism by an organization—the ABA—that deemed itself at the
forefront of knowing what those core components were.75 The Supreme
Court rejected the broad prohibition of solicitation under Canon 27.76
With regard to the idea that the prohibition is needed to protect
“professionalism” the Court ruled it went too far:
Here what Virginia has sought to halt is not a commercialization of the legal
profession which might threaten the moral and ethical fabric of the
administration of justice. It is not “ambulance chasing.” . . .
....
In the present case, the State again has failed to show any appreciable public
interest in preventing the Brotherhood from carrying out its plan to
recommend the lawyers it selects to represent injured workers.77

The Trainmen case provides an important lesson. The prohibition in the
Canons could be used not just to distill uncontroversial aspects of
professional practice, but also to impact substantive rights and to protect
established interests.78 The case demonstrates that, on a constitutional
basis, the interest of the state, and the status of the ABA, in maintaining
74. Id. at 11–12.
75. Schuchman, supra note 65, at 268.
76. See Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 1–2, 8 (rejecting the lower court’s ruling that by recommending
legal counsel to injured railroad workers and their families, the Brotherhood’s conduct “constituted the
solicitation of legal business and the unauthorized practice of law in Virginia”).
77. Id. at 6, 8. In dissent, Justice Clark (with Justice Harlan joining) states that the majority:
[O]verthrows state regulation of the legal profession and relegates the practice of law to the level
of a commercial enterprise. . . . This state of affairs degrades the profession, proselytes the
approved attorneys to certain required attitudes and contravenes both the accepted ethics of the
profession and the statutory and judicial rules of acceptable conduct.
Id. at 9 (Clark, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 2 (majority opinion) (demonstrating how the Canons could potentially affect one’s
substantive right to freedom of speech when a state court rules in favor of the prohibitions within the
ethical rules).
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“professionalism” was not sufficiently strong to overcome the
constitutional rights of attorneys.79
Hence, what does the history and adoption of the Canons of Professional
Ethics tell us about the current Paragraph 20 paradox? It provides an initial
understanding of why there is an attempt to distinguish between ethical
standards and liability in substantive disputes. The Canons were intended
to establish how lawyers were expected to maintain the professional status
of the legal profession (as opposed to devolving to nothing more than a
business).80 And, while the educational purpose of the Canons was
well-meaning, it was natural for courts to look to the standards as a basis for
determining whether a lawyer was acting inappropriately in dealings with the
court and client.81 It is also understandable that courts would begin to look
to the Canons and ask whether they set out enforceable standards beyond
the disciplinary context. In other words, if it is unethical to personally solicit
a client, why would the contract that was obtained through solicitation be
enforceable (even if it would be enforceable if the ethical standard did not
exist)? And, on the flip side, why should a contract obtained by solicitation
be invalid merely because an ethics rule prohibits it?
B. The Model Rules Evolve
In 1964, more than fifty years after adopting the Canons, too much had
changed in society to pretend that the Canons were meeting the needs of
the legal profession.82 The requirements to obtain a license had become
largely standardized—requiring sufficient education, good character and
fitness, and passage of a bar exam.83 There was a rise in integrated bar
associations—which required all practitioners to be members of the state

79. See id. at 8 (“[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the members . . .
to maintain and carry out their plan for advising workers . . . to obtain legal advice and for
recommending specific lawyers. . . . [L]awyers accepting employment under this constitutionally
protected plan have a like protection which the State cannot abridge.”).
80. See Jean E. Faure & R. Keith Strong, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: No Standard for
Malpractice, 47 MONT. L. REV. 363, 368 (1986) (“The Canons . . . offer general statements of
professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationship with the public, the legal system, and the
legal profession.”).
81. See id. at 372–73 (referring to one court’s holding that reference to the Canons is permissible
not only in a disciplinary proceeding, but also in a tort action when one party has alleged that a law
firm has breached a duty owed).
82. See Edward L. Wright, Study of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 11 CATH. LAW. 323, 326 (1965)
(asserting dramatic changes in society and the practice of law occurred in the twentieth century).
83. Id. at 325.
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bar association—giving bar associations the resources and power to
sanction lawyers for violating ethical obligations.84 Societal changes were
also forcing a change: the move to a “predominantly urban, complex
industrial economy” and a drastic increase in the regulatory reach of the
governments at all levels—especially the federal government.85 Therefore,
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., during his term as president of the ABA, appointed a
committee on August 14, 1964 to study revisions to the Canons.86 The
chair of that committee said that the revised ethical standards should have
two goals:
First, the code (or Canons) should be fully stated to aid the lawyer in his search
for appreciation and understanding of the ethics, high principles and
dedicated aspirations of the legal profession. In this sense, it is truly a moral
code, addressed primarily to the lawyer’s conscience. Secondly, it should be a
statement of the commonly accepted minimum standards of professional
responsibility, in which sense it is a binding legal code enforceable by
disciplinary action of the courts.87

To accommodate these two competing approaches, the ABA changed
how the provisions were presented. Gone were the individual “canons”
with their aspirational statements. The new version—named the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (the “Code”)88—contained two
different sections to address the two goals of aspiration and
discipline: Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules.89 The Ethical
Considerations were “aspirational in character and represent[ed] the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive.
They constitute[d] a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for
guidance in many specific situations.”90 The Disciplinary Rules were

84. See id. (demonstrating the rise of bar associations by showing the dramatic increase in
members of the ABA from 1905 to 1965).
85. Id. “Changes in the work of judges and lawyers are a reflection of the drastic changes in
many aspects of our society and economy.” Id.
86. Id. at 323.
87. Id. at 325.
88. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).
89. See id. at Preliminary Statement (retaining the original Canons but adding in the “Ethical
Considerations” and “Disciplinary Rules” sections).
90. Id.
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“mandatory in character” and “state the minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.”91
The Code’s Preliminary Statement also included the following statement
about the use of the Disciplinary Rules: “The Model Code makes no attempt
to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of a
Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standards for civil liability
of lawyers for professional conduct.”92 This statement was likely a
recognition of the evolution of the ethical rules. With the introduction of
enforceable “disciplinary rules” the drafters became concerned that the
ethical mandates would be used by courts as legal mandates.93 The
disclaimer was intended to make clear that the standards set out in the Code
were meant to be used by disciplinary authorities and not by courts in
substantive disputes.94 Following this approach, the Nebraska Supreme
Court refused to hold that a violation of the Code alone was sufficient to
constitute an impeachable offense.95 The court noted that “[t]he general
purpose of the [C]ode is to encourage and develop the conscience and ethics
of lawyers in their professional and private lives, to the end that the
institution of the law merits and receives the trust and respect of the
public.”96 Here is how the court addressed the paradox we are examining
here:
We do not intend to say that violations of a [C]ode disciplinary rule do not
have substance. On the contrary, the [C]ode is viable, but it concerns only
standards of conduct, discipline, and penalties relating to a lawyer’s
professional life. Whether the defendant has violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility is a matter to be determined in a disciplinary
proceeding commenced for that purpose.
Although an act or omission by a lawyer may be both a violation of a
disciplinary rule and an impeachable offense, it does not follow that a violation
of a disciplinary rule, as such, is an impeachable offense.

91. Id.
92. Id. (footnotes omitted).
93. See id. (specifically dispelling any thought that the Code could be used “to define standards
of civil liability of lawyers”).
94. See id. (characterizing the Code as a standard for disciplinary action of attorneys whose
conduct falls below the standards set forth).
95. See State v. Douglas, 349 N.W.2d 870, 896 (Neb. 1984) (“Although an act or omission by a
lawyer may be both a violation of a disciplinary rule and an impeachable offense, it does not follow
that a violation of a disciplinary rule, as such, is an impeachable offense.”).
96. Id. at 895–96.
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It is further noted that in addition to possible disciplinary measures under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and dependent upon the nature of
the circumstances of an alleged violation, a lawyer may be held liable in the
civil courts and prosecuted in the criminal courts.97

Courts also cited to the limitation on civil liability when third-parties
attempted to use the Code provisions against lawyers. For example, in
Bickel v. Mackie,98 a federal district court in Iowa dismissed a claim brought
by a party against the opposing lawyer alleging that the lawsuit brought by
the lawyer was not for a proper purpose—in violation of the Code.99 The
court rejected the argument and dismissed the claim, stating: “Violation of
the Code of Professional Ethics is not tantamount to a tortious act,
particularly with regard to liability to a non-client.”100
Professor Wolfram presents what might be the strongest arguments in
favor of using the ethical standards (under the Code) as a basis for civil
liability. It is worth setting out his arguments because the same claims are
made for utilizing ethical standards today. Wolfram made two main points.
First, courts use other criminal and civil regulations to establish that a
defendant has violated a standard of care.101 The regulations governing
lawyer conduct are no different from regulations in these other contexts,
and should be used in civil cases against lawyers in the same way as other
regulations.102 Wolfram dismisses the Code’s statement that the rules do
not “undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for
professional conduct”103 by saying that “this should be read as Code
neutrality, not hostility.”104 In addition, incorporating the ethics rules into

97. Id. at 896.
98. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa), aff’d, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978).
99. See id. at 1383 (disagreeing with plaintiff’s theory that defendant owed him a duty to comply
with the Code and that the failure to do so was negligence per se); see also Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d
902, 907 (Iowa 1978) (“Nor are we persuaded provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for Lawyers create grounds for imposing liability to a third party for negligence.”).
100. Bickel, 447 F. Supp. at 1383.
101. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility As a Measure of Attorney Liability
in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REV. 281, 286 (1979) (“In civil suits, courts everywhere now receive as
evidence of the violator’s failure to employ due care proof of a violation of a criminal statute if the
injured party is within the statute’s intended area of protection.”).
102. See id. at 286–87 (maintaining use of the Code in civil suits would be analogous to use of
criminal statutes, business regulations, or safe driving requirements in civil litigation).
103. See id. at 287 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1969)).
104. Id.
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substantive claims provides incentives for lawyers to follows the ethical
rules.
Because disciplinary agencies are “typically understaffed,
underfinanced, and too often so dominated by the group they regulate that
they are incapable of significantly expanding disciplinary control[,]”105
allowing clients to institute suits for violations of ethical violations will cause
lawyers, unilaterally or at the insistence of their malpractice clients, to be
more conscious of their ethical obligations.106
Second, Wolfram argues, that courts should recognize that the ethical
standards establish the custom of the legal profession and set out the
standard of care or legal obligations of lawyers.107 Thus, an attorney
expert could testify in a legal malpractice case about the customary
manner of handling a particular case, and rely on the ethics rules as
evidence of the custom.108 Wolfram analyzed disputes in four exemplar
contexts: conflict of interest, confidential information, frivolous litigation,
fee disputes and fee splitting.109 He argued that these scenarios indicate
that the Code set a sufficient standard to use in civil actions to determine
whether a lawyer has violated her standard of care or has breached a
contractual duty.110
Only seven years after the adoption of the Code, it came under
attack as inadequate and antiquated.111 In addition to attacks
on the sufficiency of the Code’s provisions by lawyers, certain
provisions
were
being
challenged
in
the
courts.112
105. See id. at 291 (highlighting the potential benefits of non-lawyers playing a role in attorney
discipline).
106. See id. at 291–92 (“The resulting liberalization and increase in damage awards will itself
supply a significant measure of deterrence and create incentives for improved office management and
increased attention to governing standards such as the Code of Professional Responsibility.”).
107. See id. at 293 (“The second general argument in favor of increased resort to the Code for a
definition of a lawyer’s civil responsibilities is the analogy to the doctrine that custom or work practices
may be used in negligence litigation to define the relevant standard of care.”).
108. See id. at 294–95 (recognizing the insufficiency of relying solely on the Code in determining
the standard of care but noting use of both expert testimony and the Code would be useful in helping
the factfinder understand the required duty of care).
109. See generally id. at 303–19 (discussing potential uses of the Code in civil litigation).
110. Id. at 304–19.
111. See Patterson, Wanted, supra note 55, at 639 (writing, only seven years after the Code took
effect, that it was insufficient and did not provide attorneys with adequate guidelines as it was “rigid
and simplistic, complex and contradictory, and difficult to read”); see also Robert Dahlquist, The Code of
Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions Against Attorneys, 9 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (“The
Code was adopted by the American Bar Association in 1969 and become effective in 1970.”).
112. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (challenging the Supreme Court
of Arizona’s ruling allowing the State Bar of Arizona to restrict attorney advertising). See also
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Perhaps most notable, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,113 the United States
Supreme Court invalidated an Arizona rule (identical to the provision in the
Code) that provided:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display
advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of
commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his
behalf.114

The Court held that the state did not have a sufficient interest to overcome
the lawyer’s First Amendment right to speak through truthful newspaper
advertising.115
Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court can be described as nothing
short of dismissive of the position taken by Arizona—and the ABA as amicus
curiae.116 For our purposes, the Court’s response to the argument that the
state has a sufficient interest in maintaining the “professionalism” of lawyers
was that it does not justify an absolute prohibition on advertising.117 The
state argued that advertising would undermine the “sense of pride” in the
law as a profession and “bring about commercialization, which will
undermine the attorney’s sense of dignity and self-worth.”118 Furthermore
“[t]he hustle of the marketplace will adversely affect the profession’s service
orientation, and irreparably damage the delicate balance between the
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 775 (1975) (“We granted certiorari to decide whether a
minimum fee schedule for lawyers published by the Fairfax County Bar Association and enforced by
the Virginia State Bar violates § 1 of the Sherman Act . . . .”).
113. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
114. Id. at 355, 360 n.12 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1976)).
115. See id. at 384 (“We rule simply that the flow of such information may not be restrained,
and we therefore hold the present application of the disciplinary rule against appellants to be violative
of the First Amendment.”).
116. See id. at 353 (“As part of its regulation of the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of that State
has imposed and enforces a disciplinary rule that restricts advertising by attorneys.”); see also Brief for
the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(No. 76–316), 1976 WL 178671, at *4 (“States [h]ave [b]road [p]ower [t]o [r]egulate [a]dvertising [b]y
[l]awyers.”).
117. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 368 (describing the State Bar of Arizona’s argument of “[t]he [a]dverse
[e]ffect on [p]rofessionalism” that would occur by not allowing the state to regulate advertising by
attorneys).
118. Id.
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lawyer’s need to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve.”119 Finally, that
the relationship between the lawyer and the client would be undermined by
the client viewing the lawyer as motivated by profit and not the client’s best
interest.120
The Court found the relationship between advertising and
professionalism “severely strained.”121 It is unrealistic to believe that
lawyers operate their businesses without a profit motivation—and it is naïve
to believe that clients retain lawyers without believing that they will be
charged for the services.122 Adding salt to the wound, the Court noted that
the Code provided that a lawyer should reach a fee agreement with a client
as soon as possible after accepting representation.123 In the Court’s
words: “If the commercial basis of the relationship is to be promptly
disclosed on ethical grounds, once the client is in the office, it seems
inconsistent to condemn the candid revelation of the same information
before he arrives at that office.”124
Perhaps more devastating to the idea that the critical function of ethical
rules was to ensure a continuation of law as a profession set apart from the
business world, the Court rejected the foundation of the prohibition on
advertising. The Court notes:
It appears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of etiquette and
not as a rule of ethics. Early lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law as a form
of public service, rather than as a means of earning a living, and they looked
down on “trade” as unseemly. Eventually, the attitude toward advertising
fostered by this view evolved into an aspect of the ethics of the profession.
But habit and tradition are not in themselves an adequate answer to a
constitutional challenge. In this day, we do not belittle the person who earns
his living by the strength of his arm or the force of his mind. Since the belief
that lawyers are somehow “above” trade has become an anachronism, the
historical foundation for advertising restraint has crumbled.125

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. (asserting the State Bar’s argument was too tenuous).
122. Id. at 368–69.
123. Id. at 369 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2–19 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1976)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 371–72 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (citing DRINKER, supra note 30, at 5,
210–11).
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Add to this the 1975 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar126 case in which the
Supreme Court struck down the enforcement of minimum-fee agreements
as violating antitrust laws.127 The ABA position on minimum-fee
agreements had shifted over time.128 In 1961, it issued an ethics opinion
stating that the failure to abide by a fee schedule “may be evidence of
unethical conduct.”129 The Code provided in the Disciplinary Rules that,
when evaluating a fee, one factor to consider was “the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar legal services.”130 The Ethical
Considerations provided this elaboration: “Suggested fee schedules and
economic reports of state and local bar associations provide some guidance
on the subject of reasonable fees.”131 All reference to fee schedules were
removed from the Code in amendments adopted in 1974.132
With criticisms from both the bench and the bar, the ABA tapped Robert
Kutak to head a commission to study the Code.133 In a speech before the
Judicial Conference for the District of Columbia Circuit, Kutak identified
two overarching reasons for adopting a new set of ethics rules.134 First,
that which was considered “ethical” had changed due to the reevaluation of
ethical obligations by lawyers in modern practice or due to outside forces—

126. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
127. See id. at 791–92 (“The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes
does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its
members.” (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578–79 (1973))).
128. See Janet F. Bentley et al., Comment, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust
Laws, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1164, 1168 (1974) (recognizing the ABA’s different stance on minimum fee
agreements from 1961 to 1970).
129. Id. (quoting ABA Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 302 (1961)).
130. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2–106(B)(3) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1969)).
131. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2–18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969)).
132. See id. at 1168–69 (“During its 1974 meeting, the ABA amended the Code to omit all
reference to fee schedules, but apparently left standing the earlier rulings that failure to follow fee
schedules could be evidence of misconduct.”).
133. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, Chair’s
Introduction (1983) (“The Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards was appointed in the
summer of 1977 . . . . Chaired by Robert J. Kutak . . . the Commission was charged with evaluating
whether existing standards of professional conduct provided comprehensive and consistent guidance
for resolving the increasingly complex ethical problems in the practice of law.”).
134. See Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Judicial Conference for the Dist. of Columbia
Circuit, 89 F.R.D. 169, 233–34 (1980) [hereinafter Forty-First Judicial Conference] (“Thus, a revision
of the Code is necessary, if for no other reason than to acknowledge the problems facing lawyers of
the 1980s and to provide them with some guidance in resolving the questions of professional ethics
which they must face daily.”).
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such as the Supreme Court.135 Second, because the Code was outdated and
reflected practice as it existed in the 1880s and not the 1980s, a new
approach was needed.136 In discussing the shift in format, from
“Disciplinary Rules” and “Ethical Considerations” to Rules and Comments,
Kutak said that the change was a recognition that, over time, “there has been
a steady evolution towards developing a systematic statement, not of
etiquette, but of professional responsibility and legal duty.”137 However,
Kutak notes (referring specifically to the Comments): “this is not to say that
the proposed Rules have abandoned the educational and socializing
function that the present Code’s Ethical Considerations have served in our
profession.”138
These statements were made in 1980, shortly after the first draft of the
Model Rules were completed by Kutak’s commission.139 The early drafts
included drastic changes both to the format and substance of the Code.140
The drafts resulted in “turmoil and controversy” inside the ABA and state
bar associations.141
For purposes of this Article, the revisions to what became Paragraph 20
is informative. In May 1981, the Kutak Commission filed its proposed final

135. See id. at 233–34 (“As a profession we are engaged in an extensive reexamination of the
most fundamental questions in ethics; spurred, in part, by our own experiences, but impelled, as well,
by the forces of public opinion.”).
136. See id. at 234 (“[W]hat does the Code say about the obligations of the advisor and the
evaluator, the special problems of corporate counsel, and the implications of lawyers practicing
together? Frankly, either nothing or very little.”). Professor Schneyer, in his examination of the
adoption of the Model Rules argues that the ABA was also motivated to “shor[e] up among lawyers
and regulators the ABA’s image as lawgiver for the practice of law.” THEODORE SCHNEYER,
PROFESSIONALISM AS POLITICS: THE MAKING OF A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS CODE, in LAWYERS’
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 95, 104
(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). With the criticisms of the Code and the broadside attack by the
Supreme Court, this credibility motivation theory is supported by the evidence. See id. (recognizing not
only that the then President of the ABA wanted a new code but that Supreme Court decisions had also
narrowed the reach of the Code).
137. See Forty-First Judicial Conference, supra note 134, at 235 (noting the proposed change to
the Rules would be “restricted to statements of basic rights and duties, amplified and illustrated by
accompanying commentary and references to authority”).
138. Id.
139. See id. at 231–41 (echoing the speech given by Kutak at the Judicial Conference in
June 1980).
140. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 61 (1986) (“The Commission’s
early work showed that it intended a bold reworking of the Code.”).
141. Id.
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rules to the ABA House of Delegates.142 As proposed, the relevant portion
provided:
Violation of the Rules should not necessarily result in civil liability, which
is a matter governed by general law. The Rules of Professional Conduct may
have relevance in determining civil liability, but they should not be uncritically
incorporated into that context. The purposes of compensatory redress
through civil liability are different from the purposes of disciplinary process.
Generally speaking, compensatory damages may be predicated on violation of
a regulatory standard only if the standard is intended to protect against the
specific harm that has ensued. Many of the Rules of Professional Conduct
seek to protect a general public interest in the integrity of the legal process,
and as regulatory devices are broader than required for determination of civil
liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they
are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule
is a just basis for a lawyer’s self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under
the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an
antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek
enforcement of the Rule.143

The ABA House of Delegates rejected this proposal.144 Instead, the House
adopted this version in June 1982:
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action nor should
it create any presumption that an independent legal duty has been breached.
The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules
can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural
weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s self-assessment, or
for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority,

142. See id. at 62 n.75 (referencing the Kutak Commission’s Proposed Final Draft, dated
May 30, 1981).
143. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1981) [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N,
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT (1981)].
144. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 400, app. A (1982).
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does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has
standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.145

Further revisions to the paragraph were adopted in 1983, changing the first
and last sentences to read:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached.
....
Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of
violating such a duty.146

For comparison purposes, the current version reads:
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a
lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty
has been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily
warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer
in pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore,
the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s
self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a
disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.
Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a
lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable
standard of conduct.147

This evolution demonstrates the difficulty faced by the drafters when
attempting to evaluate the role the Model Rules should have beyond the
disciplinary process. The first version of the Kutak commission expressly
acknowledged the Model Rules “have relevance” beyond the disciplinary
145. Id.
146. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 401, at 6–3 (1983); accord AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2013, at 16 (Art
Garwin, ed. 2013).
147. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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process.148 This was seen as an acknowledgement of how courts were
viewing ethics rules in practice.149 However, interests within the ABA
pushed back on the idea that the Model Rules should contain such an
explicit statement acknowledging the role of the Model Rules outside the
disciplinary process.150
This evolution goes a long way to explaining the seeming paradoxical
nature of the current Paragraph 20. It is no accident that Paragraph 20
seems schizophrenic—its history demonstrates it is the result of
compromise and resistance.151 With this background in place, it is time to
turn to how courts have viewed and used ethical rules in substantive claims.
By substantive claims, the Article means claims outside of the disciplinary
process. This includes malpractice claims, breach of contract claims, and
breach of fiduciary duty claims. It also applies to use of ethics rules as a
defense to these claims.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE PARAGRAPH 20 PARADOX
The reality is that some courts—despite Paragraph 20’s direction that
ethical rules have a limited role in determining substantive rights—simply
disregard the approbation.152 In these cases, courts cite to the Code and
hold that the unethical conduct creates a substantively unenforceable
obligation.153 For example, in Passante v. McWilliam,154 a California court
refused to enforce a contract between a lawyer and her attorney where the
attorney failed to advise the client to seek outside counsel as required by the

148. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT (1981), supra note 143
(demonstrating the original proposed version specifically said “[t]he Rules of Professional Conduct
may have relevance in determining civil liability”).
149. See id. (“The organizational structure of the Model Rules reflects the actual experience of
lawyers and contributes significantly to the utility of the Rules as working guides to the law of
lawyering.”).
150. See id. (“No project of such fundamental concern as the Model Rules will be—or should
be—free of controversy.”).
151. See id. (“Many questions of professional responsibility can be fairly argued on both sides
and honorably resolved in many ways.”).
152. See Dahlquist, supra note 111, at 5 (“The Code has also been a handy tool in the hands of
many judges who have used it as a type of persuasive authority to establish important points in judicial
opinions.”).
153. See id. at 6 (“Courts frequently, and usually without discussing the applicability of the Code
to the malpractice action, use the Code to address various issues in typical ‘client v. attorney’
malpractice-negligence actions.”).
154. Passante v. McWilliam, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298 (Ct. App. 1997).
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ethics rules.155 There is no citation to the prohibition on using the rules in
a dispute outside the disciplinary arena.156
These cases are important and provide one answer to the fundamental
question this Article addresses. Courts may simply enforce ethical
obligations as substantive obligations without considering why this use is
problematic.157 This lack of analysis could be because the parties do not
raise the issue or the court does not feel it is necessary to address it. It could
be that the court believes that the overlap between ethics and substance is
so obvious no discussion is necessary. Regardless, these cases create some
of the disparities related to the Paragraph 20 paradox that have been
identified by other authors.158
In Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar,159 Justice Chasanow, on
the Maryland Supreme Court (in concurrence), chastised the majority
opinion for holding that the ethical rules establish the public policy of the
state without taking into account the limitations set out in Paragraph 20:
What is most troubling about the majority opinion is that the court has
concluded that it should enforce ethical rules by flagrantly violating the same
rules. . . . [In recognizing that rules establish public policy and create a cause
of action], this Court violates another provision of the rules that is expressly
directed to the courts [referring to Maryland’s equivalent to
Paragraph 20] . . . .
This Court does not encourage respect for the rules by using part of the
ethical rules to imply a cause of action that violates an express provision of
the ethical rules.160

Next is an analysis of cases where courts addressed the issue of handling
the Paragraph 20 paradox, which perplexes courts and lawyers for several

155. See id. at 302 (holding there was no contract to enforce as there was no bargain for
exchange).
156. See id. at 299 (suggesting the existence of a prohibition even though it was not explicitly
stated by the court).
157. See Benjamin P. Cooper, Taking Rules Seriously: The Rise of Lawyer Rules As Substantive Law
and the Public Policy Exception in Contract Law, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 283 (2013) (“Most courts simply
say that the professional rules do or do not constitute public policy without providing any
explanation.”).
158. See id. at 271 (observing a split amongst courts when deciding whether the violation of
professional rules is tied to any substantive impacts).
159. Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 709 A.2d 112 (Md. 1998).
160. Id. at 125 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
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reasons. First, ethics rules typically establish legal obligations.161 Most lay
people (as well as law students and perhaps lawyers) certainly would assume
that a lawyer who enters into an “unethical” contract has violated an
obligation to a client and should be denied the right to enforce the
contract.162 The idea that a contract can be unethical and yet enforceable
runs against common sense.163 Second, disciplinary bodies will often hold
complaints in abeyance until the underlying case is resolved.164 The reason
for this is justifiable—disciplinary agencies do not want to facilitate using
ethics rules for tactical advantage in a case.165 However, this, in practice,
means that matters that might be better handled early in the litigation
(perhaps by a court) are left until the substantive matter is resolved even
though the resolution could have a direct impact on a case.166 Third, some
of the ethics rules themselves sound like they are substantive and meant to
apply in the course of representation—not just in a disciplinary matter. For
example, the conflict of interest rules are written in the required “shall” and
“must”—and mere disciplinary actions will not fully vindicate the principles
set out in the rules.167 Finally, a number of ethics rules incorporate existing
161. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(“The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role. That context includes court
rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and
substantive and procedural law in general.”).
162. See Son, 709 A.2d at 114 (“[T]hat court relied on its decision in this case, raising the broader
issue of whether agreements entered into by lawyers that were in contravention of applicable
[professional conduct] rules could be declared void as against public policy.” (citing Post v. Bregman,
686 A.2d 665, 686 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996))).
163. See id. (“[W]e took the unusual step of directing reargument in this case on the question of
whether the alleged arrangement between Ms. Park and the lawyers was void against the public policy
expressed in [Maryland Professional Conduct] Rules 5.4 and 7.2.” (citing MD. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 5.4, 7.2 (adopted 1986))).
164. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(“[V]iolation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as
disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation.”).
165. See id. (cautioning that the Rules could be used in deciding a case to one party’s advantage).
166. See Dahlquist, supra note 111, at 6 (“Courts have recently taken pause, however and
rejected civil claims against attorneys stated in terms of violations of the Code alone. These decisions
evidence a need to review and evaluate the Code’s use in [substantive matters].” (footnote omitted));
Cooper, supra note 157, at 272 (questioning the impact and relevance of the “rules beyond the
disciplinary process”).
167. For example, Rule 5.4(b) provides that a lawyer “shall not form a partnership with a
nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). This would indicate that such a partnership would
be substantively suspect (although there is likely nothing in the business association statutes prohibiting
such a partnership). See id. (listing various standards by which lawyers should abide).
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substantive law into the rules, making it at least ironic that ethics rules
should be disregarded when examining a substantive claim.168
On the other side of the coin, there are several reasons why ethical
statements should not be incorporated into substantive law in addition to
the language in Paragraph 20. First, the Model Rules set out obligations that
should result in lawyer discipline but not civil liability.169 Expanding them
to create substantive obligations can undermine a fundamental purpose of
the rules—to provide guidance to lawyers in their practice.170 Second, the
purpose of the rules is not only to discipline the deviant lawyer but also to
deter lawyers from engaging in such conduct in the future, and therefore,
discipline may be imposed as a deterrent whereas the purpose of civil liability
is to remedy past conduct through compensation.171 In this sense, the rules
are not intended to give standing to any individual to use them to pursue a
cause of action, but instead are intended to be regulations to protect the
public through disciplinary proceedings.172 Third, the ethical rules contain
a hodge-podge of mandatory and aspirational rules.173 The aspirational
rules are not appropriate for discipline and certainly would not be
appropriate for civil liability.174 Fourth, because the rules are intended to

168. To give a few examples of where the Model Rules specifically incorporate outside
substantive law: Rule 3.4(a) prohibits “unlawfully” obstructing access to evidence. Id. r. 3.4(a).
Rule 3.5(a) makes it unethical to influence a judge, juror, or prospective juror in a means “prohibited
by law.” Id. r. 3.5(a). Rule 8.4(f) makes it misconduct for a lawyer to assist a judge in conduct that is a
violation of “applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.” Id. r. 8.4(f). Rule 8.4(g) defines
misconduct as engaging in certain “harassment or discrimination” and Comment 3 provides that the
“substantive law of antidiscrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law may guide
application . . .” of the provision. Id. r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3.
169. See Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 277 (N.J. 1998) (“[T]here is general reliance on the ABA
Model Code, and frequently a particular state’s code, for the principle that state disciplinary codes are
not designed to establish standards for civil liability but, rather, to provide standards of professional
conduct by which lawyers may be disciplined.” (citing Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds,
P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tenn. 1991); Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.,
1988-NMSC-014, ¶ 16, 106 N.M. 757, 762, 750 P.2d 118, 123)).
170. See id. (explaining the rules do not sufficiently establish what constitutes civil liability and
at best provide vague standards for the practice of law).
171. See id. (“[A] lawyer may be disciplined even if the misconduct does not cause any damage.
The rationale is the need for protection of the public and the integrity of the profession.” (quoting
Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 652 (Wash. 1992) (en banc))).
172. See id. (“[E]ven if the injured party initiates a disciplinary complaint, that individual is not
a party to the proceeding.” (quoting Hizey, 830 P.2d at 652)).
173. See id. (“Many of the disciplinary rules are aspirational in nature . . . .”).
174. See id. (noting a complaint against a lawyer for exhibiting a lack of professionalism would
be unsuitable for civil action).
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provide guidance to lawyers they are not written with the precision that one
would expect of enforceable substantive obligations.175
Although this Article addresses situations in which courts have
determined whether ethical standards should constitute a substantive
obligation, there are areas where the Model Rules make it clear that they are
not intended to provide the standard of analysis and expressly direct lawyers
to look to sources of law outside of the Model Rules. For example, when
determining whether an attorney-client relationship exists,176 whether a
provision requiring arbitration of legal malpractice claims is enforceable,177
the impact of a lawyer receiving inadvertently disclosed information,178 the
definition of the unauthorized practice of law,179 the imputation of criminal
or civil liability onto lawyers in a firm,180 and when a third party that relies
on an evaluation prepared by a lawyer can sue the lawyer in malpractice,181
the Model Rules themselves make it clear that the resolution of substantive
disputes exist external to the Model Rules.182
In conclusion, this section sets the stage for the rest of this Article. The
history of the Model Rules demonstrates that they were developed as
educational and aspirational statements for lawyers to ensure that the
practice of law remained a “profession.”183 The Model Rules were based
on a combination of accepted professional norms and established

175. Consider Rule 3.8(b) which provides that a prosecutor shall “make reasonable efforts to
assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel . . . .”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). Constitutionally, there are
different times when the right to counsel attaches under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See e.g.,
United States v. Acosta, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (“The Fifth Amendment requires
law enforcement officials to advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to have a lawyer present
before they begin custodial interrogations.” (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966))). What
time is the rule referring to? This issue was presented to the court in United States v. Acosta. See generally
id. at 1091 (showing the defendant sought to suppress evidence and the court held there was no Fifth
Amendment violation).
176. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 17 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
177. Id. r. 1.8 cmt. 14.
178. Id. r. 4.4 cmt. 2.
179. Id. r. 5.5 cmt. 2.
180. Id. r. 5.1 cmt. 7.
181. Id. r. 2.3 cmt. 3.
182. See id. r. 5.1 cmt. 7 (“Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another
lawyer’s conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.”).
183. See id. Preamble and Scope ¶ 1 (stating the various roles a lawyer fulfills within the legal
profession).
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substantive obligations.184 As courts began to look to the Model Rules to
establish substantive rights and enforceable obligations of lawyers,
lawyers—who drafted the Model Rules—sought to limit the scope of
potential liability.185 This led to the adoption of Paragraph 20 and helps
explain its paradox which instructs that the Model Rules should not be used
to establish a cause of action or create a presumption that a duty has been
breached, but provides that the Model Rules can be used as “evidence of
breach of the applicable standard of conduct.”186 In the next section, we
move beyond the position taken in the Model Rules and examine how courts
have analyzed them in substantive disputes.
IV. ESTABLISHING THE LINE:
ENFORCEMENT OF ETHICS RULES AS SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The use of ethical rules in substantive disputes has received a great deal
of scholarly attention.187 Most analysis has focused on the use of ethical
rules in legal malpractice claims.188 Others have analyzed the use of ethical

184. See id. Preamble and Scope ¶ 4 (requiring lawyers to be competent in all professional
functions).
185. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 616 n.97
(1985) (“Bar commentators consistently invoked the threat of civil liability as a necessary and sufficient
basis for deleting third party protections. Other commentators targeted particular rules as
objectionable.” (citation omitted)).
186. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
187. See Cooper, supra note 157, at 270–71 (“While the Model Rules were being drafted,
Professor Charles Wolfram wrote an influential Article arguing that the professional rules in general
should play a greater role in the substantive law . . . .”).
188. See generally Niccola A. Boothe-Perry, No Laughing Matter: The Intersection of Legal Malpractice
and Professionalism, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 4–5 (2012) (“Examples of lawyers
behaving badly—such as falling asleep in court, outrageous deposition behavior, disrespectful behavior
in and out of court (even in their capacity as elected officials)—have garnered considerable amount of
attention.”); Dahlquist, supra note 111, at 4–7 (addressing actions for damages resulting in malpractice
claims particularly focusing on reasonable care and acknowledging there is no clear proper definition
for legal malpractice); Daniel Engelman, The Rules of Professional Conduct and Civil Liability of Attorneys,
1993 DET. C. L. REV. 915, 916, 918–20 (“Recent developments in the definition of standard of care
applicable to attorneys in the legal malpractice suits include new formulations of both judicially adopted
and intra-professional guidelines promulgated by American Bar Association regarding ethical rules of
professional conduct for attorneys.”); Kristy L. Gilliland, Expand Use of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct: A Basis for Civil Liability, 15 J. LEGAL PROF. 355, 356–
59 (1990) (“[E]xplore[s] the feasibility and the advantages as well as disadvantages in employment of
the Code and the Rules beyond their current role.”); Faure & Strong, supra note 80, at 363–65
(reviewing the use of the Code in legal malpractice claims and distinguishing it from the Model Rules).
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rules in claims other than malpractice—often contract disputes.189 A
consistent conclusion reached in these articles is that there is no continuity
in how courts address the issue.190 The authors propose a proper use (or
nonuse) of the ethical rules in substantive disputes.191
This Article takes both a broader and narrower approach than prior
articles; it analyzes only the cases in which courts address the limiting
language in Paragraph 20. In that sense, this Article is narrower than prior
works. However, instead of looking at a particular rule or a particular area
of law (i.e., malpractice or contract), this Article analyzes every case that has
cited to Paragraph 20.192 In this way the Article takes a broader view by
examining the paradox in various contexts.
Lawyers are governed by a number of different obligations of
professional responsibility.193 In addition substantive obligations such as
legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, a lawyer faces obligations
pursuant to rules of procedure, contract law, and criminal law.194 One of
the core purposes of Paragraph 20 is to emphasize that the Model Rules,
while they may reflect the same sentiments that exist in these other areas,
are not meant to create new substantive law obligations.195 Paragraph 20

189. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 157, at 269 (“[T]his Article examines a largely unexplored
question: the enforceability of certain agreements (other than lawyer-client fee agreements) that are
prohibited by the professional rules.”).
190. See, e.g., id. at 271 (observing the lack of uniformity amongst courts in using the professional
rules to enforce substantive contract law).
191. See, e.g., id. at 296 (“This Part encourages the courts to take the rules seriously as a source
of substantive law and articulates the legal and public policy justifications for that position.”).
192. This approach is, by definition, under-inclusive. As mentioned above, courts may view
the ethics rules as setting out substantive obligations and never discuss the Paragraph 20 paradox. This
Article does not capture those cases. However, what this analysis does capture are the circumstances
in which courts address (or at least cite to) the Paragraph 20 limitations. Since the second objective of
this paper is to develop an approach for courts to take, understanding how courts have addressed the
Paragraph 20 language is a defensible limitation on the scope of the Article. To identify the relevant
cases, the Author performed a Westlaw search in the “All States” and “All Federal” databases, and ran
the following search: “violation” /p “rule” /p “cause of action” /p “presumption.” The search was
through September 20, 2017.
193. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(“Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an
understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct,
when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.”).
194. See id. Preamble and Scope ¶ 7 (“Many of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities are
prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law.”).
195. See Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care Corp., 649 F. Supp. 468, 472 n.4 (D. Utah 1986)
(“Certain ethical mandates, such as lawyer competence, may reflect substantive law requirement such as
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makes this clear by stating that it is designed to, “provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies.”196 Disciplinary agencies then use the Model Rules to ensure that
members of the Bar maintain the level of professionalism expressed in the
Model Rules.197 Sanctions for violations of the Model Rules serve three
primary functions: (a) to sanction/remove unethical lawyers; (b) to deter
other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct; and (c) to maintain
confidence of the public in the legal profession.198 Substantive areas of
law—tort law and contract law for example—are meant to redress the harm
done to a private individual or to determine rights between contracting
parties.199 To allow the rules to be used to establish liability would, it is
argued, “create unreasonable, unwarranted, and cumulative exposure to civil
liability” of the lawyer.200
Thus, in cases where courts are faced with an unethical action the
question is whether the conduct impacts substantive rights.201 In these
cases, courts following the Paragraph 20 prohibition should disregard the
ethics rules and look to law outside the ethics rules to determine whether
substantive rights have been violated. For example, in the criminal context,
courts have refused to hold that an ethical violation alone constitutes the
standard of care required of lawyers, but rules of ethics are said not to create the substantive law
requirement.”).
196. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
197. See Bodily, 649 F. Supp. at 472 n.4 (noting the Rules serve the purpose of guiding
disciplinary agencies an addressing ethical issues).
198. See generally Bangor v. Amato, 25 N.E.3d 386, 399 (Ohio 2014) (“The purpose of
disciplinary actions is to protect the public interest and to ensure that members of the bar are
competent to practice a profession imbued with the public trust.” (quoting Fred Siegel Co.,
L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 859 (Ohio 1999))).
199. See id. (“These interest are different from the purposes underlying tort law, which provides
a means of redress to individuals for damages suffered as a result of tortious conduct.” (quoting Fred
Siegel Co., 707 N.E.2d at 859)).
200. Sanders v. Townsend, 582 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ind. 1991). In a couple of interesting cases,
courts have looked to the language of the engagement agreement and held that a lawyer and client
could contractually agree that the ethical standards should be incorporated by reference into the
agreement. See Waggoner v. Williamson, 8 So. 3d 147, 154 (Miss. 2009) (“Under the AHP agreement,
Williamson and Miller had a contractual duty to comply with Rule 1.8 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct or the state counterpart.”); see also Garfinkel, P.A. v. Mager, 57 So. 3d 221, 225–
26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (upholding a settlement agreement containing an unethical provision
(violation of Rule 5.6) where the court found it significant that the parties had expressly contemplated
the competing public interests of Rule 5.6 and expressed a conscious and reasoned agreement regarding
the issue).
201. See Waggoner, 8 So. 3d at 153 (exploring if the unethical conduct displayed by a lawyer
created tort and breach of contract claims).
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violation of a constitutional right.202 Consider the situation where a
prosecutor, as part of a plea agreement, seeks to have the defendant waive
the right to post-conviction relief.203 Numerous ethics opinions are
published on this issue and almost all have found that it is unethical for
prosecutors to offer and defense counsel to advise their client to accept a
plea that also waives these rights.204 However, if a waiver is included in a
plea agreement and the agreement is subsequently challenged, the fact that
the lawyers acted unethically in negotiating the agreement is not relevant to
its enforceability.205 The constitutional question is whether the agreement
was entered into “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”206 The
defendant must demonstrate that his defense was harmed constitutionally
by the unethical conduct.207 The key is that for the ethical obligation to
202. See State v. Maloney, 685 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“Because suppression is
not available for an ethical violation, counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise the argument.”
(footnote omitted) (citing State v. Reed, 650 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. 2002))).
203. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 356 S.W.3d 148, 150 (Mo. 2011) (“As part of the plea agreement,
Cooper waived his right to file any further motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 24.305 . . . .”).
204. See generally Ariz. State Bar Ethics, Op. 15-01 (2015) (“As a common example, a typical
federal waiver required that the Defendant give up any right to raise any claim on appeal or in a habeas
corpus petition.”); Ala. Ethics, Op. 2011-02 (2011) (“[A] lawyer may not seek an agreement with a
client prospectively limiting his ability for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in
making the agreement.”); Fla. Ethics, Op. 12-1 (2012) (asserting that conflict of interest and being
prejudicial to the administration of justice are the two reasons why a prosecutor’s offer to waive
ineffective assistance of counsel is prohibited); Mo. Advisory Comm., Op. 126 (2009) (prohibiting
defense counsel from advising waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant Rule 4.7(b)(1),
which allows the defense counsel to provide competent and diligent representation); N.C. Eth.,
Op. RPC 129 (1993) (asserting that attorneys must zealously represent their client by complying with
their duties and advising their client about risks and consequences of a plea agreement); Ohio Bd. of
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2001-6, at 2 (2001) (“[A waiver of claims of ineffective
assistance] significantly limits and may even destroy the defendant’s ability to establish proximate cause,
a necessary element of a legal malpractice claim.”); Va. State Bar Legal Ethics, Op. 1857 (2011) (“The
Committee agrees with the majority of the states that . . . a defense lawyer may not ethically counsel
his client to accept” a plea agreement that waives ineffective assistance of counsel); Vt. Advisory Ethics,
Op. 95-04 (1995) (mentioning that counsel’s advise for a plea agreement would be a violation of DR6-102 (A) even though the “execution of a lawful plea agreement” would not violate the Code).
205. See Cooper, 356 S.W.3d at 157 (explaining unethical conduct between lawyers in drafting a
plea agreement has no bearing on whether the agreement can be enforced).
206. See id. (“Cooper has neither alleged nor proven the presence of an actual conflict of
interest-that is to say, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that pertains to the knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of postconviction rights.”).
207. See United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven assuming that Lyons
did act unethically, we question the prudence of remedying that misconduct through dismissal of a
valid indictment. To justify such an extreme remedy, the government’s conduct must have caused
substantial prejudice to the defendant and been flagrant in its disregard of the limits of appropriate
professional conduct.” (citing United States v. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1991)));
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apply in a substantive context, it must have existed at common law or satisfy
a constitutional standard; the rules in these contexts are irrelevant.208
Ethics rules alone are not meant to establish a cause of action or provide a
defense, but if the rules reflect substantive obligations that exist outside of
the rules, the rules may mirror that independent obligation.209 After all, as
noted above, the drafters of the Model Rules incorporated some preexisting
substantive obligations.210 Put simply, the rules do not establish a cause of
action, and a party must rely on substantive obligations found outside the
rules.211

United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1973) (“A violation of the canon of ethics . . .
need not be remedied by a reversal of the case wherein it is violated. This does not necessarily present
a constitutional question, but this is an ethical and administrative one relating to attorneys practicing
before the United States courts.”); Clausell v. State, 455 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(“[W]ithout any showing that a prosecutor’s violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility will
or has prejudiced him, a defendant has no right to enforce the Code and is not intended to be an
incidental beneficiary of any violation of its provisions.” (citing State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955
(Fla. 1984))); State v. Decker, 641 A.2d 226, 230 (N.H. 1994) (“We need not determine whether an
ethical violation occurred, because we hold that suppression of a confession is not warranted absent a
violation of the defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights.”); State v. Bryant, 581 S.E.2d 157, 160 n.2
(S.C. 2003) (“[P]rosecutorial misconduct resulting from the failure to disclose information to the
defense as required by the Constitution is not ‘necessarily synonymous’ with misconduct as defined in
the RPC because the focus of the analysis is different, i.e., the fairness of the procedure against the
defendant v. the attorney’s alleged misconduct.” (citing Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320 (S.C. 1999)));
Harlow v. State, 70 P.3d 179, 192 (Wyo. 2003) (“In light of the language of paragraph six [the
equivalent of Paragraph 20], we hold that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct on the part
of the prosecutor does not render Harlow’s statement to the investigators involuntary or require its
suppression.”).
208. See Shapiro v. McNeill, 699 N.E.2d 407, 409 (N.Y. 1998) (“[A]n ethical violation will not,
in and of itself, create a duty that gives rise to a cause of action that would otherwise not exist at law[.]”
(citing Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 779–80 (1978))); Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal.
Rptr. 269, 271 (Ct. App. 1973) (refusing to recognize a “new tort” for the violation of ethics rules).
209. See Shapiro, 699 N.E.2d at 409 (“Liability was premised not on a violation of DR 9–102
but, rather, on the fact that the attorneys had disregarded the assignment and, thus, were liable as any
individual would be who knowingly facilitates the misappropriation of the property of another[.]”
(citing Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 89 (1994))).
210. See Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care Corp., 649 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Utah 1986)
(“The law governing lawyers consists of principles of substantive and procedural law as well as ethical
rules.”).
211. See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 918 P.2d 1274, 1288 (Kan. 1996) (“Occasionally,
attorney conduct which violates an ethics rule may also violate an independent legal duty, and a cause
of action may ensue. It is the violation of the independent legal duty, not the ethics rule, that gives rise
to a cause of action.”); In re Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 220 (Del. 1990) (“Thus, it is clear that
even though lawyers have substantive legal duties, which may be congruent with the requirements and
objectives of the Rules, the latter provide no additional bases for the enforcement of such duties
outside of the framework of disciplinary proceedings.”).
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This is the “easy” approach to the interaction between the ethics rules
and substantive law. In these cases, the ethics rules exist for a unique
purpose that are not appropriate to use in collateral disputes.212 However,
the examples also demonstrate the head-scratching aspect of the interaction.
The criminal defendant who faced admittedly unethical conduct by both his
lawyer and the prosecutor is told the unethical conduct was irrelevant to the
validity of his plea deal, and he should take his concerns to the state bar
where the result will not impact his plea deal but could result in the lawyer
being sanctioned.213 The remainder of this Article systematically addresses
how and when courts have kept the barrier between ethics rules and
substantive law and when courts have decided that the ethics rules reflect
substantive law and enforce them against a lawyer.
A. Ethics Rules Do Not Create a Separate Cause of Action
The first issue or area in which ethics rules could implicate substantive
rights is to establish the duty that a lawyer owes to a client or a third-party
in a legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary claim. This is one area where
courts are in consensus.214 No court has held that ethical rules create a new
“professional responsibility tort”—where evidence of the violation of a rule
during representation would establish a claim against a lawyer.215
212. See Infotechnology, 582 A.2d at 221 (observing a litigant who was not the client may not have
standing to sue a lawyer for an ethical violation).
213. See generally State v. Decker, 641 A.2d 226, 230 (N.H. 1994) (“Although it is true that the
principal purpose of many provisions is the protection of the public, the remedy for a violation has
traditionally been internal bar disciplinary actions against the offending attorney.” (quoting
People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Mich. 1979))).
214. See Stone v. Pattis, No. FSTCV095011515, 2010 WL 2106403, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 16, 2010) (“Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any
presumption that a legal duty has been breached.” (quoting Gagne v. Vaccaro, 766 A.2d 416, 424
(Conn. 2001))).
215. See Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Fiasco, P.C. v. Oceanus Ins. Co.,
No. 13–CV–762–JED–PJC, 2016 WL 5746210, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2016) (“[C]laims ‘based on
alleged violations of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct [are] barred as a matter of law.’”
(quoting Trinity Mort. Cos. v. Dryer, 451 Fed. App’x 776, 779 (10th Cir. 2011))); Bochenski v. M & T
Bank, No. ELH–14–1031, 2015 WL 1040281, at *26 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2015) (dismissing a claim for
breaching ethical conduct); Graven v. Sienicki, No. 1 CA–CV 13–0253, 2014 WL 648208, at *5
(Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2014) (dismissing a count in the complaint alleging plaintiff violated “various
[unspecified] Attorney Rules of Ethics” (alteration in original)); Holton v. State,
No. 8:07-cv-43-T-24EAJ, 2007 WL 951726, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2007) (dismissing for failure to
state a claim where the complaint only cites ethical rules and breaches in the complaint);
Pollen v. Comer, No. 05–1656 (JBS), 2007 WL 1876489, at *10 (D.N.J. June 28, 2007) (dismissing the
case where the plaintiff “attempts to bring a cause of action for violation of the rules themselves”);
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There are three primary reasons for rejecting a claim based on the ethics
rules. First, the ethics rules were not intended to establish a lawyer’s
substantive duty to a client and can place vague and sometimes
contradictory obligations on a lawyer.216 Second, the Model Rules
acknowledge that they are written with the assumption that in many
circumstances a lawyer will use their judgment and professional discretion
to determine how to proceed—and imposing liability would undermine the
purpose of the Model Rules which is to provide guidance to lawyers in
making difficult ethical decisions.217 Third, a jury cannot be expected to
understand or appreciate how ethical obligations interact with other
substantive and procedural obligations of a lawyer (in essence, a jury could
not properly compartmentalize unethical conduct from legally inappropriate
conduct).218 Therefore, a plaintiff bringing a cause of action against a
lawyer must, through expert testimony, establish duty and breach based on
duties that exist outside of the ethical rules.219 As a result, complaints that
Wong v. Ekberg, 807 A.2d 1266, 1271 (N.H. 2002) (“[W]e reject the plaintiff’s contention that he can
establish the defendant’s duty and breach solely through the rules of professional conduct.”);
Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 414 (Utah 1998) (“[T]he Utah Rules of Professional Conduct are
not designed to create a basis for civil liability.”); Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 275 (N.J. 1998)
(“Consonant with the intent of the ABA, no New Jersey case has allowed a cause of action based solely
on a violation of the RPCs.” (citing Sommers v. McKinney, 670 A.2d 99, 105 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1996); Ruberton v. Gabage, 654 A.2d 1002, 1005 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 663 A.2d
1358 (N.J. 1995); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 623 A.2d 272, 278 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff’d,
655 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995); Albright v. Burns, 503 A.2d 386, 390 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1986)));
Zanders v. Jones, 680 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (rejecting an argument that adoption of
ethical rules justified a new cause of action for violation of the rules).
216. See DeFoe v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 526 S.W.3d 236, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (noting
that the rules provide for a great deal of professional discretion and do not clearly set forward a
statement of public policy); Hooper v. Gill, 557 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Md. Ct. App. 1989) (citing a general
rule of not holding lawyers liable for damages occurring from breaches of ethical duties);
Carlson v. Morton, 745 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Mont. 1987) (highlighting several cases where courts
dismissed plaintiff claims based on ethical standards); Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr.
269, 271 (Ct. App. 1973) (observing that there was no liability on behalf of the Sears attorneys for the
conduct of the private investigators that were hired by the company).
217. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(“Within the framework of these Rules . . . many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise.
Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgement
guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.”).
218. See Carlson, 745 P.2d at 1137 (“[T]he evidence concerning the alleged improprieties
involved in this case, while seemingly straightforward, might very easily confuse and befuddle lay jurors
unacquainted with general notions of civil procedure, incorporation, and professional legal
responsibility.”).
219. The Carlson court does recognize that there could be cases where the duty and the breach
are so obvious that no expert testimony is needed. See id. (recognizing that cases in which an “attorney’s
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merely cite the ethical rules likely will not satisfy the pleading requirement
necessary to state a claim against the defendant.220
B. Three Approaches As to Whether Ethics Rules May Be Cited in Legal
Negligence (Malpractice) and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
Beginning with the presumption that the ethical rules do not, standing
alone, establish a cause of action, the question is whether the rules play any
role in disputes between lawyers and clients (or third parties). The two most
common claims brought against a lawyer related to representation are legal
malpractice (negligence) and breach of fiduciary duty.221 The distinction
between these two claims is not always clear, but has been described this
way: “A breach of fiduciary duty claim considers whether an attorney
obtained an improper benefit from representing the client, while a
negligence claim focuses on whether the lawyer represented a client with the
requisite level of skill.”222 Although these two causes of action are distinct,
both are based on the overarching obligations of a lawyer to her client.223
Therefore, the discussion below does not emphasize the distinction between
these two causes of action but instead focuses on the impact of
Paragraph 20 on these claims generally.224
misconduct is so obvious that no reasonable juror could not comprehend the lawyer’s breach of duty”
can proceed without expert testimony). For example, where the lawyer misses the statute of limitations
or fails to appear at a critical time in the proceedings. Id. (citing George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822, 829
(N.M. Ct. App. 1979); Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 120 (Kan. 1984)). These exceptions,
however, establish the rule. Id. at 1138.
220. See Foreman v. Hausman, No. CV-91-03966988, 1991 WL 209647, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Oct. 2, 1991) (“The Rules and Code cannot form a basis to actions for civil liability.”).
221. See Walker v. Morgan, No. 09-08-00362-CV, 2009 WL 3763779, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Nov. 28, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting the plaintiff brought negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty claims against his lawyer).
222. Id. at *4 (citing Duerr v. Brown, 262 S.W.3d 63, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, no pet.)).
223. See Stone v. Pattis, No. FSTCV095011515, 2010 WL 2106403, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 16, 2010) (“[N]ot every instance of professional negligence results in a breach of [a] fiduciary
duty . . . . Professional negligence implicates a duty of care, while breach of a fiduciary duty implicates
a duty of loyalty and honesty.” (quoting Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 896 A.2d 777, 797
(Conn. 2006))); 2 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15:3 (2018 ed.) (“An analytical
approach recognizes that an attorney’s duties to a client include two obligations: (1) competent
representation and (2) compliance with the fiduciary obligations.”).
224. See Bronzich v. Persels & Assocs., L.L.C., No. CV–10–0364–EFS, 2011 WL 2119372,
at *10 (E.D. Wash. May 27, 2011) (noting claims against lawyers for breach of fiduciary duty should
not be derived from the Rules of Professional Conduct).
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Both legal malpractice claims and breach of fiduciary claims require the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the lawyer violated an actionable standard of
care or conduct.225 When it comes to a lawyer’s ethical obligations, the
issue is whether the rules set out the standard of care, a breach of which can
support a claim.226 Traditionally, a plaintiff must put on evidence from a
lawyer who practices in the area to establish how a competent lawyer would
proceed under the circumstances.227 So, for example, if a plaintiff alleges
that her divorce lawyer committed malpractice, the plaintiff must bring
forward an expert in the area of divorce to testify to the obligations owed
by a divorce lawyer to his client and that the defendant lawyer failed to
satisfy those duties.228 If the ethical rules did not exist, the expert would
be limited to discussing what a reasonable lawyer would do under the
circumstances.229 However, in a world where ethics rules do exist, courts
take different approaches to the proper role of the rules.230 The argument
in favor of this approach is that the rules codify the common law obligations
of a lawyer.231 Courts take three divergent approaches to this

There is no sound rationale for allowing a plaintiff bringing a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim to
rely on an RPC violation, while prohibiting a plaintiff bringing a legal-malpractice claim from
relying on an RPC violation. The duty of loyalty owed to a client and breach thereof can be
established without reliance on an RPC.
Id. at *10.
225. See id. at *9 (“[T]hese legal-malpractice elements mirror the elements for a
breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against an attorney.” (citing Al-Ghezzi v. McCoy, No. 56702–1–I,
2006 WL 2664460, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2006))).
226. See Pollen v. Comer, No. CV-05-1656 (JBS), 2007 WL 1876489, at *10 (D.N.J. June 27,
2007) (explaining an attorney’s violation of a rule of professional conduct is evidence of malpractice).
227. See Jacobson v. Lloyd, No. 294929, 2011 WL 1376312, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 12,
2011) (“As a general rule, expert testimony is required in a legal malpractice action in order to establish
the applicable standard of conduct, the breach of that standard, and causation.” (citing Law Offices of
Lawrence J. Stockler, P.C. v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989))).
228. Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 652 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (“To comply with the duty
of care, an attorney must exercise the degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge commonly
possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this
jurisdiction.” (citing Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238, 1447 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975))).
229. See id. (explaining malpractice liability is “premised on the conduct of the ‘reasonable’
lawyer” (citing Hansen, 538 P.2d at 1447)).
230. See id. (discussing the complications that arise when a violation of an ethics rule is used as
evidence of breach of a standard of care).
231. See, e.g., Azzar v. Tolley, No. 249879, 2004 WL 2451938, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 2,
2004) (illustrating the Michigan approach, which finds that a violation of a professional rule creates a
presumption of malpractice; thus, the rules in a sense are the codified duties of lawyers).
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question: (1) the Michigan approach; (2) the Alabama approach; and (3) the
Massachusetts (majority) approach.232
It is important to note that even in jurisdictions that allow the ethical rules
to be admitted as evidence of a breach of a duty owed to the client, the client
still must demonstrate the other elements of her claim.233 The causation
and damages elements can be difficult to establish.234 Thus, while a lawyer
can be disciplined for acting unethically even if there is no harm to the client,
a client cannot recover unless she can demonstrate that the lawyer’s
misconduct actually caused her harm.235
1. The Michigan Approach: Breach Creates a Rebuttable Presumption
of a Violation of Standard of Care/Conduct
The Michigan approach takes the position that the ethics rules set out a
lawyer’s duties.236 Therefore, in a malpractice or breach of fiduciary suit,
the plaintiff need only present the jury (through an expert witness) with the
ethical rules, that they were violated, and that they caused harm to the
plaintiff.237 The burden then moves to the lawyer to show that the ethical
rules were not violated or that causation or damages is lacking.238 Michigan

232. See infra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2, IV.B.3.
233. See Pollen v. Comer, No. CV-05-1656 (JBS), 2007 WL 1876489, at *10 (D.N.J. June 27,
2007) (“Even if Plaintiff intended to use Comer’s alleged violation as evidence of malpractice, Plaintiff
would still be faced with the hurdle of proving causation.”); see also Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178,
183 (Ind. 2007) (“[W]hile civil liability in damages may not be predicated on a claimed violation of a
specific professional conduct rule relating to fiduciary duties [(here, Rule 1.8(a)’s limitations on
engaging in business transactions with a client)], a client nevertheless may seek damages if the attorney’s
conduct constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty at common law.”).
234. See, e.g., Lovett v. Estate of Lovett, 593 A.2d 382, 393 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991)
(dismissing a plaintiff’s claim against her attorney for failure to satisfy all the required elements,
including causation and damages).
235. See Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 975 P.2d 1159, 1174 n.12 (Haw. 1999) (“Even
in cases of plain violation of a disciplinary rule, a potential plaintiff mus[t] still negotiate the hurdles of
standing, cognizable injury, proximate cause, duty, and breach[.]” (second alteration in original)
(quoting GEOFFREY HAZARD & WILLIAM HODES, A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.1:201 (2d ed. 1997 Supp.))).
236. See Azzar, 2004 WL 2451938, at *6.
237. See Jacobson v. Lloyd, No. 294929, 2011 WL 1376312, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 12,
2011) (explaining that a plaintiff must put forward expert opinion regarding the breach of ethical rules).
238. See id. at *5 (“[A]n adverse party . . . must . . . set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.” (quoting MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 2.116(C)(10) (adopted 1993))).
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seems to be the only jurisdiction that uses this rebuttable presumption
approach.239
The underlying justification for this approach is that the rules establish
(or codify) a standard of conduct that clients can justifiably rely on lawyers
to follow.240 For example, there are often situations where an action that
could be actionable in criminal law also establishes a civil claim in tort.241
In the same way, the breach of an ethical obligation may constitute both an
action before a disciplinary body and a tort action.242 Under this approach
it would be “patently unfair” to set a standard of lawyer conduct that could
be enforced through a disciplinary action but inadmissible when a client cites
to the same misconduct to recover in tort.243 Thus, similar to violations of
statutes, violations of ethical obligations create rebuttable evidence that a
lawyer has violated an obligation to their client.244
2. The Alabama Approach: Ethics Rules Are Irrelevant to
Establishing Lawyer’s Standard of Care/Conduct
The second approach—which is at the opposite end of the continuum
from the Michigan approach—holds that the ethics rules should not be used
in any way in a malpractice case, not even to be relied upon by experts or
239. See Azzar, 2004 WL 2451938, at *6 (“Although MRPC 1.0 provides that violations of the
Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct do not give rise to a cause of action, this Court has found a
rebuttable presumption that violations of the Code of Professional Conduct constitute actionable
malpractice.” (citing Beattie v. Finschild, 394 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986))); see also
Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding a violation of the Code is
“rebuttable evidence of malpractice” (citing Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. 1976))).
In the 2007 Deluca v. Jehle decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals seemed to be moving away from
the “rebuttable presumption” standard in favor of the “evidence of negligence” standard.
Deluca v. Jehle, No. 266073, 2007 WL 914350, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2007). In Deluca, the
court affirmed where the trial court—although saying it was going to use the rebuttable presumption
standard—used a jury instruction consistent with the evidence of the negligence standard. Id. In
contrast, in Burnett v. Sharpe, a Texas Court of Appeals held that the ethical obligations to a client set
out in Rule 1.15 (to timely return any unearned fee after termination), established a fiduciary duty that
continued to exist after the attorney-client relationship terminated. Burnett v. Sharp, 328 S.W.3d 594,
602 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). In a separate opinion, Justice Boyce noted the
uncertainty created by the recognition of this duty “untethered to a specific cause of action.” Id. at 609
(Boyce, J., concurring and dissenting).
240. See Jacobson, 2011 WL 1376312, at *5 (“Violations of MRPC create a rebuttable
presumption of actionable malpractice.” (citing Beattie, 394 N.W.2d at 109)).
241. See Lipton, 313 N.W.2d at 166 (drawing an analogy between the Code providing grounds
for a malpractice action and criminal law and tort law).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 166–67.
244. Id. at 167.
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admitted into evidence.245 This approach is based on the proposition that
the ethics rules only play a role in disciplinary actions and are irrelevant when
addressing legal liability.246 According to these jurisdictions, the mere
introduction of a rule violation would create an improper presumption in
the minds of the fact finder that a duty has been breached.247 In essence,
these courts determine that, as a matter of evidence, “[t]he probative value
of reference to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is outweighed by
unfair prejudice.”248
3. Massachusetts Approach: Ethics Rules Provide “Some Evidence”
of Standard of Care/Conduct
The third, and majority rule, is the Massachusetts approach, which allows
the use of ethical violations as “some evidence” of duty and breach.249 In
245. See Ex parte Toler, 710 So. 2d 415, 416 (Ala. 1998) (illustrating the statutory prohibition on
utilizing rules); see also Johnson v. Walker, P.A., No. 4:14-cv-04087, 2015 WL 11121363, at *2
(W.D. Ark. June 10, 2015) (citing Orsini v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 366, 369
(Ark. 1992)) (“While Plaintiff might not intend to offer evidence of failure to comply with the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct as a basis for civil liability, the evidence could create the presumption
that a legal duty has been breached. The probative value of references to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct is outweighed by the unfair prejudice.”); Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 652
(Wash. 1992) (en banc) (stating the model rules “were never intended as a basis for civil liability”);
Webster v. Powell, 391 S.E.2d 204, 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 328 N.C. 88 (1991) (affirming the
exclusion of evidence of the defendant’s violations of rules of professional conduct).
246. See In re Adoption of M.M.H., 981 A.2d 261, 273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (“The Rules of
Professional Conduct do not carry the force of substantive law, nor do they broaden an attorney’s
duties in civil legal proceedings; instead, they are a basis upon which to sanction a lawyer through the
disciplinary process.”).
247. See id. (utilizing the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct to reason that a violation
of a professional rule should not be used to “create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached”).
248. Johnson, 2015 WL 11121363, at *2.
249. Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1986); see also Sealed Party v. Sealed
Party, No. Civ.A.H.–04–2229, 2006 WL 1207732, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2006) (“[A]lthough the
Texas Rules are not dispositive, they may be considered evidence and significantly inform the analysis
of the scope of fiduciary duties between attorneys and their clients, as well as between attorneys and
their former clients.”); S. Council of Indus. Workers v. Ford, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1133 (E.D. Ark.
1997) (predicting the holding of the Arkansas Supreme Court: “[T]hat the violation can be introduced
as some evidence of the standard of care” (citing Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C.,
453 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. 1995); Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y v. Dotey, No. 91C-06-088, 1994 WL 146370
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 1994); Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830 (D.C. Ct. App. 1994)));
Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“A violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence
per se, although it may be used as some evidence of negligence.” (citation omitted) (citing Oberon
Invs., N.V. v. Angel, Cohen, & Rogovin, 492 So. 2d 1113, 114 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), quashed
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these jurisdictions, ethics rules may not be used to establish a duty, but can
be used to supplement (one court describes it as bolstering) the standard of
care.250 In other words, the plaintiff must first establish a common law
duty or standard of care, and then may cite to the rules as additional evidence
of the duty.251 To demonstrate this approach, consider Lovett v. Estate of
Lovett252 out of New Jersey. In that case, the plaintiff, a former client, filed
a legal malpractice claim against her lawyer alleging that, under New Jersey
law, the lawyer improperly acted as both a real estate broker and lawyer in a
transaction.253 The court rejected the idea that the plaintiff could merely
cite to the ethical violation in her complaint to establish the standard of
care.254 Instead the client had to demonstrate that a legal duty had been
breached.255 However, “[a]lthough it is true that a violation of ethical
standards does not per se give rise to tort claims, the standards do establish a
minimum level of competency which must be displayed by all attorneys.”256
Therefore, the ethical breach can be presented as evidence that a legal duty
has been breached once a standard of care has been established.257
on other grounds, 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1987))); Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 504 (Iowa 2017)
(adopting the “some evidence” approach); Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308, 320–31 (Nev. 2004)
(adopting the majority rule); Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 276 (N.J. 1998) (“Our courts have recognized
that the existence of a duty owed by an attorney may be supported by reference to an attorney’s
obligations under the RPCs, and that plaintiffs may present evidence that an attorney has violated the
RPCs in cases claiming the attorney has breached his or her duty of care.”); Smith v. Haynsworth,
Marion, McKay & Geurard, 472 S.E.2d 612, 614 (S.C. 1996) (“We concur with the majority of
jurisdictions and hold that, in appropriate cases, the RPC may be relevant and admissible in assessing
the legal duty of an attorney in a malpractice action.”).
250. See In re IH 1, Inc., No. 09–10982 (LSS), Adv. Proc. No. 12–50713 (LSS), 2016 WL
6394296, at *22 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 28, 2016) (“Evidence, however, is distinct from the standard of
care, which must exist independently of the Rules. Thus, an expert may refer to the Rules to support
a claim of negligence, but only to the extent the Rules are ‘expressive of the common law duty otherwise
owed’ to the client. Put differently, the Rules may bolster, but do not establish, a breach of the standard
of care.” (footnotes omitted) (first citing Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y v. Dotey, 1994 WL 146370, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 1994); then citing Flaig v. Ferrara, No. 90C-11-095 WTQ, 1996 WL 944860,
at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 1996); then quoting id.; and then citing Gatz Props. L.L.C. v. Preston,
2014 WL 1725822 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2014))).
251. See id. (requiring a common law duty to supplement the attorney’s violation of the Rules
to find the attorney breached the standard of care).
252. Lovett v. Estate of Lovett, 593 A.2d 382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991).
253. Id. at 385–86.
254. See id. at 388 (finding the plaintiff’s allegations and evidence is insufficient to establish legal
malpractice).
255. Id. at 386.
256. Id. at 391.
257. Id. In Lovett, even though the ethical breach was clear and evidence of the ethical obligation
could be presented to support the standard of care owed to the plaintiff, the court upheld dismissal of
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In adopting the “some evidence” standard, the Supreme Court of
Georgia noted that the stated purpose of the rules is to ensure that lawyers
act in such a way as to maintain the integrity of the judicial branch by
providing guidance as to how lawyers should act.258 Then, citing to the
standard for admitting evidence—that it “relate to the questions being tried
by the jury”259—the court held: “Given the potential consequences of their
violation and the fundamental nature of their purpose, it would not be
logical or reasonable to say that the Bar Rules, in general, do not play a role
in shaping the ‘care and skill’ ordinarily exercised by attorneys practicing law
in Georgia.”260 Of course, given the fact that admission of the ethics rules
is ultimately a question of evidence, a court could determine that citation to
a particular rule is outweighed by unfair prejudice to the other side even if
evidence of the rule would otherwise be admissible.261
The key in jurisdictions that allow the rules to be used as some evidence is
that the rule must be used as some evidence of a violation of another
substantive duty found at common law: “[B]efore a violation of our rules of
professional conduct can be used—even as some evidence of negligence—
there must be an underlying actionable claim against the attorney arising out
of how the attorney mishandled a legal matter.”262 To the extent that the
ethical rules overlap with common law obligations, the rules can be
referenced as supplemental evidence of a breach of that duty by an
expert.263
the case because the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the violation of the legal duty caused her
damages. Id. at 393.
258. See Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719, 721 (Ga. 1995)
(leveraging the language in the preamble of the Code).
259. Id. (quoting OCGA § 24-2-1 (repealed 2011)) (citing MacNerland v. Johnson, 224 S.E.2d
431 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)).
260. Id.; see also Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308, 321 (Nev. 2004) (“Supreme Court Rules reflect
a professional consensus of the standards of care below which an attorney’s conduct should not fall, it
would be illogical to exclude evidence of the professional rules in establishing the standard of care.”).
261. Greenwald v. Eisinger, Brown, Lewis & Frankel, P.A., 118 So. 3d 867, 871
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
262. Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 504 (Iowa 2017).
263. See In re Mullen, No. 03–11963–MWV, Adv. No. 05–1113–MWV, 2007 WL 2712957,
at *8 (Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 14, 2007), aff’d, No. 07–cv–372–PB, 2008 WL 3200734 (D.N.H. Aug. 6,
2008) (mem. op.) (noting that the ethical rules “provide an ‘instructive backdrop’” to determine if an
attorney violated a fiduciary duty to his client (quoting Kalled v. Albee, 712 A.2d 616, 617
(N.H. 1998))); Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., 87 A.3d 534, 545
(Conn. 2014) (allowing citations to ethical rules where consistent with the underlying duty owed in a
malpractice claim); Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y v. Dotey, No. 91C-06-088, 1994 WL 146370, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 1994) (finding that refusing to allow a party to cite to the ethical rules in this
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Courts have not been consistent when applying the “some evidence”
standard. For example, Hawaii has adopted what might be best called a
modified version of the standard (although it could also be described as
fairly close to the Michigan approach).264 As noted above, in a “some
evidence” jurisdiction, courts hold that the plaintiff must demonstrate that
a common law duty exists before a plaintiff can reference an ethical rule that
corresponds with that common law duty. The Hawaii Supreme Court,
however, held that the ethical rules themselves are “at least relevant to a
determination of the duty owed by an attorney to his or her client.”265
Under this modified standard a plaintiff can use the standards set out in the
ethical rules to establish the duty owed by the lawyer to the client.266 This
approach runs counter to the Paragraph 20 limitation, which indicates that
the court should not use ethics rules to establish the standard of care, but
should look to the rules only after the plaintiff has established that the
standard of care exists outside the rules.267 It may be that Hawaii, and states
using this modified approach, are attempting to adopt the Massachusetts

context would “subvert the purpose of the Rules”). The following is a jury instruction demonstrating
the interaction between substantive law and the ethics rules: “[a] violation of a rule of professional
conduct does not establish an act of legal malpractice. It is merely evidence that you may consider in
your determination of whether the defendants committed legal malpractice.” Mainor, 101 P.3d at 321
(alteration in original).
264. See, e.g., Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 975 P.2d 1159, 1174 n.12 (Haw. 1999)
(“This implicates the relationship between violation of an ethical rule and potential tort liability.
Violation of the HRPC does not, per se, equate to liability in tort.”).
265. Miyashiro v. Roehrig, Roehrig, Wilson & Hara, 228 P.3d 341, 360 (Haw. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting Delmonte, 975 P.2d at 1174 n.12).
266. See Delmonte, 975 P.2d at 1174 n.12 (“Given the potential consequences of their violation
and the fundamental nature of their purpose, it would not be logical or reasonable to say that the Bar
Rules, in general, do not play a role in shaping the ‘care and skill’ ordinarily exercised by attorneys
practicing law[.]” (alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C.,
453 S.E.2d 719, 721 (Ga. 1995))); see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen
& Ginsburg, P.A., No. 8:11–CV–2831–T–33MAP, 2013 WL 4402968, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 15,
2013) (applying Florida law and finding ethics expert’s “testimony regarding the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct and ethical considerations was sufficient to establish the standard of care
applicable to Defendants” (citing Transcript of Trial Proceedings held on May 16, 2013 at 215–230,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 2013 WL 4402968
(No. 8:11–CV–2831–T–33MAP); Transcript of Trial Proceedings held on May 17, 2013 at 14–121,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 2013 WL 4402968
(No. 8:11–CV–2831–T–33MAP))); Moye White L.L.P. v. Beren, 320 P.3d 373, 379–80 (Colo. App.
2013) (asserting rules relating to the obligation to communicate truthfully—Rules 1.4 and 7.1—can be
used as evidence of the standard of care).
267. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(instructing a violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action).
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approach, and the issue is simply one of semantics. If that is the case, it
contributes to the already confused state of the law, and it would be better
practice to more precisely define which of the three established categories
the jurisdiction follows.
C. Use of Ethical Rules As a Defense to a Claim
The sections above discussed the use of ethics rules offensively—to
establish a lawyer’s standard of care or conduct. This section analyzes
reliance on ethical rules in a defensive manner. This situation arises most
often when a party is challenging enforcement of an unethical contract or
transaction.268 Unsurprisingly, courts are not consistent in how they use
ethics rules in these contexts.269 Some courts will simply cite to the doctrine
that ethics rules should not be used to establish substantive obligations and
refuse to invalidate the challenged transaction—often citing the proposition
that the rules should not be used as procedural weapons270 and that they
are not intended to create substantive rights.271 Some courts have taken
268. See, e.g., Eakin v. United Tech. Corp., 998 F. Supp. 1422, 1428 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (seeking to
use an ethical rule to void a contract).
269. See Garcia v. Garza, 311 S.W.3d 28, 43–44 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied)
(recognizing, in certain situations, Texas courts have refused to enforce agreements that violate ethical
rules, but refusing to invalidate a deed obtained in violation of ethics rules in this instance).
270. See Trinity Mortg. Cos. v. Dreyer, No. 09–CV–551–TCK–FHM, 2011 WL 61680, at *4–5
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 7, 2011), aff’d, 451 Fed. Appx. 776 (10th Cir. 2011) (following precedent and barring,
as a matter of law, a breach of contract claim based solely on the fact that it violated the ethical rules);
Eakin, 998 F. Supp. at 1429 (“[T]he Court finds that Eakin has no basis for invoking the Rules
[r]egulating the Florida Bar as a means to void an otherwise valid contract.”); Poole v. Prince, 61 So.
3d 258, 282 (Ala. 2010) (“We conclude that the trial court erred to the extent that it determined the
parties’ agreement to be unenforceable as violative of Rule 1.5(e). . . . [T]he sole remedy for a violation
of Rule 1.5(e) is disciplinary in nature; therefore, the trial court lacked the authority to declare the
parties’ agreement unenforceable as violative of Rule 1.5(e).”); Tilzer v. Davis, 204 P.3d 617, 627
(Kan. 2009) (“[The rule governing aggregate settlements] is a rule of professional conduct defining an
unethical conflict of interest for an attorney representing two or more clients . . . .”);
Gray v. Noteboom, 159 S.W.3d 750, 752–53 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied) (refusing to
invalidate an agreement, reasoning that although the agreement unethically restricts the right of the
lawyer to practice, “under the circumstances of this case, [it] is not contrary to public policy and should
not be used as a procedural weapon”).
271. Loeffler Thomas P.C. v. Fishman, No. CV 15-5194, 2016 WL 1457895, at *9 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 12, 2016) (“Defendants’ argument fails as a matter of law because compliance with the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct merely gives rise to disciplinary action against an attorney.
It does not create separate claims or defenses to claims.”); MH Inv’rs, L.L.C. v. CT Fin. Partners,
L.L.C., No. KNLCV166028059S, 2017 WL 3881018, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2017) (“[T]his
court agrees . . . that such violations alone would not sufficiently serve as the basis for invalidating the
agreement based on public policy.” (citing Biller Assocs. v. Peterken, 849 A.2d 847 (Conn. 2004);
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the opposite approach and hold that the rules establish the substantive law
of the state and invalidated the contract or transaction.272
It is a legitimate question whether Paragraph 20 should apply to the
defensive use of ethics rules. After all, Paragraph 20 states that the Model
Rules should not “give rise [itself] to a cause of action” or “create any
presumption” in those cases that a duty has been breached.273 Does this
same prohibition apply when ethics rules are being used defensively to limit
liability? Most courts assume Paragraph 20 applies to defensive actions.274
One court, however, has held Paragraph 20 addresses only the
establishment of liability and not defensive use of ethics rules, and therefore,
a party is not prohibited from using such rules defensively.275
Courts do not systematically evaluate the defensive use of ethics rules.276
Rarely do courts analyze the transactions under traditional contract
Ankerman v. Mancuso, 830 A.2d 388 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); Noble v. Marshall, 579 A.2d 594
(Conn. App. Ct. 1990))).
272. See In re Worldpoint Interactive, Inc., Nos. HI–04–1172–MoRB, HI–04–1181–MoRB,
Bk. No. 02–00867, Adv. No. 03–90015, 2005 WL 6960239, slip op. at *11 n.23 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
June 28, 2005) (mem. op.) (voiding lawyer’s interest in bankruptcy context: “we believe that when an
attorney fails to comply with the requisites of Rule 1.8, the attorney’s self-interested and unethical
transaction should be voidable”); Sands v. Menard, 887 N.W.2d 94, 106 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d,
904 N.W.2d 789 (Wis. 2017) (holding a violation of Rule 1.8(a) created unclean hands on the part of
the lawyer and defeated equitable claims against client). But see Weaver v. Sch. Bd. of Leon Cty.,
624 So. 2d 761, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“On the record before us we are unable to conclude
that an abuse of discretion has been shown with respect to the Commission’s failure to compensate
Weaver for any delay in receipt of attorney’s fees.”); Harvard Farms, Inc. v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 617 So. 2d
400, 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to invalidate an oral fee agreement).
273. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
274. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Selman, 689 S.E.2d 517, 529 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (finding the
defensive use of the Model Rules is permissible).
275. See Law Offices of Peter H. Priest, P.L.L.C. v. Coch, No. 12 CVS 3532, 2014 WL 5780815,
at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2014), aff’d, 780 S.E.2d 163 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (“The issue is whether
the client can use the Rules defensively even though the client may not seek to impose civil liability
based on a violation of the Rules.”).
276. Several cases hold that Rule 5.6(b) violations are not per se invalid.
See
Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723, 732 (Ariz. 2006) (Bales, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (holding agreements that violate Rule 5.6(b) will not be
enforced, but citing to Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, which analyzes restrictions on physician practice
pursuant to Restatement section 188 (citing Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1282
(Ariz. 1999))); Lee v. Fla. Dep’t of Ins. & Treasurer, 586 So. 2d 1185, 1188–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (“Until [the restriction on representation] of the settlement agreement has been voided, canceled,
or nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction, it must be treated as valid and binding on all parties
legally affected by its terms.”); Feldman v. Minars, 658 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617 (App. Div. 1997) (“At the
least failure to enforce a freely entered into agreement would appear unseemly . . . . Even if it is against
the public policy of this State, the ‘violation’ can be addressed by the appropriate disciplinary
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principles to determine whether they are unenforceable as a matter of
substantive law.277 Instead, courts that are willing to view ethics rules as
enforceable standards hold that they pronounce the public policy of the
state.278 Courts that merely adopt the ethical standards as enforceable
obligations, without doing the appropriate analysis, leave future courts without
clear guidance and create the disparity in holdings that we see today,
undermining the very purpose of the Model Rules, which is to provide
consistent guidance to lawyers on how to act in their practice.279
A line of Florida cases demonstrates this problem. In Chandris,
S.A. v. Yanakakis,280 the Florida Supreme Court held that the prohibition on
oral contingency fee agreements stated the public policy of the state and these
agreements were unenforceable.281 Because there was no analysis to guide
future courts in determining whether other rules also stated the public policy of
the state,282 the results in future cases have been inconsistent. The confusion
caused a Florida appellate court to seek guidance from the Florida Supreme
Court as to whether unethical solicitation of clients would be actionable or
whether Chandris was limited to the written contingency fee rule.283
authorities[.]” (citing Shebay v. Davis, 717 S.W.2d 678, 682 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, no writ); Lee,
586 So. 2d at 1188)); Shebay, 717 S.W.2d at 682 (“[Even if the provision violates Rule 5.6(b)] its
inclusion does not void the settlement agreement. . . . The ethics of the attorneys’ actions, if justifiably
questioned, are for a state bar grievance committee to decide and not for this tribunal.” (citing Borden,
Inc. v. Wallace, 570 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1978, writ dism’d))). In the alternative, a
number of cases hold that a violation of Rule 5.6(b) invalidates the agreement. See La. Mun. Police
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Black, No. 9410–VCN, 2016 WL 790898, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2016) (asserting
that a restriction on practice would be unenforceable—in its entirety); Cardillo v. Bloomfield 206 Corp.,
988 A.2d 136, 140 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“Because the . . . Agreement violates RPC 5.6(b),
it is not enforceable.”).
277. See Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180, 185 (Fla. 1995) (holding a contingent fee
contract must comply with the Code or the Rules of the Florida Bar to be enforceable).
278. See id. 185–86 (“[W]e hold that a contingent fee contract entered into by a member of [t]he
Florida Bar must comply with the rule governing contingent fees in order to be enforceable. . . . [T]he
requirements for contingent fee contracts are necessary to protect the public interest.”).
279. See id. at 188 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (explaining that the purpose of the Rules of
Professional Conduct is to provide a framework for the practice of law).
280. Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995).
281. See id. at 185–86 (majority opinion) (holding a contingent fee contract “must comply with
the rule governing contingent fees in order to be enforceable” because the requirements “are necessary
to protect the public interest”).
282. See generally id. (remaining silent on whether other rules articulated the public policy of the
state).
283. See, e.g., Smith v. Bateman Graham, P.A., 680 So. 2d 497, 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(certifying the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether, under the Chandris rule, private parties
have standing to seek injunctions based on alleged violations of Florida ethics rules).
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The Chandris case demonstrates the problem with adopting, without
discussion, the ethical standard as a statement of public policy.284 A rule
that a contract or action that violates an ethical rule violates public policy
creates a bright line rule that courts would apply regardless of the
equities.285 Under traditional contract law analysis, when contracts are held
to violate public policy, courts do not look behind the contract to see if it
would be unfair not to enforce it.286 If a contract violates public policy it is
void ab initio.287 Such a proposition is problematic in the context of the
ethical rules for two reasons. First, invalidating certain contracts could be
used by a lawyer to advance their own personal interests, contrary to the
purpose of the rules, which is not to protect the interests of the lawyer.288
Second, and more significant, unethical agreements may have been fairly
negotiated and, as a matter of substantive contract law, are not
problematic.289 This situation can arise because the ethics rules serve a
different purpose than substantive doctrines.290 Take for example
Rule 5.6(b), which makes it unethical for a lawyer to enter into a settlement

284. See id. (discussing the confusion caused by Chandris and interpreting its reach).
285. See Rich v. Simoni, 772 S.E.2d 327, 335 (W. Va. 2015) (invalidating a fee sharing agreement
between a lawyer and a non-lawyer, and denying a non-lawyer quantum meruit recovery). But see
Freeman v. Mayer, 95 F.3d 569, 575 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Indiana law and refusing to invalidate
an unethical fee sharing agreement between lawyers, noting Indiana law makes a “distinction between
contracts that may be illegal . . . and those that must be declared void and unenforceable”); Polland &
Cook v. Lehmann, 832 S.W.2d 729, 736 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (explaining
that while “a court may use the disciplinary rules to determine whether a contract is contrary to public
policy[,]” in other situations Texas courts had invalidated unethical referral fee agreements; yet in this
case, the contract is enforceable (citing Lemond v. Jamail, 763 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Kuhn, Collins & Rash v. Reynolds, 614 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Fleming v. Campbell, 537 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.))).
286. See Rich, 772 S.E.2d at 335 (finding a fee-sharing agreement that violates public policy
“void . . . and wholly unenforceable”). But see Mark Jay Kaufman, P.A. v. Howell, Milton & Liles, P.A.,
127 B.R. 898, 902 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991) (discussing the bankruptcy court’s equitable powers to
evaluate the nature of the underlying unethical agreement and enforce it if it brings more money into
the bankruptcy estate unless the agreement is “clearly a violation of public policy or is clearly illegal”).
287. See Kaufman, 127 B.R. at 900 (stating the general rule that for a contract to be valid and
enforceable it must not violate public policy or be illegal).
288. See Rich, 772 S.E.2d at 335 (deciding a lawyer is not required to share fees with a non-lawyer
despite their agreement because it was unethical and violated public policy).
289. See id. (rendering a bargained for agreement between a lawyer and non-lawyer to share fees
unenforceable because it violates Rule 5.4 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct).
290. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(outlining the purpose of the Model Rules).
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agreement that “[restricts] the lawyer’s right to practice.”291 The
justification for this rule is that such agreements limit the professional
autonomy of a lawyer in her practice and limits the ability of future clients
to be represented by the lawyer of their choice.292 From the standpoint of
determining the validity of the contract, there is nothing in the common law
that would impose these per se limits on these settlement agreements.293
Therefore, when seeking to enforce the limitation, courts are faced with the
option of either invalidating an otherwise valid provision by relying on the
ethical rule or evaluating it under traditional contract principles and
enforcing the unethical agreement unless there is an independent common
law ground for invalidating the provision.294
Just as ethics rules may simply state the standard of care or conduct in a
legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty claim, they can also be
coexistent with a common law defense to a contract or transaction.295
Nevertheless, courts should be especially careful to do a two-step analysis
in these situations. First, the court should determine whether, as a matter
of common law, the transaction is suspect.296 Second, if the ethical
standard is coextensive with the common law rule, then the rule is relevant
in the transaction to supplement the common law defense (the same as the
Massachusetts approach in the tort context).297
For example, in Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance,298 a lawyer violated the
ethical rule on testifying as a witness.299 Subsequently, the lawyer sued the
client for an unpaid bill.300 In defense, the client cited to the ethical
prohibition on lawyer testimony and argued that the lawyer breached his
291. Id. r. 5.6(b).
292. Id. r. 5.6 cmt. 1.
293. See Mark Jay Kaufman, P.A. v. Howell, Milton & Liles, P.A., 127 B.R. 898, 900
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991) (“However, when the proposed reformation would result in an invalid or illegal
contract, the court will not reform the instrument since equity cannot accomplish an illegal act.” (citing
Hedges v. Dixon Cty., 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1983))).
294. See Garfinkel, P.A. v. Mager, 57 So. 3d 221, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (considering the
public interest implications of enforcing or invalidating a settlement agreement in light of Rule 5.6).
295. See, e.g., Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp., 457 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Wis. 1990) (analyzing
the standard of care as articulated in both the Code and common law).
296. See, e.g., id. (looking first to common law for the rationale of the rule and essence of the
conduct at issue).
297. See, e.g., id. (evaluating the attorney’s actions in light of common law and the Code to
determine if liability should be imposed).
298. Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp., 457 N.W.2d 538 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
299. Id. at 540.
300. Id.
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duty to the client and should not recover his fee.301 The court first
determined that the prohibition on lawyers testifying in cases in which they
are an advocate goes back to at least 1846.302 The court noted that the
purpose of the prohibition is to ensure that the trial is fair—to prevent
confusion created by the lawyer as both the advocate and witness.303
Therefore, under the common law, the rule was not intended to protect the
interests of the client.304 This meant that, at common law, the client would
not have a cause of action against the lawyer for violating the lawyer-witness
rule.305 Therefore,
[s]ince attorney-liability to a client based solely on a lawyer’s testimony for the
client was unknown at common law, and because Wisconsin’s Code of
Professional Responsibility is not only bereft of any indication that it was
designed to impose such liability, but, as noted, reveals an explicit contrary
intent, we may not impose such liability by decisional fiat.306

In Potter v. Peirce,307 the Delaware Supreme Court addressed a lawyer
attempting to utilize the rules in a defensive manner.308 A Delaware lawyer
entered into a fee sharing agreement with a Pennsylvania lawyer.309 The
agreement, while satisfying the Pennsylvania ethical rules for such an
agreement, did not satisfy the Delaware obligations.310 After the case
settled, the Delaware lawyer argued that he could not share the agreed-to
share of the fee with the Pennsylvania lawyer because the agreement violated
the Delaware ethical rules and was therefore invalid as against public
policy.311 The court held that the agreement was not invalid merely because

301. Id. at 541.
302. Id. at 542.
303. Id. at 542–43 (citing Arnold N. Enker, The Rationale of the Rule that Forbids a Lawyer to Be
Advocate and Witness in the Same Case, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 465).
304. Id. (citing Enker, supra note 303, at 465).
305. Id. at 543 (citing Walker v. Bignell, 301 N.W.2d 447, 454 (Wis. 1981); Wells v. Chicago &
N.W. Transp. Co., 296 N.W.2d 559, 565 (Wis. 1980); Olson v. Ratzel, 278 N.W.2d 238, 246
(Wis. Ct. App. 1979)).
306. Id. (citing Grube v. Moths, 202 N.W.2d 261, 268 (Wis. 1972)).
307. Potter v. Peirce, 688 A.2d 894 (Del. 1997).
308. Id. at 896.
309. Id. at 895–96.
310. Id. at 896.
311. Id.
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it violated the ethical rule.312 As the court notes, allowing a lawyer to utilize
the rules in this way would create the unacceptable incentive for lawyers to
violate the ethical rules—knowing that later they can avoid obligations by
relying on the rules.313
Both Peck and Potter appropriately utilized the rules and determined that
ultimately, the proposed defensive use of the ethical rules was not
appropriate in a substantive dispute.314 To give an example of how a court
can err in analyzing these claims, consider Robert A. Shupack,
P.A. v. Marcus.315 In Shupack, the court held that an unethical fee sharing
agreement was unenforceable.316 In that case, three lawyers entered into a
valid and enforceable fee sharing arrangement.317 Subsequently, one of the
lawyers was terminated by the client and a new fee sharing agreement was
entered into with the remaining two lawyers.318 The case then settled and
the terminated lawyer filed suit against the settling attorneys seeking his
agreed-to amount of fees.319 The court held that once the new contingency
fee agreement was entered into, it violated the requirement for sharing fees
between lawyers not in the same firm and was, therefore, invalid.320
Therefore, the two remaining lawyers were not required to share any of the

312. Id. at 897; see also Okla. Turnpike Auth. v. Horn, 861 P.2d 304, 308 (Okla. 1993)
(“Assuming that the fee agreement violated [the rule regulating fee splitting among lawyers] . . . [a
lawyer] is not relieved of its responsibility to reimburse . . . attorney fees.”); Mark Jay Kaufman,
P.A. v. Davis & Meadows, P.A., 600 So. 2d 1208, 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (“We have
interpreted [the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct Paragraph 20] language to mean that it is error
to use an ethical rule as a basis to invalidate or render void a provision in a private contract between
two parties.” (citing Lee v. Fla. Dept. of Ins. & Treasurer, 586 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991))).
313. Potter, 688 A.2d at 897 (citing Freeman v. Mayer, 95 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also
Counsel Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. Leibowitz, No. 13–12–00103–CV, 2013 WL 3895331, at *9 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi July 25, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“It appears to this Court that the purpose of the
rules can . . . be abused when an attorney enters into a contract with a non-lawyer and then seeks to
avoid the contract on grounds it violates the Disciplinary Rules.”).
314. Potter, 688 A.2d at 897; Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp., 457 N.W. 2d 538, 543
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
315. Robert A. Shupack, P.A. v. Marcus, 606 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
316. Id. at 467.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. (citing Dade Cty. v. Goldstein, 384 So. 2d 183, 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Bell v. Cristol, 373 So. 2d 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Spence, Payne, Masington & Grossman,
P.A. v. Phillip M. Gerson, P.A., 483 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1334
(Fla. 1986)).
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fees with the terminated lawyer.321 Thus, the court, without explanation,
incorporated into general contract law a defense that did not exist at
common law.322
The Shupack approach runs counter to the limitations set out in
Paragraph 20.323 It is problematic because it validates (and encourages)
lawyers to seek to avoid otherwise valid agreements by citing to ethical
rules.324 Courts should not allow lawyers or other parties to use ethical
rules as a mechanism to reduce or avoid an otherwise valid debt. As one
court put it: “The fact that the defendant has chosen to address [the] alleged
rule violation in this wholly self-serving manner rather than through
established channels for reporting attorney misconduct strongly suggests
that it is invoking the rules for . . . improper reasons[.]”325
The dissent in Shupack had the correct approach to analyzing cases of this
sort, stating that “this case is . . . properly approached as if it were a simple
action for breach of contract.”326 The dissent correctly noted the
consequence of the majority’s holding: “[T]o convert what was meant as a
client’s shield against the assertion of a claim for fees without services being
rendered, into a sword to permit an unjustifiable breach of an otherwise
binding obligation between two persons who happen to be lawyers. This is
wrong.”327 The dissent goes on to note that the irony of ethical rules, which
are meant to establish and maintain a professional relationship between

321. Id. (citing Goldstein, 384 So. 2d at 189; Bell, 373 So. 2d at 42; Spence, Payne, Masington &
Grossman, P.A., 483 So. 2d at 775).
322. See id. at 468 (“A broader principle of equity, applied in fee-splitting cases, would preclude
the result reached by the majority.”); see also Lemond v. Jamail, 763 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ. denied) (citing Baron v. Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Baab, Inc.,
623 S.W.2d 457, 462 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.)) (declaring an agreement brought
by a lawyer against another lawyer to recover a referral fee when the client did not consent as required
by the ethics rules, was held unenforceable).
323. Compare Shupack, 606 So. 2d at 467 (allowing the introduction of unethical conduct to be a
defense for substantive disputes between lawyers), with MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble
and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (defining the scope of the rules of professional conduct).
324. See, e.g., Potter v. Peirce, 688 A.2d 894, 897 (Del. 1997) (“As a matter of public policy, this
Court will not allow a Delaware lawyer to be rewarded for violating Delaware Lawyers’ Rule[s] of
Conduct . . . by using it to avoid a contractual obligation. To hold otherwise would encourage
non-compliance with the Rule[s] and create incentives for malfeasance . . . .”).
325. Odell v. Wallingford Mut. Fed. Credit Union, No. CV106012228S, 2013 WL 4734783,
at *22 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 2013).
326. Shupack, 606 So. 2d at 469 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
327. Id.
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lawyers, is being utilized to “lower the responsibilities of attorneys toward
each other below even the ‘morals of the marketplace.’”328
A systematic approach to analyzing defensive use of the ethics rules is
important because litigants can be endlessly creative when it comes to using
ethical rules. In Noris v. Silver,329 two lawyers entered into an oral fee sharing
agreement in a personal injury case.330 One of the lawyers committed
malpractice in handling the claim.331 The other lawyer argued that he could
not be held jointly liable in the malpractice action because the fee sharing
agreement was unethical.332 The court held that the ethical rule could not
be used as a shield to avoid malpractice liability.333 The court noted that
adopting such a rule would encourage lawyers to intentionally disregard their
obligations under the ethical rules to avoid potential liability.334 In
Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Laticrete International,335 the court awarded attorney’s fees
to the plaintiff and opposing counsel argued that the unwritten contingency
fee agreement was unethical and therefore unenforceable.336 The court
rejected the claim, noting that the defendant did not have standing to
challenge the fee agreement and that the ethical rules “[do] not afford
Defendant the opportunity to use [the absence of a written fee agreement]
as a sword to reduce a reasonable attorneys fee award.”337
Not only do lawyers seek to use ethical rules defensively, but so do clients.
So in cases where a lawyer sues to recover a fee, clients cite to the ethical
rules to invalidate contracts entered into with a lawyer—including fee
agreements, business transactions with their lawyer,338 and agreements
328. Id. at 470 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
329. Noris v. Silver, 701 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
330. Id. at 1239. The Noris court noted that had there been recovery on the claim the lawyer
would have been prohibited from recovering under the oral contingency fee agreement. Id. at 1240
(citing Chandris v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180, 185 (Fla. 1995)). Although, the author is unsure whether
the Noris court conducted a correct reading of Chandris, in which the Florida Supreme Court held oral
contingency fee agreements were unenforceable. Chandris, 668 So. 2d at 181.
331. Noris, 701 So. 2d at 1239–40.
332. See id. at 1240 (explaining the attorney’s argument that because “there was no written
agreement with the client as required by [the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct] he cannot be held
liable for any malpractice committed by [the other attorney]”).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Laticrete Int’l, Inc., No. CV065014930S, 2010 WL 2574146
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 27, 2010).
336. Id. at *6.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Buffalo v. Blackmon, No. CA 93-155, 1994 WL 14583, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App.
Jan. 12, 1994) (quoting Orsini v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 366, 392 (Ark. 1992))
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allowing a lawyer to take an interest in the underlying litigation.339 Often
these agreements are clearly unethical.340 These situations are a closer
question than the situation addressed above where lawyers or third-parties
are seeking to use the rules to avoid an otherwise valid debt.341 Some courts
have refused to invalidate such agreements, citing to the Paragraph 20
language.342 Others have invalidated these agreements—holding that the
requirements represent the substantive public policy of the state.343
In conclusion, when it comes to the defensive use of ethics rules, courts
should analyze the contract or transaction under traditional contract
principles and should only invalidate the agreement if the transaction would
be invalid at common law. When courts fail to systematically approach these
disputes, they not only disregard the limitation set out in Paragraph 20, but
they also create confusion in the case law concerning the role of ethics rules
in future cases.344 If a court desires to incorporate a particular ethical
obligation into the pantheon of traditional defenses, it should do so
(rejecting the client’s 1.8(a) offense and holding that “[a]n attorney does not lack the capacity to deal
with his client; and although such transactions are carefully scrutinized, they will be upheld if fair and
just” (citing Blake v. Denman, 236 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Ark. 1951))).
339. Ankerman v. Mancuso, 830 A.2d 388, 393 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (quoting Statewide
Grievance Comm. v. Botwick, 627 A.2d 901, 906 (Conn. 1993)).
340. See id. at 390 (emphasizing the cloud of suspicion when an attorney records a promissory
note creating a mortgage on the client’s property the same day the client has terminated their
professional dealings).
341. Id. at 391.
342. See Estate of St. Martin v. Hixson, 145 So. 3d 1124, 1133 (Miss. 2014) (“[A] violation of
Rule 1.8(e), standing alone, is not a basis for voiding a contingency-fee agreement.”); Ankerman,
830 A.2d at 393 (“Although we do not condone violations of the ethical rules governing attorneys . . .
we hold that the violation of rule 1.8(j) [prohibiting lawyer from taking an interest in the underlying
litigation] does not bar enforcement of the note.”); Pierce Couch Hendrickson Baysinger &
Green v. Freede, 936 P.2d 906, 912–13 (Okla. 1997) (announcing that clients cannot rely on lack of a
written contingency fee agreement to avoid responsibility for expenses of litigation); Kalish v. Smith,
824 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming what the trial court found as inappropriate to allow
the client to buttress a case’s underlying basis with a disciplinary rule).
343. See Rich v. Simoni, 772 S.E.2d 327, 335 (W. Va. 2015) (finding an unethical fee-sharing
agreement “wholly unenforceable” and that the party is not entitled to quantum meruit recovery);
United States v. 36.06 Acres of Land, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275–76 (D.N.M. 1999) (citing
Fryar v. Johnsen, 601 P.2d 718 (N.M. 1979); Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 600 P.2d
1212 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); In re Greenfield, 916 P.2d 833 (N.M. 1996)) (interpreting New Mexico law
to find an unethical contingency fee unenforceable, but finding the lawyer was entitled to quantum
meruit recovery).
344. See Ankerman, 830 A.2d at 391 (overturning Schulman v. Major Help Center based on apparent
confusion on the weight of rules of Professional Conduct in substantive disputes (citing
Schulman v. Major Help Ctr., No. CV 970569027S, 1997 WL 809909 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 24,
1997))).
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explicitly, adopting the ethical standard as the public policy of the
jurisdiction.345
D. Use of Ethical Rules in Other Substantive Contexts
Although the use of ethics rules in establishing a lawyer’s duty or standard
of care or use of the ethics rules in defensive disputes divides courts, the
appropriate use of ethics rules in other substantive contexts has not been as
difficult.346 This section analyzes the interaction of ethical rules with other
substantive legal claims.
Courts have been consistent in holding that definitions and standards
contained in the ethics rules are not intended to substitute or provide
definitions outside the disciplinary context.
For example, in
Stewart v. Coffman,347 a client brought a legal malpractice suit against several
members of a Utah law firm.348 The law firm was structured under Utah
law as a corporation—which would shield the individual members from
liability.349 It was argued that ethical rules defined a partner as a member of
the law firm, and therefore all members of the firm were in a partnership
and therefore jointly liable.350 The court refused to incorporate the ethical
definition of partner into the state’s business code, noting that the rules are
meant to address disciplinary actions and not to displace corporate law.351
Similarly, a lawyer disciplined for engaging in fraudulent conduct under the
ethical rules has not necessarily engaged in “fraud” under the Bankruptcy
Code.352 Courts have also not been receptive to client attempts to use the
345. See infra Part V.
346. See B & O Mfg., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. C 70-02864 JSW, 2007 WL
3232276, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007) (“[A]lleged violation of the professional rules of conduct is
insufficient to void the contract at issue based on illegality.”).
347. Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
348. Id. at 580.
349. Id. at 581.
350. Cf. id. at 581–82 (analyzing an appeal from dismissal of a claim against an attorney that the
trial court determined had no personal involvement in the alleged matters).
351. Id.; see also In re Kane, 470 B.R. 902, 938–39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing In re Siddell,
191 B.R. 544, 554 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Lorenzo, 434 B.R. 695, 709 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010);
In re Daprizio, 365 B.R. 268, 283 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007)) (indicating ethical obligations related to trust
funds do not create a property interest in a third-party sufficient to establish an embezzlement claim).
352. See In re Wyant, 236 B.R. 684, 695 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1999) (“Because the conduct violated
professional and ethical rules does not necessarily mean that the conduct amounted to fraudulent
conduct pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.”). But see In re White, Nos. KS–00–39, 97–42097, 97–7118,
271 B.R. 213, at *4 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001) (citing In re Romero, 535 F.2d 618, 621–22 (10th Cir. 1976))
(agreeing Rule 1.15 (Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct)—addressing lawyer handling of client
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ethical rules to establish violations of state unfair trade practice laws.353
Finally, in Allen v. Allison,354 the client brought, inter alia, a civil conspiracy
claim against their lawyer, arguing that the lawyer’s in-person solicitation
could be used to establish the “unlawful purpose” element of the civil
conspiracy claim.355 The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the use of the
ethics rules in this way, noting that using the rules to establish a necessary
element of the claim meant that the client was using the rules to establish
civil liability in violation of Paragraph 20.356
E. Use of Ethics Rules in Disqualification Disputes
The role of the ethics rules in questions of lawyer disqualification presents
a particularly difficult issue.357 The ethical rules set out when a lawyer is
disqualified from representing a client.358 They also set out when a lawyer’s
disqualification is to be imputed to a law firm.359 It is legitimate to ask: If
the disqualification rules are not intended to provide the substantive
standard for disqualification, then what is their purpose? Rarely does a
disciplinary body sanction a lawyer for failure to disqualify, leaving the
decision to the courts.360 However, Paragraph 20 expressly states that
funds—did make the lawyer a “technical trustee” as defined under the Bankruptcy Code, and finding
the lawyer’s debt to a client non-dischargeable).
353. See Brown v. Loomis, No. CV 990088096, 2000 WL 1196425, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 27, 2000) (stressing violations of ethical rules do not constitute “public policy” under the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act); Noble v. Marshall, 579 A.2d 594, 596 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990)
(“[T]he Rules of Professional Conduct do not of themselves give rise to a cause of action, even to an
attorney’s client.”); accord Birdsall v. Haymond, No. 33 88 80, 1993 WL 34371, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Feb. 4, 1993) (quoting Noble, 579 A.2d at 596) (citing Noble, 579 A.2d at 596) (dismissing a claim of
conflict of interest and solicitation allegations under the Connecticut Rules of Professional
Responsibility and Unfair Trade Practices Act for failure to state a claim for which relief can be
granted).
354. Allen v. Allison, 155 S.W.3d 682 (Ark. 2004).
355. Id. at 690.
356. Id. (citing Orsini v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 366, 399 (Ark. 1992)).
357. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, LAWYER DISQUALIFICATIONS: DISQUALIFICATION OF
LAWYER’S AND LAW FIRMS 3–6 (2d ed. 2014) (detailing the common issues that courts find when
faced with motions to disqualify counsel).
358. See id. at 41 (“A disqualification motion is most likely to be predicated upon an alleged
infraction of one of the rules that seek to prevent attorneys from engaging in conflicted representation,
but such motions have sometimes been based on punitive violations of other ethical rules.”).
359. See id. at 685–92 (“A party often moves to disqualify not just an attorney, but those with
whom she is affiliated in the practice of law.”).
360. See, e.g., Gregori v. Bank of Am., 207 Cal. App. 3d 291, 301 n.6 (Ct. App. 1989) (“The
increase in the use of motions to disqualify counsel, a remedy rarely heard of until fairly recently, may
also reflect the failure of the legal profession to use bar disciplinary proceedings to effectively enforce
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ethical rules should not be used outside the disciplinary process in the
context of disqualification: “[V]iolation of a Rule does not necessarily
warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a
lawyer in pending litigation.”361
The reality is that courts often cite to the ethical standard when evaluating
a motion to disqualify.362 However, when courts consider the Paragraph 20
language, they are more likely to look beyond the rules for the historic
common law standard of disqualification and not assume that the ethical
standard is the same as the common law standard.363
In In re Estate of Pendrick,364 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed
this issue.365 The court held that the ethical rules would only be appropriate
where the rules mirror the requirement that disqualification is required to
ensure due process and a fair trial:
[W]hile it may be appropriate under certain circumstances for trial courts to
enforce the Code of Professional Responsibility by disqualifying counsel or
otherwise restraining his participation or conduct in litigation before them in
the cannons of ethics . . . .” (footnote omitted) (citing Kapelus v. State Bar, 4 Cal. 3d 179, 203 (1987)));
cf. Dan Crystal, Diversion: Addressing Less Serious Lawyer Ethical Misconduct, 68 N.W. LAW. 18, 18 (2014)
(“Most grievances are dismissed following review or investigation by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
(OCD).”).
361. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
362. See Pallon v. Roggio, Nos. 04–3625(JAP), 06–1068(FLW), 2006 WL 2466854, at *8
(D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2006) (disqualifying a law firm under Rules 1.6 and 1.9); see also
Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 662 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2003) (finding
a law firm disqualified under the imputation of conflict rule 1.10).
363. See Schuff v. A.T. Klemens & Son, 16 P.3d 1002 (Mont. 2000) (“[T]he gravamen of a
motion to disqualify is not that an attorney or firm violated one of the conflict of interest rules under
our Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .” (citation omitted) (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017))); Maritrans G.P., Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton
& Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1284 (Pa. 1992) (“Long before the Code of Professional Responsibility was
adopted . . . the common law recognized that a lawyer could not undertake a representation adverse to
a former client in a matter ‘substantially related’ to that in which the lawyer previously had served the
client.”); see also Carlson v. Fredrickson & Byron, P.A., 475 N.W.2d 882, 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(“Evidence sufficient to establish a violation of [the conflict of interest rule] is not necessarily sufficient
to establish a cause of action for legal malpractice.”), overruled on unrelated grounds, Rouse v. Dunkley &
Bennett, P.A., 520 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1994). But see Beale v. Edgemark Fin. Corp., 697 N.E.2d 820,
827 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“Where what is sought is only to penalize the attorney for such misconduct,
the only forum for exacting such punishment is the Illinois Supreme Court and its disciplinary arm,
the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.” (citing In re Mitan, 518 N.E.2d 1000
(Ill. 1987); In re Marriage of Dall, 569 N.E.2d 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Camden, 569 N.E.2d
312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Freeman v. Myers, 547 N.E.2d 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989))).
364. In re Estate of Pendrick, 482 A.2d 215 (Pa. 1984).
365. Id. at 217.
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order to protect the rights of litigants to a fair trial, we are not inclined to
extend that enforcement power and allow our trial courts themselves to use
the Canons to alter substantive law or to punish attorney misconduct.366

In another often cited case, In re Infotechnology, Inc.,367 the Delaware
Supreme Court refused to allow a non-client to seek disqualification of the
lawyer based on a conflict of interest under the ethical rules.368 The court
held that to allow a party to rely on the ethical rules would infringe on the
sole authority of the Delaware Supreme Court in regulating the bar
(discipline would be imposed by trial courts and not through the designated
disciplinary process).369 In addition, opponents could turn ethics rules
Instead,
from rules of guidance into procedural weapons.370
disqualification is required only where the moving party
can: “(1) [demonstrate] the existence of a conflict and (2) demonstrate how
the conflict will prejudice the fairness of the proceedings.”371 Absent a
showing that the proceedings would be prejudiced, “there is no independent
right of counsel to challenge another lawyer’s alleged breach of the Rules
outside of a disciplinary proceeding.”372
One last case addressing the substantive use of the disqualification rules
is Bevan v. Fix,373 from the Wyoming Supreme Court. The Bevan case
involved a legal malpractice case brought by a former client against a lawyer
alleging the lawyer breached a duty to the former client by engaging in
litigation against the former client.374 The question the court addressed was
whether the conflict standard created a common law duty for which a lawyer
could be liable to the former client for breaching.375 The court held that
liability for violating the fiduciary obligations owed to former clients
predated the adoption of the ethical rules.376 The court then cites to the
Third Restatement approach to disqualification, which is substantially
366. Id. at 221.
367. In re Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215 (Del. 1990).
368. Id. at 221.
369. Id. at 220.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 221 (citation omitted).
372. Id.
373. Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013 (Wyo. 2002).
374. Id. at 1027 (citing Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 571 (Wyo. 1996)).
375. Id.
376. Id. at 1028. “[I]t is important to remember that attorneys’ fiduciary obligations
substantially pre-date the ethical codes.” Id. (quoting RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 17.3 (5th ed. 2000)).
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similar to the standard set out in the ethical rules.377 The court concluded
that the protections provided to former clients in the ethical rules reflect a
“codification of the common law.”378 Because the ethical standards are
commensurate with the substantive standards, the court held that a breach
of those standards could lead to liability.379 The court goes on to note that
whether a lawyer will ultimately be liable to a former client will depend both
on whether the lawyer went adverse to a client in the same or substantially
related matter, and also on whether the jury determines that confidential
information was compromised in that second matter.380 This creates an
element of harm or prejudice that is not required to establish an ethical
breach.381 This follows the position set out in the cases cited above that
merely showing a breach of the ethics rules is not sufficient (there is no
irrebutable presumption of harm), but the client must establish a conflict
and that the breach caused harm to the client.382
The Infotechnology approach provides, in this author’s opinion, the
appropriate approach to evaluating motions to disqualify by courts. Merely
citing to a violation of the rules is insufficient; the party moving for
disqualification must “offer sufficient proof that the continued
representation of one party by the attorney or firm will prejudice or
adversely impact the rights of another party in the matter pending before
the court.”383 Once this showing is made, the court is not disqualifying the
377. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000)).
378. Id. at 1029; see also Greene v. Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., No. 3:14-CV-00619-TBR,
2016 WL 6877746, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 21, 2016) (asserting that the ethics rules provide evidence of
standard of care for malpractice claim based on conflict of interest (citing CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin,
538 F.3d 402, 413 (6th Cir. 2008))).
379. See Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1029–30 (“[W]e think it is obvious that a breach of [Professional Rule]
standards by the attorney gives rise to potential civil liability to the former client.”).
380. Id. at 1031 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033–34 (E.D. Mo. 1998),
aff’d, 186 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 1999)). The opinion reads:
The Court does not believe that under Missouri law a breach is presumed or somehow established
as a matter of law if the matters are “substantially related” under Rule 1.9. Instead, the evidence
of a relationship, or lack thereof, between the cases are facts that the jury may consider in
determining whether it should draw an inference that confidential information was used.
Id. (quoting Carey, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1033–34).
381. Id. at 1030 (citing Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 349 (Wyo. 1988)).
382. Id. at 1030–31.
383. Schuff v. A.T. Klemens & Son, 16 P.3d 1002, 1011 (Mont. 2000). Similarly, when conflict
of interest is asserted as a basis for attorney liability in a negligence or breach of fiduciary duty claim,
the client must do more than cite to the ethics rules in her complaint—she must allege that the lawyer
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lawyer because of the ethical violation, but because the action harms a party
before the court.384 The authority to disqualify when this standard is shown
is based on the courts’ inherent authority to regulate lawyers who appear
before them.385 Of course this means it is possible a lawyer can operate
under an actual conflict of interest and continue to represent a client in the
matter—with discipline left to the disciplinary body.386 This is the
inescapable Paragraph 20 paradox.
Occasionally, someone other than the client seeks disqualification based
on conflict of interest.387 These situations raise the concern that the rules
are being used inappropriately for procedural advantage.388 As one court
put it:
To allow an unauthorized surrogate to champion the rights of the former
client would allow that surrogate to use the conflict rules for his own purposes
where a genuine conflict might not really exist. It would place in the hands of
the unauthorized surrogate powerful presumptions which are inappropriate
in his hands.389

“breached a common law duty to the plaintiff” that caused her harm. Flaig v. Ferrara,
No. 90C-11-095 WTQ, 1996 WL 944860, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 1996).
384. See Schuff, 16 P.3d at 1012 (“Thus, a proven or admitted rule violation is not prima facie
grounds for disqualification—or any other relief sought from a district court, for that matter.”).
385. See id. at 1011 (“A district court’s discretion in this regard flows from its inherent authority
to control trial administration in the interest of fairness and justice.” (citing Anderson v. Werner
Enters., Inc., 972 P.2d 806, 809 (Mont. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3–1–111)); see also
Cargould v. Manning, No. 09-AP-194, 2009 WL 3674669, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009) (“A trial
court has inherent authority to regulate the practice before it and to protect the integrity of its
proceedings, including the authority and duty to ensure the ethical conduct of attorneys. This power
includes the inherent authority to disqualify counsel if he or she cannot, or will not, comply with Ohio’s
rules governing ethics and professionalism when representing a client.” (citation omitted) (citing
Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 510 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ohio 1987))).
386. Schuff, 16 P.3d at 1012. In Schuff, the court refused to disqualify the lawyer because the
opponent could not demonstrate the prejudice necessary to justify disqualification. Id. at 1015–16.
However, in concluding its opinion, the court referred the actions to the disciplinary authority, both
the lawyer moving for disqualification and the lawyer subject to the disqualification motion. Id. at 1016.
The lawyer subject to disqualification was there for representing a client under a conflict of interest
and the moving lawyer for failing to report the alleged unethical conflict of interest to the disciplinary
body. Id. at 1015.
387. See, e.g., id. at 1013 (providing an example of a former client raising a conflict of interest).
388. See Winchester v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., No. 5:10–CV–00012–TBR, 2010 WL 2521465,
at *1 (W.D. Ky. June 18, 2010) (cautioning about the use of the rules as “procedural weapons” (quoting
KY. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT Preamble ¶ XXI (2009))).
389. Id. at *2 (citing In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976)).
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In most of these cases the court will reject the claim for disqualification
based on lack of standing (reserving standing to the client).390 However,
there are situations where the conflict of interest is so open and obvious or
egregious that the court will act, relying on the inherent power to regulate
the actions of lawyers appearing before the court, and disqualify counsel.391
F. Use of Ethics Rules in Claims by an Opponent Against a Lawyer
The traditional rule is that a third-party is not in privity with a lawyer and
cannot sue the lawyer for violating a duty to that person.392 Some states
continue to follow the strict privity rule.393 Most states, however, have
relaxed the privity requirement in certain contexts.394 The Restatement
recognizes four limited situations where a non-client can sue a lawyer.395
With the loosening of privity, it is natural to ask whether it has any impact
on the ability of third-parties to sue attorneys for violation of ethical
obligations. A number of the Model Rules set out obligations of the lawyer
to third parties.396 Rules 4.1 through 4.4 are all included under the heading
“Transactions With Persons Other Than Clients.”397 These rules state that
a lawyer shall not make a false statement of material fact to a third person
(Rule 4.1),398 shall not directly contact someone in a matter who is
represented by counsel (Rule 4.2),399 shall not imply disinterest when
390. See, e.g., Zerger & Mauer L.L.P. v. City of Greenwood, 751 F.3d 928, 929 (8th Cir. 2014)
(approving the intervention of the former client into a subsequent matter to assert a motion to
disqualify their former lawyers).
391. See FMC Techs, Inc. v. Edwards, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(recognizing non-client standing where unethical representation is “manifest and glaring” or “open and
obvious” such that the court has a duty to act (quoting Yarn Processing, 530 F.2d at 89)).
392. See, e.g., Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames, Prof’l Corp., 364 P.3d 872, 877 (Colo. 2016) (citing
Nat’l Sav. Bank of D.C. v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879)) (indicating the lawyer’s obligation is
generally to clients and not third parties).
393. See id. at 874 (“We decline to abandon the strict privity rule, and we reaffirm that where
non-clients . . . are concerned, an attorney’s liability is generally limited to the narrow set of
circumstances in which the attorney has committed fraud or a malicious or tortious act, including
negligent misrepresentation.”).
394. See, e.g., id. at 877 (showing states like California have relaxed the traditional privity
requirements).
395. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
396. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1–4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(establishing rules of conduct between attorneys and third parties).
397. Id.
398. Id. r. 4.1.
399. Id. r. 4.2.
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dealing with an unrepresented person (Rule 4.3),400 and, as defined in
Rule 4.4, must demonstrate respect for third persons.401 It is a fair question
to ask that if these ethical obligations (which are written in the mandatory
“shall”402) impose obligations that are enforceable by non-clients impacted
by a lawyer’s violation. In addition to those above, third parties attempt to
use other Model Rules in opposing a lawyer’s conduct—such as the
requirements in Rule 1.15 regarding lawyer trust accounts.403
Such third-party claims have universally been rejected.404 First, the
Model Rules themselves—even those that are directed at an adversary—are
400. Id. r. 4.3.
401. Id. r. 4.4.
402. See, e.g., id. r. 4.1 (“In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
403. See Caesars Entm’t Operating Co. v. Johnson, No. 3:13-00620-CRS, 2015 WL 5020695,
at *7 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 24, 2015) (“Because this is not a Court of Ethics, Rule 1.15(a) and its comments
are of no consequence here. Caesars must point the Court elsewhere if it seeks to establish that the
‘nature’ of an attorney’s IOLTA creates a fiduciary relationship between that attorney and anyone
claiming a right to funds therein.”); Accident & Injury Med. Specialists, P.C. v. Mintz, 279 P.3d 658,
660 (Colo. 2012) (en banc) (finding no fiduciary relationship established between lawyer and third party
based on Rule 1.15 trust fund obligations); see also Chambers v. Weinstein, No. 157781/2013, 2014 WL
4276910, slip op. at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2014) (dismissing a claim of breach of fiduciary duty
because ethics rules do not create a fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and claimants of money
held by the lawyer in trust).
404. See Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2012) (disallowing a claim by an
opponent against an attorney in the absence of a direct attorney-client relationship); Bradley v. CVS
Corp., No. PJM 07–2732, 2008 WL 7874768, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 28, 2008) (even assuming that the
lawyer violated the duty of candor to tribunal under Rule 3.3, opposing counsel would have no claim,
“it is the Court or professional disciplinary authorities, and not the opposing litigant, that has standing
to act”); Md. Nat’l Bank v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 895 F. Supp. 762, 771 (D. Md. 1995) (rejecting a claim
for liability under Rule 3.3(a)); Biller Assocs. v. Peterken, 849 A.2d 847, 852–53 (Conn. 2004)
(recognizing conflicts created by fiduciary relationships owed to opposing counsel); Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Windham, 81 A.3d 230, 239, 243 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (affirming a lower court’s rejection of
an argument that an arbitration award should be set aside where the opposing lawyer violated Rule 3.3);
Weaver v. Milard, 819 P.2d 110, 121 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (denying a motion to disqualify based on a
conflict of interest filed by opposing counsel); see also Akins v. Edmondson, 207 S.W.3d 300, 308
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the claim by a non-client against the lawyer); accord
Blankinship v. Brown, 399 S.W.3d 303, 311 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (rejecting an
argument that a lawyer owed a duty to its opponent pursuant to Rule 4.1); Jurek v. Kivell,
No. 01-10-00040-CV, 2011 WL 1587375, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 21, 2011,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (denying the extension of duties to third-parties in an attorney-client relationships);
Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W.3d 440, 422 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (declining to find that a
fiduciary obligation is owed to an opponent when a firm fails to ethically handle proceeds it received);
Adams v. Reagan, 791 S.W.2d 284, 291 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990, no pet.) (“We hold that
appellants have no standing to complain of a possible conflict as they are not represented by appellees’
counsel.” (citing Pioneer Nat. Gas Co. v. Caraway, 562 S.W.2d 284, 290 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1978,
writ ref’d n.r.e.))).
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“for the benefit of the public and to aid in the proper administration of
justice”405—they are not intended to create duties to third parties.406 The
Hurley v. Fuyat407 court stated the problem with using ethical rules to extend
liability to opponents:
To allow plaintiff [to sue opposing counsel], under the guise of
negligence, . . . would be to turn the rules of conduct on their head. [By using
the rules] in the form of duties of care owed to private, adverse litigants rather
than to the public at large, they begin to lose their character as ethical
guideposts and the means by which lawyer misconduct can be remedied
extra-judicially. Those rules exist not for the benefit of the unethical or
corrupt lawyers, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is not only
that lawyers practice law ethically but also that they remain free to counsel and
litigate without fear of unwarranted professional attack. Attorneys should not
have to fear that adverse litigants will haunt them with litigation charging
violations of the rules of professional conduct. Imposing such a burden
would do nothing to augment the ethical practice of law but could chill
effective and zealous representation, undermine the civility of the profession
and ultimately compromise the very public interest that the rules seek to
protect.408

This is a well-stated basis for not extending substantive obligations to
opponents.
A frequently cited case addressing the enforceability of ethical obligations
by third parties is the Connecticut Supreme Court case Mozzochi v. Beck.409
In Mozzochi, the opposing party sued a lawyer claiming malicious
prosecution and legal malpractice, arguing that it was a “foreseeable
beneficiary” of the obligations imposed by the ethical rules.410 The court
first noted that there are circumstances when a non-client can sue an
opposing lawyer.411 However, in each of those situations the non-client
405. Hurley v. Fuyat, No. 92-5082, 1994 WL 930891, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1994) (citing
Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (N.D. Iowa),
aff’d, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978); L & H Airco, Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372, 380
(Minn. 1989); Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., 750 P.2d 118, 123 (N.M. 1988)).
406. See id. (indicating that the benefit of the duty is not intended to run to adversaries).
407. Hurley v. Fuyat, No. 92-5082, 1994 WL 930891 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1994).
408. Id. at *10.
409. Mozzochi v. Beck, 529 A.2d 171 (Conn. 1987).
410. Id. at 175.
411. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“[T]he lawyer or (with the lawyer’s acquiescence) the lawyer’s client invites the [non-client]
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reasonably relied on work performed by the lawyer and suffered injury as a
result of that reliance.412 The court refused to extend the existence of
ethical obligations to create a new basis for a non-client to sue a lawyer.413
This is a universally accepted position.414 There are several reasons for
prohibiting these suits. First, the disclaimer in Paragraph 20, makes it clear
that the Model Rules are not intended to be used to establish liability.415
Second, the suits would have a chilling effect on a lawyer’s zealous
representation of a client, creating a conflict of interest between lawyer and
client:
[C]reation of a duty in favor of an adversary of the attorney’s client would
create an unacceptable conflict of interest which would seriously hamper an
attorney’s effectiveness as counsel for his client. Not only would the
adversary’s interests interfere with the client’s interests, the attorney’s

to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision of other legal services, and the [non-client] so relies; and . . .
the [non-client] is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to
protection[.]”); see also Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb P.A., 750 P.2d 118, 122
(N.M. 1988) (“A duty of care toward non-clients has been found to exist only in those situations where
the non-client was an intended beneficiary of attorney’s services, or where it was reasonably foreseeable
that negligent service or advice to or on behalf of the client could cause harm to others.” (citing
Annotation, Attorneys-Liability to Third Parties, 45 A.L.R.3d 1181 (1972))).
412. Mozzochi, 529 A.2d at 176.
413. Id. at 176 n.8; see also Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris, P.A.,
655 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (applying Florida law and dismissing a claim by a non-client
for failure to disclose the client’s fraudulent statements); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381
(N.D. Iowa), aff’d, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978) (“While it is true that the attorney owes a general duty
to the judicial system, it is not the type of duty which translates into liability for negligence to an
opposing party where there is no foreseeable reliance by that party on the attorney’s conduct.”).
414. See, e.g., Mozzochi, 529 A.2d at 176 (“Every court that has examined this question has
concluded that the Code of Professional Responsibility does not, per se, give rise to a third party cause
of action for damages.” (citing Bickel, 447 F. Supp. at 1383; Noble v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal.
Rptr. 269 (Ct. App. 1973); Myers v. Cohen, 687 P.2d 6, 16 (Haw.), rev’d on other grounds, 688 P.2d 1145
(Haw. 1984); Brody v. Ruby 267 N.W.2d 902, 907–08 (Iowa 1978); Young v. Hecht, 597 P.2d 682
(Kan. 1979); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331, 333–35 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Spencer v. Burglass,
337 So. 2d 596, 600–01 (La. App. 1976), writ of review denied, 340 So. 2d 990 (La. 1977); Robert L.
Sullivan D.D.S., P.C. v. Birmingham, 416 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); Friedman v. Dozorc,
312 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1981); Drago v. Buonagurio, 401 N.Y.S.2d 250, rev’d on other grounds,
386 N.E.2d 821 (1978); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ
ref’d n.r.e.); RONALD E. MALLEN & VICTOR B. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 67 (2d ed. 1981);
Wolfram, supra note 101, at 310–14)).
415. See id. at 176 n.8 (“The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability.”).
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justifiable concern with being sued for negligence would detrimentally
interfere with the attorney-client relationship.416

Third, ethics rules are intended to protect and vindicate public rights and
not to give aggrieved private individuals a cause of action.417 Similarly,
allowing such suits would undermine the American adversarial system418
and cause lawyers to turn down valid claims, fail to put forward novel legal
arguments, and refuse to sue defendants with a reputation of bringing
retaliatory suits against lawyers that sue them.419
If there is a consistent message from courts in this area, it is that ethical
rules—even if applicable to a lawyer’s interaction with third parties—do not
create a cause of action for the third party.420 Except in very limited
circumstances, the lawyer’s legal duties run solely to the client and not to
opposing counsel, the opposing party, or to another third person.421 To
hold otherwise would “create a duty in an attorney which flows both to the
client and to the opposing party seems to be untenable and in diametric
conflict.”422 By interfering with a lawyer’s obligations to their client, the

416. Friedman, 312 N.W.2d at 591–92 (footnotes omitted) (citing Goodman v. Kennedy,
556 P.2d 737, 743 (Cal. 1976)); see also Hurley v. Fuyat, No. 92-5082, 1994 WL 930891, at *14 (R.I.
Jan. 5, 1994) (“Trying to limit this duty to situations where the client’s interest would not be
compromised would create an unworkable standard that could spawn litigation adverse to the client’s
interest.”).
417. Hill, 561 S.W.2d at 334; Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., 750 P.2d
118, 123 (N.M. 1988); see also Martin, 578 S.W.2d at 770 (“The duties set forth in the Code of
Professional Responsibility establish the minimum level of competence required of attorneys for
protection of the public. A violation thereof will not give rise to a private cause of action.” (citing
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Elgin Coal, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 17, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); Hill,
561 S.W.2d at 334; Spencer, 337 So. 2d at 600)).
418. See Friedman, 312 N.W.2d at 592 (“[T]he public policy of maintaining a vigorous adversary
system outweighs the asserted advantages of finding a duty of care to an attorney’s legal opponent.”);
see also Jurek v. Kivell, No. 01–10–00040–CV, 2011 WL 1587375, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Apr. 21, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[In the adversarial system,] a party cannot justifiably
rely on the opposing party’s lawyer representations or silence as a matter of law.” (citing McCamish,
Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 794 (Tex. 1999))).
419. Brody, 267 N.W.2d at 907; Friedman, 312 N.W.2d at 592–93.
420. See Wiseman v. Batchelor, 864 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Ark. 1993) (indicating that the general
duty owed to the public under the Model Rules of Professional conduct does not satisfy the “duty
prerequisite for constructive fraud”).
421. See id. (finding duties that flow both to the client and opposing counsel make little sense).
422. Id. (citing Smith v. Hurd, 699 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Haw. 1988)).
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attorney “would be tentative in his actions out of fear of liability to the
adversary.”423
This does not mean that an opponent is without a remedy for the
misconduct of a lawyer.424 First, there is the possibility of sanctions under
procedural rules—such as Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.425
An opponent can also file a complaint with the appropriate disciplinary
body.426 Third, the common law recognizes causes of action for malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation against attorneys.427 Some
423. Gaide v. Flanagan, No. CV030521353S, 2004 WL 1966313, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Aug. 9, 2004) (citing Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733 (Conn. 1988)).
424. See Robert L. Sullivan, D.D.S., P.C. v. Birmingham, 416 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Mass. App. Ct.
1981) (“While an attorney may be liable in damages to a person injured by his or her misconduct, that
liability must be based on a recognized and independent cause of action and not on ethical violations.”
(citing Slotnick v. Pike, 370 N.E.2d 1006 (Mass. 1977); Rey v. Brown, 357 N.E.2d 343 (Mass. App. Ct.
1976); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (N.D. Iowa), aff’d, 590 F.2d (8th Cir. 1978);
Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 600 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Drago v. Buonagurio, 386 N.E.2d 821,
822 (N.Y. 1978))); Hurley v. Fuyat, No. 92-5082, 1994 WL 930891, at *14 (R.I. Jan. 5, 1994) (“Civil
liability of lawyers to their adversaries is imposed not for negligent conduct but is reserved for
intentional acts of malicious prosecution, fraud, collusion and criminal misconduct.” (citing
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1980); Nat’l Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199–200 (1879);
L & H Airco, Inc. v. Rapistan, 446 N.W.2d 372, 380 (Minn. 1989); Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d 1367,
1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978))).
425. See Unarco Material Handling, Inc. v. Liberato, 317 S.W.3d 227, 239–40 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2010) (dismissing a claim brought by opposing lawyer based on the litigation privilege, but noting there
are sanctions available when a lawyer violates ethical obligations, including Rule 11 sanctions and
disciplinary actions, which the court says creates sufficient “risk of punishment for the errant lawyer . . .
real enough to require that lawyer to beware” (alteration in original) (quoting Finkelstein, Thompson
& Loughran v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 774 A.2d 332, 346 (D.D.C. 2001))); Jurek v. Kivell,
No. 01–10–00040–CV, 2011 WL 1587375, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 21, 2011,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating, in rejecting opponent’s cause of action under the ethical rules, that: “the
offending attorney can still be punished for wrongful litigation conduct by the court in which the
conduct occurred under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure” (citing Bradt & Bradt, P.C. v. West,
892 S.W.2d 56, 72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied))).
426. Magness v. Magness, 558 A.2d 807, 815 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); see also Hurley v. Fuyat,
No. 92-5082, 1994 WL 930891, at *15 (R.I. Jan. 5, 1994) (“It is difficult to imagine more powerful
deterrents to professional misconduct than [disciplinary sanctions,] which carry the attendant risks of
loss of one’s professional reputation and livelihood.”). The Magness court made it clear that the failure
to report an opponent’s misconduct demonstrates that the misconduct must not have been
egregious: “If appellant believes that failure to reveal [certain facts] constitutes a violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, he should file a report [with the appropriate agency] . . . . We assume
counsel’s failure to report these alleged violations is a concession either that they do not pose a violation
or at worst do not raise a substantial question as to fitness.” Magness, 558 A.2d at 815.
427. See Nelson v. Miller, 607 P.2d 438, 451 (Kan. 1980) (“We believe that the public is
adequately protected from harassment and abuse by an unprofessional member of the bar through
means of the traditional cause of action for malicious prosecution. . . . We further hold that a violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not alone create a cause of action against an attorney
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courts have also recognized a cause of action for intentional or negligent
misrepresentation against lawyers for statements relied on by third
parties.428
V. EVALUATING ETHICAL RULES AS STATING A JURISDICTION’S
“PUBLIC POLICY”
Up until this point, this Article has stressed the difference between ethical
and substantive obligations. This section discusses the situation when
courts choose to incorporate ethical standards into substantive law. After
all, ethics rules are traditionally adopted by a state’s highest court
and it is somewhat anomalous that courts should disregard the standards
set out to govern lawyers in evaluating lawyer conduct.429 This issue is
analyzed in two sections. The first is where courts consider whether the
ethical rules as a whole state the public policy of the state. The second
analyzes situations where courts address individual rules to determine
whether a particular rule states the public policy of the state. This
is somewhat of an artificial dichotomy; courts that adopt wholesale the
ethical rules as the “public policy” of the state, still consider on a case-bycase basis whether the unethical conduct has substantive consequences.430

in favor of a third party.”); see also Gaide, 2004 WL 1966313, at *5 (“A plaintiff who has sustained injury
as a result of an attorney’s unauthorized use of the legal process may sue the attorney for abuse of
process.” (citing Mozzochi v. Beck, 529 A.2d 171, 173 (Conn. 1987))); accord Chidnese v. Chidnese,
708 S.E.2d 725, 731 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (“Protection against wrongful litigation is afforded by a cause
of action for either abuse of process or malicious prosecution.” (quoting Stanback v. Stanback,
254 S.E.2d 611, 624 (N.C. 1979))). Regarding defamation specifically, the litigation privilege protects
a lawyer from most statements made during the course of representation. Silberg v. Anderson,
785 P.2d 365, 374 (Cal. 1990). However, some courts have recognized a defamation claim in certain
circumstances—such as when the lawyer sends the content of a complaint (which is protected) to the
press—which some courts hold is not protected. See, e.g., Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67, 70
(Pa. 2004) (reaching the conclusion that the attorney had faxed a copy of the complaint to the press).
428. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivatives & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 609 (S.D. Tex.
2002) (“[W]ith respect to both fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation, Texas
recognizes that an attorney has an established duty to third parties not to make material
misrepresentations on which the attorney ‘knew or had reason-to-expect’ that the parties would rely or
the attorney intended to reach and influence a limited group that might reasonably be expected to have
access to that information and act in reliance on it.”).
429. See, e.g., Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules of Disciplinary
Enforcement . . . .” (citing In re Adoption of M.M.H., 981 A.2d 261, 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009))).
430. See, e.g., id. at 135 (recognizing liability does not come merely from adoption and violation
of the Rules but rather the rules provide a basis for evaluating violations of fiduciary duties—a breach
of common law).
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The distinction is not unimportant; it impacts how courts approach the
cases that are brought.
A. Adopting the Ethics Rules As a Whole As the Public Policy of the Jurisdiction
When courts are faced with an ethical violation in a substantive context,
they take one of two approaches. The first is to determine whether the
ethics rules as a whole reflect the public policy of the state.431 The
second—incorporating rules on a case by case basis—is discussed in the
next section.432 Some courts hold that they do not reflect the public policy
of the state and should only be utilized in disciplinary proceedings.433
Those jurisdictions willing to incorporate ethical obligations into
substantive law take two approaches: wholesale adoption of the ethics rules
as public policy and rule-by-rule adoption.434
The wholesale adoption approach is discussed in this section.435 This
approach essentially incorporates all ethical obligations into substantive
law.436 This approach has the benefit of simplicity—the ethical rules create

431. See, e.g., Kersten v. Van Grack, Axelson & Williamowsky, P.C., 608 A.2d 1270, 1275
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (rejecting the argument that liability stems from the rules because the rules
are not a reflection of the public policy of the state).
432. See infra Part V.B.
433. See id. (“[The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct] are not a reflection of public policy
nor do they provide a basis upon which to impose liability.”); see also Smith, 47 A.3d at 135 (affirming
the rejection of a jury instructions which relied exclusively on ethical rules to establish a fiduciary duty);
State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397, 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (indicating ethical rules are merely “self-imposed
internal regulations prescribing the standards of conduct for members of the bar” and not as a
reflection of public policy (quoting People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Mich. 1979))).
434. See Rich v. Simoni, 772 S.E.2d 327, 327 (W. Va. 2015) (“[W]e must now determine whether
this state’s Rules of Professional Conduct constitute statements of public policy that carry the force
and effect of legislative enactments.”).
435. See Post v. Bregman, 707 A.2d 806, 816 (Md. 1998) (“Unquestionably, so thorough a
regulation of an occupation and professional calling, the integrity of which is vital to nearly every other
institution and endeavor of our society, constitutes an expression of public policy having the force of
law.”); Rich, 772 S.E.2d at 334 (“[W]e have no difficulty recognizing that the Rules of Professional
Conduct may constitute statements of public policy which in turn may carry the equivalent force and
effect as statutes enacted by this state’s legislature.”); see also Turner v. Turner, 73 So. 3d 576, 587 n.4
(Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (Griffis, J., dissenting) (“The Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct are not
simply limited to disciplinary matters. The rules govern the ‘ethical conduct’ of lawyers. If the rules
determine what is ‘ethical conduct’ then certainly the rules can be considered to determine what is or
is not the proper conduct of lawyers.”).
436. See Post, 707 A.2d at 816 (opining that the ethics rules have the “force of law”).
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substantive obligations and limitations.437 The problem with this approach
is that no court actually intends to incorporate every ethics rule into the
substantive pantheon—after all, that would mean that the ethical rules that
run to individuals other than the client (e.g., opposing counsel) would have
the force of law and could be enforced by an injured party.438
The way that courts avoid converting every ethics rule into actionable
standards, is by holding that the ethical rules as a whole establish the public
policy of the state, but then to determine whether, in an individual set of facts,
the ethics rules provide a remedy.439 These courts essentially adopt an
equitable approach to analyzing disputes.440 The Maryland Supreme Court,
after stating that the rules set out the public policy of the state, adopted a
seven factor test to determine whether a particular violation would justify
court intervention or whether the matter should be left to disciplinary
authorities:
[L]ook to all of the circumstances—whether the rule was, in fact, violated, and
if violated[:] (1) the nature of the alleged violation, (2) how the violation came
about, (3) the extent to which the parties acted in good faith, (4) whether the
lawyer raising the defense is at least equally culpable as the lawyer against
whom the defense is raised and whether the defense is being raised simply to
escape an otherwise valid contractual obligation, (5) whether the violation has
some particular public importance, such that there is a public interest in not
enforcing the agreement, (6) whether the client, in particular, would be
harmed by enforcing the agreement, and, in that regard, if the agreement is
found to be so violative of the Rule as to be unenforceable, whether all or part
of the disputed amount should be returned to the client on the ground that,
to that extent, the fee is unreasonable, and (7) any other relevant
considerations.441

437. See, e.g., Rich, 772 S.E.2d at 336 (Benjamin, J., concurring) (adopting the ethical codes as a
“prudent check on the public policy exception to employment at-will” (quoting Rocky Mt. Hosp. &
Medical Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1996))).
438. See Post, 707 A.2d at 819 (addressing concerns that purpose of the rules might be
“subverted” and used as “procedural weapons” by opposing parties (quoting MD. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT Scope (adopted 1986))).
439. See id. (requiring courts to look at “all of the circumstances” when a party is attempting to
use a professional conduct rule as a defense).
440. See id. (“We view a violation of [the Rule] . . . as being in the nature of an equitable defense,
and principles of equity ought to be applied.”).
441. Id. (footnote omitted).
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The Maryland approach provides an answer to the difficult issue of what
it means for the rules to be a statement of the state’s “public policy.”442
The traditional meaning of this term is that a principle is so important that
a violation will not be countenanced by the state.443 Under this modified
approach the question becomes whether, in the application of the ethical
rules, the public policy of the state has been violated.444
A federal court in Florida, attempting to interpret Florida law and faced
with contradictory opinions across the state (some interpreting the ethical
rules as substantive policy and others refusing to invalidate unethical
agreements) adopted what appears to be a similar equity-based approach.445
The court held, that when evaluating an unethical fee agreement, in order
for the agreement to be unenforceable under substantive law the ethical
violation must be “material and substantial” and “not merely technical or
insignificant.”446 It appears that no subsequent court to date in Florida has
embraced this substantial versus technical standard or provided an
explanation of what these terms mean.
Using equitable principles has the benefit of allowing courts arguably to
reach the “right” result in individual cases.447 The downsides to this
approach, however, are significant. First, and foremost, it inserts a
tremendous amount of uncertainty into every transaction that could be
considered unethical but not unenforceable as a matter of substantive
law.448 Going into a transaction, lawyers cannot know whether a contract
442. See id. at 816 (finding these rules have the force of law).
443. See id. at 815 (“It is established in Maryland that a contractual provision that is in violation
of public policy, to the extent of the conflict, is invalid and unenforceable.” (citing State Farm
Mut. v. Nationwide Mut., 516 A.2d 586 (Md. 1986); Walsh v. Hibberd, 89 A. 396 (Md. 1913))).
444. See id. at 819 (determining whether Rule 1.5 had been violated).
445. State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., No. 97–7014–CV, 2004 WL
5500705, at *22 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2004).
446. Id.
447. The Post case involved a fee sharing agreement in which two attorneys agreed to share a
fee 40% and 60%. Post, 707 A.2d at 807–08. Ultimately, it was determined that the fee sharing
agreement was unethical because one of the attorneys, Bregman, did not perform that percentage of
the work in the case (and no other exception applied). Id. at 828 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). The
majority remands for the trial court to determine whether the agreement should be enforced or whether
the “equitable defense” that the agreement was unethical should invalidate the agreement. Id. at 819
(majority opinion). Justice Chasanow notes that this could result in attorney Post ultimately receiving
all of the fee (and hence more than the percentage of work he put into the case). Id. at 828 (Chasanow,
J., dissenting). “Isn’t allowing Post to keep more of the fee than he can prove he earned at least as
unethical as allowing Bregman to recover more of the fee than he can prove he earned?” Id.
448. See id. (“This vague, amorphous ‘equitable’ test for contract enforcement is not the law
anywhere else, and is at best problematic. For example, what variance between an ethical fee and the
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is unenforceable because it is unethical and inequitable, or whether it is
enforceable although unethical, because equities weigh in favor of
enforcement. More important than lawyers, however, are clients. Clients
will have no idea what it means for a lawyer’s conduct to be unethical, much
less understand that in certain situations unethical conduct will be condoned
by the court so long as the equities weigh in the lawyer’s favor.449 This
approach seems to undermine the very purpose of the ethical rules, which
are to provide clear guidance to lawyers (and clients) as to what is proper
and improper.450 What could provide less guidance than one court
enforcing an unethical contract because equity demands it while another
court refusing to enforce that same contract because the equities weigh in
favor of the lawyer?
In a subsequent case, the Maryland Supreme Court was faced with the
question of whether a division of fees between a law firm and a non-lawyer
should allow the client to “claw back” that portion of the fee paid to the
non-lawyer.451 The court, applying the Post standard, found that, even if
the agreement was unethical the equities did not weigh in favor of
invalidating the entire fee agreement—requiring the firm to disgorge the
entire fee.452 In concurrence, Justice Chasanow challenged the court’s
reliance on equitable principles in deciding the case.453 Chasanow reasoned
that the question the court should be focused on is whether the fee
agreement could be invalidated under traditional common law contract
defenses, such as whether the agreement was acquired in a fraudulent
manner, and not based on ethical rules.454
Similar issues arise in the criminal context. In fact, there is an entire
ethical rule dedicated to ensuring that a prosecutor acts ethically in relation
actual contractual fee would constitute an “insubstantial” difference justifying enforcement of the
unethical agreement?”).
449. See id. (finding the lawyers fee appropriate based on the amount of legal work performed).
450. See id. at 819 (majority opinion) (citing MD. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (adopted
1986)).
451. See Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 709 A.2d 112, 113 (Md. 1998) (“The
issues now before us arise from the manner and circumstances under which the settlement proceeds
were distributed . . . .”).
452. See id. at 123 (“On this record, we can find no equitable basis for requiring the firm to
disgorge that fee, even if the payment to Ms. Park were found to be in violation of Rule 5.4 or
Rule 7.2.”).
453. Id. at 124 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
454. See id. (“The instant case is a contractual dispute. Traditional contract law should be
applied. Neither court created ‘public policy,’ nor any vague ‘equitable’ balancing should be substituted
for established contractual principles.”).
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to a criminal defendant.455 When a prosecutor violates these rules, does it
constitute a violation of the defendant’s rights that justify suppression of
evidence or reversal of a conviction? If the ethical obligations mirrored the
constitutional standards, this question would be easy to answer. However,
a prosecutor can violate ethical obligations without also violating a
defendant’s constitutional rights.456 A Wisconsin federal district court
seemed to add an equitable twist to the traditional analysis in United
States v. Acosta.457 The court noted that a court has two avenues for acting
to suppress evidence.458 The first is the constitutional standard that, if it is
violated, would require action.459 The second is the “supervisory powers”
of courts “to protect their integrity” by refusing to condone unethical
conduct that is “egregious, highly improper, or unconscionable.”460 Stated
another way—using ethical obligations as a basis for determining
substantive rights under the guise of the court’s inherent powers.461
B. Analyzing Individual Rules As Statements of Public Policy
Most courts do not fully incorporate ethical obligations into the public
policy of the jurisdiction (and then decide the cases on a case-by-case
basis).462 Most courts make the determination on a rule-by-rule basis.463
When faced with a particular rule violation, the court determines whether

455. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
456. See United States v. Acosta, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (indicating the
court may use its supervisory powers to suppress evidence instances where misconduct does not give
way to constitutional violations).
457. United States v. Acosta, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
458. See id. at 1095 (“The supervisory power, like the exclusionary rule, has a twofold purpose
of deterring misconduct and protecting judicial integrity . . . .”).
459. Id.
460. Id. at 1095, 1097.
461. See id. at 1096 (“[T]here is nothing in the nature of a court’s supervisory powers that would
allow a court to suppress evidence to enforce some but not all of its own procedures.”).
462. See Cooper, supra note 157, at 277 (“[L]awyer code provisions may also be relevant as an
expression of public policy of the jurisdiction with respect to . . . enforceability of transactions entered
into[.]” (quoting Alex B. Long, Attorney-Client Fee Agreements that Offend Public Policy, 61 S.C. L. REV. 287,
300 (2009))).
463. See Gillespie v. Hernden, 516 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied)
(“Although the Rules ‘do not define standards of civil liability of lawyers,’ the Texas Supreme Court
and our sister courts have looked to the Rules for guidance in determining whether a specific situation
violated the public polic[y] . . . .” (citing Royston, Vickery, & Williams, L.L.P. v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d
494, 503 (Tex. 2015))).
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the individual rule defines the public policy of the state.464 If it is
determined that the ethical standard does state public policy, it is
incorporated as a new substantive obligation—creating a claim or defense
in tort or contract.465
In a sense, using the principles set out in ethical rules to impose new
obligations onto lawyers makes sense. Such rules have been extensively
vetted by states (and by the ABA if the new rule is based on the Model
Rules).466 They often arise because of new circumstances or situations that
were not adequately addressed in the past.467 Therefore, looking to ethical
rules to determine the extent of new substantive obligations is both
understandable and appropriate. From a lay person’s standpoint, however,
it is little solace to say that a lawyer’s unethical conduct is not sufficiently
significant to rise to the level of public policy of the state.468 The problem,
of course, is identifying those ethical obligations sufficiently important to
state the public policy of the state.469 In addition, courts should always be
464. See id. at 545–46 (analyzing the law and taking into consideration the particular situation in
the context of the rule and the public policy).
465. See id. at 547 (“[T]he Rules do not create standards of civil liability for attorneys, but courts
may examine the Rules to discern the policies and protections embodied in them as an aid in deciding
questions of attorney civil liability.” (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble,
reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (West 2016);
Hoover Slovacek L.L.P. v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2006); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d
312, 317–19 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ))); Counsel Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. Leibowitz,
No. 13-12-00103-CV, 2013 WL 3895331, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 25, 2013, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (“[A] court may deem the disciplinary rules to be an expression of public policy, so that a
contract violating them is unenforceable as against public policy.” (citing Garcia v. Garza, 311 S.W.3d
28, 43 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied); Cruse v. O’Quinn, 273 S.W.3d 766, 775
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); Dardas v. Flemming, Hovenkamp & Grayson,
P.C., 194 S.W.3d 603, 613 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied))).
466. See, e.g., Green v. Green, 437 S.E.2d 457, 461–62 (Ga. 1993) (Sears-Collins, J., concurring
specially) (citing Stevens v. Thomas, 361 S.E.2d 800 (Ga. 1987)) (analyzing the meaning and
applicability of a Georgia ethical rule in the context of the ABA Model Rules).
467. See, e.g., Engelman, supra note 188, at 920 (“It is submitted, that in order to meet the rapid
increase in legal malpractice actions, the standards by which attorney misconduct is measured must
and are changing through an expanded use of the Model Code and the Model Rules in civil litigation.”).
468. See Green, 437 S.E.2d at 459 (majority opinion) (“[L]ay persons sincerely believe that when
a justiciable issue arises, if they so desire they will be accorded their ‘day in court.’ . . . [W]hen these
expectations are not fulfilled, there is understandable discontent with our system of justice.” (quoting
Evanoff v. Evanoff, 418 S.E.2d 62, 63 (Ga. 1992) (per curiam))).
469. See generally id. at 459–60 (illustrating how a court overturns a judgment because a lawyer
acts unethically). In Green, Justice Sears-Collins’ concurrence expressed concern that the court is
opening itself up to having to evaluate which professionalism standards are “more important than
others, [with] some transgressions as more unprofessional than others” and stating that courts should
leave discipline to disciplinary bodies. Id. at 462 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring specially).
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conscious of the criticism that some ethical rules are intended to protect the
interests of lawyers—and adopting them as a standard of public policy could
provide less protection to a client than public policy would demand.470
In Kaplan v. Pavalon & Gifford,471 the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois
law, was faced with the question of whether an oral fee sharing agreement
was enforceable.472 The court began with a test of whether the agreement
would violate Illinois public policy.473 The court then defines what is
against public policy as an action that is
injurious to the interests of the public, contravenes some established interest
in society, violates some public statute, is against good morals, tends to
interfere with the public welfare or safety, or is at war with the interests of
society or is in conflict with the morals at the time.474

The court goes on to identify decisions by the Illinois Supreme Court in
which the court held that oral fee sharing agreements are unenforceable—
and therefore held that was the public policy in the state.475 The Seventh
Circuit was bound by the decision issued by the Illinois Supreme Court
interpreting Illinois law.476 However, state courts facing the issue of
whether public policy should be incorporated into the substantive law
should be especially diligent when analyzing whether the alleged violation
actually violates the state’s public policy.477 The analysis should be the same
as in other situations where courts use public policy to invalidate
transactions or conduct.478 This is because the consequence of such a
finding is that future violations will also be found to violate public policy—
470. See id. at 459 (majority opinion) (noting the expectation of non-lawyers that they will be
afforded some remedy when they are wronged by their lawyers, and the discontent such an absence of
remedy causes (citing Evanoff, 418 S.E.2d at 62–63 (Benham, J., concurring))).
471. Kaplan v. Pavalon & Gifford, 12 F.3d 87 (7th Cir. 1993).
472. Id. at 89.
473. Id.
474. Id. (quoting Marvin N. Benn & Assocs. v. Nelsen Steel & Wire Inc., 437 N.E.2d 900, 903
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).
475. See id. at 91–92 (“According to the [Illinois Supreme] [C]ourt, the requirements set forth
in that rule now represent the public policy of Illinois and require fee-sharing agreements between
attorneys for referrals to be in writing . . . .”).
476. Id. at 92.
477. See Cooper, supra note 157, at 299 (showing three examples why professional rules “should
be considered ‘public policy’”).
478. See, e.g., Rich v. Simoni, 772 S.E.2d 327, 335 (W. Va. 2015) (holding conduct, such as
splitting attorney’s fees between an attorney and non-attorney, and which is in violation of a rule of
professional conduct, violates public policy and is therefore void).
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either invalidating contracts or leading to liability.479 These decisions
should not be made lightly.
In Garfinkel, P.A. v. Mager,480 the Florida Court of Appeals addressed
whether the prohibition on settlement agreements limiting a lawyer’s future
practice (Rule 5.6) was a statement of public policy that would invalidate
those provisions of a settlement agreement as a matter of public policy.481
Public policy is only implicated when the action is “clearly injurious to the
public good or contravene[s] some established interest of society.”482 To
make that determination, the court analyzed the underlying purpose of the
rule.483 The court concluded that the Rule 5.6 prohibition was not so
fundamental to the public policy of the state that it would invalidate any
agreement containing such a restriction.484
Courts faced with a claim that a rule contravenes public policy should be
determined to set out the public policy of the jurisdiction. This should be a
systematic analysis under traditional standards to evaluate whether an ethical
rule rises to the level of sufficient importance that, to violate it, would violate
the public policy of the state.485 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
recommends a balancing test to evaluate a jurisdiction’s public policy.486 It
encourages a consideration of whether the statement is necessary to protect
some aspect of the public welfare, and a balancing of the interests impacted
by enforcing and not enforcing the agreement.487 Whether adopting the
Restatement approach or following the jurisdiction’s established standards,
479. See Counsel Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. Leibowitz, No. 13–12–00103–CV, 2013 WL 3895331,
at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 25, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (acknowledging several cases
where a violation of disciplinary rules deemed the applicable contract unenforceable).
480. Garfinkel v. Mager, 57 So. 3d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
481. Id. at 223–24.
482. Id. at 224 (quoting Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Williams, 17 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla. 1944)) (citing
Fla. Windstorm Underwriting v. Gajwani, 934 So. 2d 501, 506–07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
483. Id.
484. See id. at 225–26 (identifying the competing interests involved in the case and noting that
the parties, in their agreement, had contemplated these interests and the agreement “reflects a reasoned
effort to balance the aforesaid competing public policy interests and would not be injurious to the
public good or otherwise contrary to public policy”). The Florida Supreme Court is not hesitant to
discipline a lawyer for this same conduct. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So. 2d 108, 121 (Fla. 2007)
(demonstrating how an attorney was disbarred for (among other things) entering into a settlement
agreement that violated Rule 5.6).
485. See, e.g., Rich v. Simoni, 772 S.E.2d 327, 332 (W. Va. 2015) (“We begin our analysis by
reviewing the authority which supports a finding that the Rules of Professional Conduct are statements
of public policy.”).
486. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
487. Id.
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the key is to determine whether a particular ethical standard is so important
that a court is willing to find that a violation makes the transaction void as
against public policy and unenforceable.488 In making this finding courts
should be conscious of future cases that may come before the court.489 A
holding that an unethical action violates public policy in one case creates a
precedent that should be followed in future cases where the equities are not
as clear; for example, where a lawyer is benefited by a court’s refusal to
enforce an unethical agreement.490
In making the determination of which rules are and are not part of the
public policy of the state, courts should also keep in mind the fact that a
number of rules are set out in terms of “may” or “should” and not “must”
or “shall.”491 The mandatory rules are those in which the adopting body
has viewed as requiring affirmative action on the part of a lawyer and have
an increased likelihood of rising to the level of public policy.492
For example, in Capozzi v. Latsha & Capozzi,493 the Pennsylvania court
was faced with an agreement restricting a lawyer’s right to practice after
leaving a firm—an agreement which is unethical under Rule 5.6(b).494 The
court determined that the prohibition did not state the public policy of
Pennsylvania and was enforceable.495 In making this determination, the
court analyzed the purpose of the ethical restriction—to ensure that clients
are not limited in their ability to choose lawyers and to prevent the practice
of law from becoming merely a business.496 The court then analyzed the
restriction in the context of current law practice, in which lawyers frequently
change firms and take clients and the fact that today it is assumed that law
488. See Rich, 772 S.E.2d at 335 (finding the rule prohibiting fee sharing with non-lawyers is
“void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable”).
489. See id. (emphasizing the need to continue diligent review and directing the court to submit
a copy of the opinion to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel).
490. See, e.g., id. at 334 (“‘[B]y refusing in every case to assist the lay party, courts may deter lay
persons as well as attorneys from attempting such agreements’ and ‘in this way, the public will be
protected more effectively from the potential harms posed by fee-sharing agreements[.]’” (quoting
O’Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld & Kempster, 537 N.E.2d 730, 737–38 (Ill. 1989))).
491. Id. at 333 (quoting Gaddy Eng’g Co. v. Bowles Rice McDavid, 746 S.E.2d 568, 581 (W. Va.
2013) (Loughry, J., concurring)) (citing Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. 1997)); Cooper, supra
note 157, at 287.
492. Rich, 772 S.E.2d at 334.
493. Capozzi v. Latsha & Capozzi P.C., No. 99-3981, 2001 WL 34644543 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
Feb. 27, 2001).
494. Id. at *502–03.
495. Id. at *510–11.
496. Id. at *507–08 (quoting Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1994)).
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practices operate as businesses, and to create a substantive restriction on these
type of freely entered into agreements would run counter to the current
reality of practice in today’s firm.497 Therefore, the court held that such an
ethical restriction does not establish the public policy of the state.498 Instead,
the court held that such non-compete agreements will be subject to the same
substantive requirements/limitations as non-compete agreements in other
contexts.499
VI. CONCLUSION: A SUMMARY
This Article has attempted to provide an overview of the different
approaches taken by courts in evaluating the interaction of ethical rules and
substantive obligations. This concluding section will pull everything
together and provide a summary of how courts have addressed these issues
and provide some guidance on how, in the future, courts faced with these
issues should respond.
First is the situation where the plaintiff relies solely on the ethical rules to
establish the duty owed or to escape liability under a contract. Reliance
solely on the ethics rules—without framing the complaint in traditional
common law claims or defenses—should result in dismissal of the case.500
In these cases, the parties are attempting to have courts determine that an
ethical violation has occurred without first going through the established
disciplinary process. For example, where a client merely cites to the rule
addressing business transactions with a client (Rule 1.8(a)) and argues that a
violation of that rule also invalidates the underlying transactions, the court

497. Id.
498. See id. at *510 (finding, “as a matter of public policy,” that attorneys in Pennsylvania could
enter into agreements such as that at issue in the case).
499. See id. (presenting the standards set by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for
non-compete agreements (citing Piercing Pagoda Inc. v. Hoffner, 351 A.2d 207 (Pa. 1976))). But see
Adams v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., No. 96-2473-CIV, 2001 WL 34032759, at *9 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(invalidating a settlement agreement that restricted a lawyer’s representation of defendant’s employees
for a period of time).
500. See Holton v. State, No. 8:07-cv-43-T-24EAJ, 2007 WL 951726, at *3–4 (N.D. Fla.
Mar. 28, 2007) (“A motion to dismiss should be granted where ‘the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45–46 (1957))); Gatz Props. L.L.C. v. Preston, No. N13C–02–089 EMD, 2014 WL 1725822, at *10
(Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2014) (“[T]he use of the Rules as a legal standard to show an independent
breach of a duty would be directly contrary to . . . the Scope of the Rules.” (quoting Flaig v. Ferrara,
No. 90C-11-095 WTQ, 1996 WL 944860, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 1996))).
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correctly rejected the defense.501 However, in that case if the client had
made the required showing of how the transaction was invalid under the
common law rules addressing agreements between fiduciaries,502 or how
the transaction violates public policy,503 the outcome would have been
different. Courts should be conscious however, that some of the ethics rules
overlap with the substantive common law obligations of a lawyer. For
example, a lawyer owes a client a duty of loyalty as a matter of substantive
law.504 This includes the obligation to avoid conflicts of interest and a duty
to maintain client confidentiality.505 A complaint that sufficiently states a
breach of these fiduciary duties (even if it also cites to ethical obligations)
should not be dismissed if the complaint would state a claim even without
citation to the rules.506 Furthermore, during litigation, the plaintiff’s expert
should be allowed to cite to the appropriate rule of professional conduct in
501. See, e.g., Buffalo v. Blackmon, No. CA 93-115, 1994 WL 14583, at *2–3 (Ark. Ct. App.
Jan. 12, 1994) (failing to find error in a chancery court decision declining to permit a cause of action
under Rule 1.8(a)).
502. Id. at *3. In Buffalo the client had previously conceded the fairness of the transaction and
therefore could not argue that it was invalid solely because Rule 1.8(a) was violated. Id.; see also Cost
Saver Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Napolitano, No. CV 10-2015-JST (CWx), 2011 WL 13119439, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
June 7, 2011) (dismissing a complaint that merely alleged that lawyer violated Rule 4.2 (prohibiting
contact with represented persons)).
503. See Kaplan v. Pavalon & Gifford, 12 F.3d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1993) (determining a fee-sharing
agreement is unenforceable because it violated public policy).
504. See Destefano & Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, No. 2775JUNETERM2000, 2001 WL 1807790
at *5 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 9, 2001) (suggesting a breach of fiduciary duty can be brought with a tort
action in addition to breaching ethics rules); Maritrans G.P., Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz,
602 A.2d 1277, 1283 (Pa. 1992) (establishing that an attorney’s failure to perform their fiduciary duty,
such as loyalty, and refrain from getting involved in conflict of interest can be actionable).
505. See, e.g., Maritrans, 602 A.2d at 1283 (stressing how the United States Supreme Court stated
“[t]here are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than those of
attorney and client” (quoting Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850))).
506. See Booth v. Davis, No. 10–CV–4010–SAC, 2010 WL 4160116, at *8 (D. Kan.
Apr. 31, 2010) (“The court has reviewed the complaint and finds that it does not portend to state a
separate claim for defendant’s violation of Rule 1.8(g) . . . , although it cites that rule in support of its
claim of breach of common law fiduciary duty. Attorney conduct[,] which violates an ethics rule may
also violate an independent legal duty and a cause of action may ensue. It is the violation of the
independent legal duty, not the ethics rule, that gives rise to a tort cause of action.” (citation omitted)
(citing Wasserstrom v. Appelson, No. 87–0277–CV–W–1, 1988 WL 878409, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 15,
1988))); Gatz Props. L.L.C. v. Preston, No. N13C–02–089 EMD, 2014 WL 1725822, at *10
(Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2014) (granting plaintiff the authority to replead its claim to assert a legal
malpractice claim independent of a violation of ethical rules); see also Elkind v. Bennett, 958 So. 2d
1088, 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (restating that a claim can survive regardless of it including an
ethical rule); Owen v. Pringle, 621 So. 2d 668, 671 (Miss. 1993) (“[C]ase law establishes a civil cause of
action independent of . . . the Professional Rules . . . .”).
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both their expert opinion and in their testimony so long as the rules correctly
state the preexisting common law duty.507 This is where courts often have
difficulty and may tend to want to exclude expert citation to the rules
all-together. While it may be true that some rules are properly not referred
to, it is inappropriate to exclude reference to all rules because citation to
some rules would be inappropriate.
Second, if the plaintiff relies on the ethics rules to supplement their
claims, citation to the rules is appropriate so long as the plaintiff’s claim rests
upon an established common law foundation. In these situations, the
citation to the rule is not to establish liability of the lawyer; if the rules were
removed, the claim would stand on its own. The Pennsylvania case
Maritrans G.P., Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz508 provides an appropriate
analysis.509 In Maritrans the trial court, relying on the prohibition in
Paragraph 20, dismissed a breach of fiduciary claim where the
plaintiff/client cited to the ethical rules in the complaint.510 On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint without analyzing whether the complaint cites a common law
breach of fiduciary duty independent of the Model Rules.511 As the court
recognized, by simply dismissing the case because of the cite to ethical
obligations, the trial court essentially made the lawyer immune from liability
for his wrongful conduct:
At common law, an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to his client; such a duty
demands undivided loyalty and prohibits the attorney from engaging in
conflicts of interest, and breach of such duty is actionable. The Superior
Court here emasculated these common law principles, in effect turning the

507. See Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y v. Dotey, No. 91C-06-088, 1994 WL 146370, at *2 (Del.
Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 1994) (“To the extent that the Rules express substantive duties imposed on lawyers
by the common law, there is no reason that the Rules may not be referred to by an expert witness to
buttress his or her conclusion that a lawyer has violated such duty. Indeed, in my view, to deny an
injured party such reference is to subvert the purpose of the Rules.”).
508. Maritrans G.P., Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).
509. Id. at 1283. The court also noted that disregarding the common law fiduciary obligations,
the trial court “elevated attorneys above the law and granted to them greater rights and protection than
are enjoyed by another fiduciaries in this Commonwealth.” Id.
510. Id. at 1282.
511. Id.
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ethical or disciplinary rules governing lawyers into a grant of civil immunity
for conduct which has been condemned from time immemorial.512

Courts should avoid the mistake of the trial court in Maritrans.
Paragraph 20 is not meant to be used by lawyers to avoid obligations that
existed prior to the enactment of the rules (or rules that are adopted as the
substantive law of the jurisdiction). The rules also do not eliminate the
notice pleading standard for complaints.513 If a complaint alleges
malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty, a court should analyze the complaint
in light of background common law principles of those claims.514 If the
complaint does not sufficiently plead a common law claim, a citation to the
rules of professional conduct will not save it.515 However, if the elements
of a claim are pled, then citation to the rules of professional conduct should
not be used to defeat it.516 The fact that a lawyer may also be subject to
disciplinary action for the same conduct does not mean that the lawyer is
not also civilly liable.517
To the extent that a claimant argues that the ethical rules state the
substantive law of the jurisdiction, as a matter of public policy courts should
address this claim head-on. It may be that a rule does establish the public
policy of the jurisdiction and the court should explain why. This is an
512. Id. at 1283 (citations omitted) (first citing Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232 (1850); then citing
Woods v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941); and then citing T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
513. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (indicating pleadings should be “simple, concise, and direct”).
514. See Maritrans, 602 A.2d at 1284 (noting that the power of the court to address conflicts of
interest dates back to the early 1900s—before the adoption of ethical rules in the state).
515. See id. at 1285 (discussing the flawed logic of the superior court in dismissing the claim
where there were independent grounds in tort law to save the claim).
516. See Bronzich v. Persels & Assocs., L.L.C., No. CV–10–0364–EFS, 2011 WL 2119372,
at *11 (E.D. Wash. May 27, 2011) (“[T]he court rules that Plaintiffs may not rely on an RPC violation
to support their breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. This prohibition, however, does not equate to
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim. The . . . Complaint alleges sufficient facts to plausibly show that the
Attorney Defendants breached their duty of loyalty [to their client.]”); Destefano & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Cohen, No. 2775JUNETERM2000, 2001 WL 1807790, at *5 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 9, 2001)
(acknowledging that a party may bring a cause of action for “breach of fiduciary duty and negligence”
although the actions may also be a breach of ethical obligations).
517. Maritrans, 602 A.2d at 1284.
While the breach by a lawyer of his duty to keep the confidences of his client and avoid
representing conflicting interests may be the subject of appropriate disciplinary action, a court is
not bound to await such a development before acting to restrain improper conduct where it is
disclosed in a case pending in that court.
Id. (quoting Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 338 A.2d 584, 589 (Pa. 1975)).
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important determination and should not be taken lightly. Determining that
a particular ethical obligation states the substantive law of the jurisdiction
can have significant impacts on lawyer liability and practice. In determining
whether a particular rule reflects a jurisdiction’s public policy, courts should
consider traditional common law principles and the present realities of law
practice. Every state has a different formulation of what constitutes the
public policy of the jurisdiction.518 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
described the consideration this way:
Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents
and not from general considerations of supposed public interest. As the term
‘public policy’ is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law of
the sovereignty to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to that
policy . . . . Only dominant public policy would justify such action. In the
absence of a plain indication of that policy through long governmental
practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical or moral
standards, the Court should not assume to declare contracts . . . contrary to
public policy.519

Once a court has completed this analysis to determine whether a
substantive claim or defense lies, the court should then analyze whether the
court has an ethical obligation to report the lawyer to the appropriate
disciplinary body. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to report
lawyers when the judge “ha[s] knowledge that a lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects[.]”520 To make the disciplinary process effective
and efficient, judges should satisfy this obligation; as a self-governing body,
the role of judges is critical.
In contract cases the court has three choices. The first choice is to reject
any use of the rules. The second is to allow the rules to be used as some
518. See Bronzich, 2011 WL 2119372, at *10 (establishing that both breach of fiduciary duty and
malpractice claims are not supported by the Model Rules); Owen v. Pringle, 621 So. 2d 668, 671
(Miss. 1993) (establishing a Mississippi court defines civil causes of action as separate from the Model
Rules); Douglas-Peters v. Cho, Choe & Holen P.C., No. 05-15-01538-CV, 2017 WL 836848, at *20
(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 3, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing how public policy is examined under
a specific situation and are not set standards).
519. Heller v. Pa. League of Cities & Muns., 32 A.3d 1213, 1220–21 (Pa 2011) (quoting
Burstein v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa. 2002)).
520. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.15(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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evidence to establish a defense to enforcement of a contract.521 Third, the
court can determine that the rules are significantly important because they
state the public policy of the jurisdiction.522 If a court adopts the first or
second approach, the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that a
common law defense to the contract exists to invalidate it.523
The Paragraph 20 paradox exists and will continue to create challenges
for courts attempting to determine the appropriate role of ethics rules in
substantive disputes. This Article has attempted to draw out the various
contexts where courts might face the paradox and to provide a systematic
approach to addressing the thorny questions raised.

521. See Douglas-Peters, 2017 WL 836848, at *20–21 (noting that the court “may examine the
Disciplinary Rules”).
522. See id. (“[C]ourts look to the Disciplinary Rules for guidance when determining whether a
specific situation violated the public policy protections embodied in the Disciplinary Rules.”).
523. See id. at 20–24 (analyzing whether an allegedly unethical contingency fee agreement was
unenforceable because the agreement was unconscionable).

